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ORGANISATIONAL SOCIAL CAPITAL AND LEADERSHIP COMPETENCE IN LOAN RECOVERY IN MICRO-CREDIT PROJECTS IN UGANDA

MWESIGWA SIMON[1] **& HASHIM, UTHMAN**[2]

ABSTRACT

Trust, mutual understanding and shared values are believed to be the virtues against which human networks and communities are built for achievement of cooperative goals. Leadership enables teams to be productive and achieve their goals. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between organizational social capital and leadership competence in loan recovery in micro-credit projects. Study employed a cross-sectional survey design and data from 128 respondents was collected. The data was analyzed using chi-square tests, rotated component factor analysis, correlations, regression and ANOVA. Findings revealed that there was a significant positive relationship between organizational social capital and leadership competence. This means that people with organizational social capital also share leadership competence. The results showed that the statistically significant predictors of loan recovery are organizational social capital and leadership competence. This means that even without other factors, organizational social capital alone or leadership competence alone will greatly influence loan recovery in micro-credit projects. The results imply that there is need for managers of micro-credit projects to recognize and uphold organizational social capital among micro-credit project group members. Significantly still, the managers and leaders of micro-credit groups should develop leadership competence because this too was found to be a statistically significant predictor of loan recovery.

Keywords: *Organizational social capital, leadership competence, loan recovery, micro-credit*

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Introduction

There is a wide acceptance that the private sector is the engine of development especially in the developing countries. In order to boost their operations, individuals have organized themselves into small groups in order to access small loans from micro finance institutions. These micro finance small groupings are found in the urban, peri-urban and rural areas in Uganda. It is a requirement that for any group to register and access the micro-credit funds, it must have a minimum number of members most commonly ten (10). Each member must be the others' surety as they get the loan.

Characteristic of these groups is lack of social trust among the members, who sometimes show businesses of other people disguising them as their own for the sake of getting the loan, leading to inappropriate assessment of capacity to pay back. Typical of the members of these groups is the lack of mutual cooperation; there is no formal controlling and monitoring system or a reward system which penalizes non-cooperative behavior of a single member; if a member fails to pay, it is the rest of the group members to clear off his/her loan amount plus the accrued interest.

There is lack of the stock of active connections among people; the trust, mutual understanding and shared values and behavior that bind the members of human networks and communities, and make cooperative actions possible (Cohen and Prusak, 2001). This makes them loosely accountable to each other. Each of these groups has a group leader who is responsible for organizing and mobilizing the members plus overseeing their business activities. This involves convening group meeting and monitoring performance in terms of loan repayment. Unfortunately these group leaders do not receive thorough leadership and financial management skills training to be able to handle such complexity of a large group.

This leads to loss of millions of the organization's money in form of bad debts. For instance it was found out that the rate of recovery is 20-39% in most of the groups, leading to a 69-80% loss of the organization's funds. When such groups fall short of the above, couple with lack of appropriate training in skills to support pre-loan disbursement and post-disbursement, poor management of savings and credit operations, it leads to failure in loan recovery.

Organizational social capital

Cohen and Prusak, (2001) contend that organizational social capital refers to the stock of active connections among people; the trust, mutual understanding and shared values and behavior that bind the members of human networks and communities, and make cooperative actions possible. Putman (1993) defines Organizational Social Capital as the features of social organization such as trust, norms and networks that improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions. Social Capital cannot be traded on an open market; rather, it is a form of capital that can change overtime, the supply of which increases rather than decreases with use (Hirshman 1984).

However, Lin (2001) defines Organizational Social Capital as resources embedded in an organizational social structure that are accessed and mobilized in purposive actions. It is valuable because it solves problems of coordination, reduces transaction cost, and facilitates the flow of information between and among individuals (Lazega and Pattison, 2001). Organizational social capital concerns interpersonal relationships in social systems. It has both relational dimension and cognitive dimension. The relational dimension focuses on the effective quality of the connections between individuals in an organization. The cognitive dimension concerns the extent to which employees within a social network share a common perspective or understanding. Organizational social capital is valuable because it solves problems of coordination, reduces transaction cost, and facilitates the flow of information between and among individuals (Lazega & Pattison, 2001). Organizational social capital refers to those stocks of social trust, norms and networks that people can draw upon to solve common problems.

Leadership competence

Armstrong (1999) defines leadership as the ability to persuade others to behave differently. He goes on to say that team leadership enables teams to be productive and achieve their goals with the help of the members themselves. Leadership is the ability to influence a group towards the achievement of goals (Robbins, 1992). This is in agreement with Newstrom (1993) who defines leadership as the process of influencing and supporting others to work enthusiastically towards achieving objectives. Effective team leadership is that that is conducive or facilitative enough to achieving team tasks. It is the nature of social organization that we must have leaders at all levels because they play certain key roles.

Competences are used in the workplace to perform a variety of behavior and activities, which in turn produces outputs (products and services) that are provided to others (Pickett, 1998). The quality of these outputs and the reactions of those that receive it lead to results-job performance with positive, negative or neutral consequences for the organization. A competence is a relationship between the employee and his/her task environment (Munene, Bbosa & Ebonyu, 2005). When an individual maneuvers the environment in which he is and becomes successful, then he has the competence. Operant competences are specific skills, knowledge, attitudes and behavior necessary to fulfill a task (Munene, 2004). The major function of operant competence analysis and profiling is to uncover the behavior, decisions, roles and role relationships implied in tacit knowledge and complexity that comprise all workplace expertise (Munene et al, 2005). Operant competence analysis and profiling is associated with customization of managerial decision making to the work context through the removal of ambiguities found in management theory and practice (Munene, Bbosa and Ebonyu, 2004). A competence is a measurable characteristic of a person that is related to success at work. It may be a behavioral skill, a technical skill, an attribute, or an attitude. In his article, Don Clark, (1999) Leadership Competency Model, makes a sample listing that is broken into three main groups, Core or Essential competencies, Leadership Competencies, and Professional competencies. These three groups of competencies can be thought of as the pyramid of leadership, which collectively form the basic requirements for becoming a leader.

Core or essential competencies are the personal skills required at all levels of leadership. Essential competencies provide the foundation that a person needs to become a leader. Without a strong foundation, the sides of the pyramid will soon fall and crumble as the base gives away. Core or essential competencies may include: communication skills, teamwork, creative problem solving, interpersonal skills, managing client relationships, self-direction, and flexibility, building appropriate relationships, professionalism and financial skills.

Leadership (special) competencies are the skills needed to drive the organization onto the cutting edge of new technologies. Leadership competencies form the basic structure that separates leaders from bosses. These skills create the walls and interiors of the pyramid. Without them, a leader is just a hollow windbag, or as Scott Adams of Dilbert fame best characterizes it, “a pointy-head boss.” The leadership develops ownership by bringing employees in on the decision making and planning process. It provides the means to enable employee success, while

maintaining the well-being of the organization. Effective leadership develops processes to engage employees in achieving the objectives of the organization. It empowers the employees by giving them the authority to get things accomplished in the most efficient and timely manner. When leadership recognize that learning happens at every opportunity (treats mistakes as a learning event) they endeavor to develop future leaders by being involved in the company mentoring program. The result will be that the employee will develop the attachment to the organization in form of psychological contract. The organization provides feedback, coaching and career development to the teams and individuals to maximize their probability of success; ensure leadership at every level by coaching employees to ensure the right things happen; ensure performance feedback is an integral part of the day-to-day activities.

Professional and individual competencies: these are the skills and knowledge needed to direct the system and processes that a leader controls. Professional competencies form the mortar that binds the pyramid together. Without some knowledge of the technical skills that they direct, the pyramid soon begins to fall apart and the organization begins to operate in damage control mode. Each organization requires a different set of professional competencies for each leadership position. Although leaders do not need to be the Subject Matter Experts (SME) for the tasks that they direct, they must have a basic understanding of the systems and processes that they control. Again, each position requires a different set of skills and knowledge.

These competencies of a leader will impact on the features of social organization such as trust, norms and networks that improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions; which cannot be traded on an open market but rather, a form of capital that can change overtime, the supply of which increases rather than decreases with use (Hirshman 1984). The effective leader will be in agreement with Lin (2001) and be able to create such resources embedded in an organizational social structure that are accessed and mobilized in purposive actions. The leader will influence the organization towards solving problems of coordination, reduce transaction cost, and facilitate the flow of information between and among individuals (Lazega and Pattison, 2001). Networks of civic engagement, such as neighborhood associations, sports clubs, and cooperatives, are an essential form of social capital, and the denser these networks, the more likely members of a community will cooperate for mutual benefit. This is so, even in the face of persistent problems of collective action, because networks of civic engagements:

- Foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity by creating expectations that favors given now will be returned later;
- Facilitate coordination and communication, and thus create channels through which information about the trustworthiness of other individuals and groups can flow, and be tested and verified;
- Embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration on other kinds of problems;
- Increase the potential risks to those who act opportunistically that they will not share in the benefits of current and future transactions.

Organizational performance/Loan recovery

Performance refers to how well one does a piece of work or activity and the ability to bring about desired results in a satisfactory manner (Cascio, 1999). Organizational performance is a function of the organization's ability to reach and maintain equilibrium with its environment (Lawrence & Lorsh, 1967). Organizational performance is the measure of how well the organization does its job (Stoner, Freeman and Gilbert, 1996). It is the extent to which an organization achieves its intended outcome (Pettigrew, 1992). Performance in micro-credit institutions is therefore measured considering the clientele rate of Loan recovery and the profit accrued. While financial performance clearly is important for the firm, it only taps the economic dimension of performance, neglecting other important goals of the firm (Venhatramen & Ramanjan, 1996).

Although institutions involved in microfinance have different institutional types, ownership and origins, they run surprisingly similar operations. The vast majority provide credit on a solidarity group-lending basis without collateral, often referred to as Grameen-type lending. Some provide loans to individuals after appraising the borrower and requiring some guarantee either real or in the form of a guarantor. Village banks are a mixture of the two methods, lending to individuals but usually not requiring collateral. The average loan sizes decline as one moves from individual lending to group lending and village bank lending (Hulme & Mosley, 1996). The group lending method is the most common and is offered by some government-related institutions, private owned institutions and non-government organizations. It has been a breakthrough approach to lending small amounts of money to a large number of customers who are poor and cannot offer collateral.

There are variations in the way group-lending is operated. Group sizes vary but most are in the four to eight member range. Either the group receives a loan, or

loans are granted to some members first and then to the others. The principle is that the group self-selects its members of similar background and shows solidarity for a certain amount of time before obtaining a loan. Most institutions require a percentage of the loan to be saved in advance to indicate ability to make regular payments and serve as collateral. Group members are responsible for the repayment of each other's loans and usually meet weekly to collect repayments. In case of default group members will not be allowed to borrow again. The creditworthiness of the borrower is therefore determined by the members rather than the institution. Group-lending is therefore based on transferring most of the financial administration onto members and transferring the risk of non-repayment from the institutions to the group through peer pressure and joint liability. The absence of peer pressure and joint liability arrangement in the case of individual-lending organizations, has impaired their loan recovery performance and has permitted staff to focus their efforts on financial rather than social intermediation (namely group mobilization and group education).

Loan recovery is key to financial viability of the micro-finance institutions. Thus micro-finance institutions need to set up mechanisms and tools for monitoring loan recovery performance as well as strategies to address identified weaknesses. One of the causes of failure of micro-finance institutions is the inability to recover their costs. With the mandate to offer credit at low interest rates, compounded with political interference that forces these institutions to offer credit to politically connected individuals and businesses, micro-finance institutions have struggled to keep positive profit margins (Ndikumana, 2006). Loan recovery is influenced by a number of factors that operate within the members of the group. These factors range from individual/personal characteristics and perceptions of the members to the leadership techniques and capabilities. The interplay between organizational social capital and the leadership abilities/competences will lead to higher rate of loan recovery.

Methodology, data collection and analysis

The study employed a cross-sectional survey design. This involved interviewees from the top managers in the micro-credit projects, the group leaders and the group members of sixteen micro-credit projects. This involved six hundred forty (640) group members. The study employed a stratified sampling approach which involved choosing members from the different micro-credit groups in Kampala district. The survey population consisted of leaders of the micro-credit groups together with members who accessed loans. The leaders of these groups

were those member elected by the group members; they were part of the beneficiaries. The group members were those people who identified each other through a process of soliciting the mandatory members so as to access the loan from the micro-credit projects.

Sample size

The survey used a multistage, multi-purpose probability sampling technique. The de Vaus (2002) approach was applied to calculate the minimum sample size. The population was stratified into two that is the group leaders and the group members themselves. Nine (9) group members were interviewed from each of the sixteen groups. This gave a total of one hundred forty four (144) interviewees. However, Sarantakos (1998) suggests that a sample of thirty (30) is sufficient in quantitative research.

Measurement of variables

Organizational social capital was measured using Bullen and Onyx 1999 measure. Leadership competence was measured basing on a self-developed questionnaire. This involved a multistage; where the first stage was a quantitative data collection where key informants were interviewed to extract the qualities of good leadership. This was done using the "Administrator's operant competence Analysis and Profiling questionnaire". Then the Job profiling was done to establish the Key Result Areas (KRAs) for the leader holding the position of Chairperson of the Micro credit group. Competencies were then identified that were used to formulate the Leadership Competence questionnaires. The second stage was to analyze the qualitative data to extract the quantitative leadership characteristics. Organizational performance, which shows itself in Loan recovery, was measured basing on a self-developed questionnaire, which involved a multistage process; the first stage involved a qualitative data collection where key informants were interviewed to extract the characteristics of a good group member of a micro-credit group.

TABLE 1: Reliability and Validity of Instruments

Variable	Alpha
Organizational Social Capital	.8884
Leadership Competence	.9058
Loan Recovery	.8889

All the variables had Alphas greater than 0.5 thus the instrument was reliable.

Data processing and analysis

Quantitative data was edited and coded, then entered into the computer using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). The relationship between Organizational Social Capital, Leadership Competence and Loan Recovery was then analyzed using correlation (which established both the significance and direction of the relationship between variables), Regression (which determined the predictive strength of the independent variables on the dependent variable) and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Test and T-tests (which determined the difference in perception about the variables in relation to the sample characteristics).

Presentation and interpretation of results

The results showed that there is no significant difference between male and female respondents in their age groups [chi-square value = 3.566, level of significance (P) = .468].

There is no significant difference between male and female respondents in the duration of work in the organization [chi-square value = 2.073, level of significance (P) = .150].

There is no significant relationship between male and female respondents in the number of children they have [chi-square value = 1.454, level of significance (P) = .483].

Rotated Component Factor Analysis Results:

Leadership Competence.

Leadership competence scale revealed four factors; these are problem solving, planning, supervision and coordination. Problem solving has an Eigen value of 6.275 and a percentage of variance of 33.024; Planning has an Eigen value of 1.551 and percentage of variance of 8.165; Supervision has an Eigen value of 1.433 and percentage of variance of 7.541 and Coordination has an Eigen value of 1.344 and percentage of variance of 7.072. Overall, these four factors contribute 55.80% of Leadership Competence scale.

Organizational Social Capital

Organizational social capital scale revealed two factors; these are Trust and Associability. Trust has an Eigen value of 6.832 and the percentage of variance of 34.149 while Associability has an Eigen value of 2.476 and percentage of

variance of 12.381. Overall, these two factors contribute 46.540 of the Organizational Capital scale.

TABLE 2: Inferential statistics

This shows the correlation and regression for the different variables.

	LEADERSHIP COMPETENCE	ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIAL CAPITAL	LOAN RECOVERY
LEADERSHIP COMPETENCE	1		
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIAL CAPITAL	.649**	1	
LOAN RECOVERY	.543**	.514**	1

** Relationship significant at .01

There is a significant positive relationship between Organizational Social Capital and Leadership Competence ($r = .649$, $P \leq 0.01$). This implies that the higher the Organizational Social Capital, the higher the Leadership Competence.

There is a significant positive relationship between Leadership Competence and Loan Recovery ($r = .543$, $P \leq 0.01$). This implies that the higher the Leadership Competence, the higher the rate of Loan Recovery.

There is a significant positive relationship between Organizational Social Capital and Loan Recovery ($r = .514$, $P \leq 0.01$). This implies that the higher the Organizational Social Capital, the higher the Loan Recovery.

TABLE 3: Multiple Regression

Model	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.	R-square	Adj Rsq	F	Sig.
(Constant)	.719	.226		3.178	.002	.355	.331	14.587	.000
Leadership Competence	.370	.092	.441	4.046	.000				
Organizational Social Capital	.167	.070	.253	2.377	.019				

Dependent variable: LOAN RECOVERY

Results show that 33.1% of the variance in Loan Recovery is attributed to Leadership Competence and Organizational Social Capital. The statistically significant predictors of Loan Recovery in Micro-credit projects are Leadership

Competence (Beta = .441, P = .000) and Organizational Social Capital (Beta = .253, P = .000).

Other findings

ANOVA test was used to show how respondents of different categories differ in the study variables.

There is a significant difference between respondents of different age groups in their loan recovery (level of significance = 0.50). Results show that loan recovery among members who are younger is higher than that among members who are older (means of 1.8409 and 1.5000 for the 20 – 25 year old and 36 – 40 year old respectively).

There is a significant difference between respondents of different durations in the organization in the Loan Recovery and Organizational social capital levels. Results show that the members who have stayed in the organization for lesser years have higher levels of organizational social capital than those who have stayed longer (thus the mean of 2.5713 and 2.3659 for duration of 1 – 5 years and 6 – 10 years respectively. The level of significance is .051).

More still, the results show that the longer members stay in the organization, the lower the Loan Recovery (mean = 1.7433 and 1.5947 for 1 – 5 years and 6 – 10 years respectively. The level of significance is .041).

The results show that members without children have a higher rate of loan recovery than those with more than 5 children (mean of 1.7614 and 1.5588 for 2 – 5 children and 5 above children respectively. The level of significance is .029).

Conclusions and implications

The study focused on the relationship between Organizational social capital, Leadership competence and Loan recovery. The findings revealed that the statistically significant predictors of Loan recovery in micro-credit projects are Leadership competence and Organizational social capital. That means that even without any other factors, Leadership competence alone or Organizational social capital alone will greatly influence loan recovery in micro-credit projects.

Organizational social capital was found to be one of the statistically significant predictors of Loan recovery with values from the multiple regression results depicting Beta = .253 and P = .019; this implies that Organizational social

capital alone can predict the rate of Loan recovery. That is to say that the stock of active connections among people that make cooperative action possible, greatly affect Loan recovery in Micro-credit groups. These may include Trust, Mutual understanding and Shared values. These are resources embedded in an organizational structure that can be accessed and mobilized in purposive actions. They facilitate coordination and communication which create channels through which information about trustworthiness of other individuals and groups can flow. The members of micro-credit group will be able to collect their monthly subscriptions to service their loans with ease because of the fear to betray the trust that they put in each other. The results imply that there is need for managers of micro-credit projects to recognize and uphold organizational social capital among micro-credit project group members.

Leadership Competence is another variable that was found to be a statistically significant predictor of Loan recovery with values from the multiple regression results depicting Beta = .441 and P = .000; this means that leadership competence alone can predict Loan recovery in Micr0-credit groups. Competences are underlying characteristics of a person, which result in effecting superior performance. Leadership competences are skills needed to drive the organization onto the cutting edge of new technologies. They are specific skills, attitudes, knowledge and behaviors necessary to fulfill a task. Managers of Micro-credit schemes should train the group leaders in those technical skills and behaviors that are necessary to steer the group to enthusiastically work towards achieving the objective of loan servicing and thus improve loan recovery.

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POLITICAL PARTIES, ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA: CHALLENGES AND CONTRADICTIONS

ENOJO KENNIE ENOJO Ph.D[1]

ABSTRACT

Democracy without any strength of imagination is the most accepted form of government in the world today. Consequently, there is virtually any leader who does not wish to be seen to be having some degree of democratic credentials or addressed as a democrat. However, the roles played by the political parties in such State, makes the difference. In fact, nearly all regimes described themselves as democratic. The paper focuses on the synergy between the challenges and contradictions of democratic governance, political parties and the 2019 electoral processes in Nigeria. The central aim is to locate the issues of inequality, fragile economy, poverty, unemployment, corruption and lack of internal democracy in our political parties as the consequences of a failed State in our democratic experiment. Our findings show that there is a strong organic linkage between good governance and ideologically rooted electoral process, and that; without stronger institutions, vibrant civil society, political parties, and sophisticated opposition political parties, electoral processes cannot function optimally. For Nigeria to have a robust, and efficient electoral process, civil society and institutions of the State should be stronger, responsive, attentive and assertive, our political elites should be ideologically rooted, and the electorate should participate without hiding under any ideological cover of ethnicity, or religion.

Keywords: Political Parties, Electoral System, Elections, Democracy and Ideology

Background to the Study

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The success of any representational or constitutional democracy is the integrity of political parties and electoral process. This implies therefore that, both appearance and methods of the final results are imperative for an evasive evaluation. The quality of indirect democracy is linked to the state to evolve a viable, transparency electoral system that inspires the overall interest and confidence of broad spectrum of opposition parties, media, civil society, and contending fractions of the political class. The historical conditions of electoral politics in Nigeria, however, show the pervasive struggle to control electoral machinery for individual votes. Thus, political parties rely on electoral victory to their capacity to manipulate the electoral systems, processes or structures to their own primitive advantage (Agara, 2018).

The 2019 general election was not different as nearly all major political parties with national or regional spread deploy different tactics (orthodox and scientific) to manipulate the final outcome. Some of the crude methods include, but not limited to either votes buying, inducement, violent, assassination, burning and ballot snatches were not left out as witnessed in the previous elections of 1964, 1983,2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. The major shift in the 2019 was the complex nature the whole exercise took ranging from postponements of presidential elections barely ***8 hours*** to the commencement, inconclusive and delay in results announcement not as in the previous elections of the 2011, and 2015. There were anxieties, apprehension, delusion and total distrust of the entire electoral process. The waste in both time and resources were monumental to all as over. It was estimated that about #69 billion was spent above the 2015 general elections, resources considered huge in a nation struggling with deficit budget, double digits inflation, poverty and unemployment figures, insecurity and underemployment rate.

Nigerian political architecture, culture and socialization are functions of her historical heritage, and that historical condition is colonialism and primitive accumulation of wealth, which influences the nature and the final outcome of electoral contests. The access to political power is viewed as the means to influence, affluence and authority, creating the artificial phobia that political power is everything and best virtue that must be overvalued. The pursuit of politics therefore became a negative tendency and crude appropriate political reward. The conflictual nature of politics and election is also linked to the critical role of the state as a distributive of rewards. This role attracts the patronizing presence of political elite that centralize, monopolize and organize electoral frauds in different forms, and even extend this to power blocs to access

state power and resources. The pursuit of representative democracy in Nigeria is intended to appropriate the political space and resources among the fractions of political elite (Eleojo, 2019).

The state lacks of autonomy, amenable to the manipulation politics of fractions of the political elite. The Nigeria politics were rooted from the beginning in the nature of state that is vulnerable to the hegemonic politics of the dominant fraction of the political class, and their rentier and what Agbaje (2005) described as compradorial character in the political systems. Nothing significant has changed from the 1964 election, except in form, individuals in involved, and dimension

Conflict is an inherent feature of all societies, and it springs from two roots that cannot possibly be eliminated; these are, material scarcity and disagreement over values which are to be authoritatively allocated in any given society taking into consideration of who gets what, when, and how these values are evenly distributed (Enojo, 2015). The reason is predicated on the simple assumption that the material resources are limited in quantity and different people and groups often subscribe to so many and different values, principles, hiding usually under the ideological cover of ethnicity and religion (Orogun, 2017, Agara,2004, Gambo, 2006).

No doubt, this situation obfuscates the core values of democratic participation and popular representation. However, since the modern State is a welfare state, the hope of democracy usually is that the outcome of any political conflict in whatever form should eventually create more winners rather than losers. Consequently, it is on rational scaffold such as this, that the challenges and contradictions of the 2019 election in Nigeria is wheeled into an intellectual theatre for an invasive examination especially, the core values of electoral process remained unresolved with reference to internal democracy and parties without manifesto.

Our fears, as usual, are the consequences of stronger institutions, lack of vibrant opposition political parties, robust civil society and ideology. These have made our democratic experiences or democratization journey more mysterious and dangerous to analysts for two obvious reasons: the unpredictability and immeasurability of our electoral political architecture. The consequences have been, limiting the democratic space and producing dictatorship. This are evidential considering the level with which governance is treated with levity,

broad or fragrant senseless impunity, and careless primitive accumulation of state resources before, during and post the electoral process. This sordid development has become a political ritual with flaws.

Perhaps, Nigeria's electioneering campaign is a quintessential laboratory for the study of the role of the Nigerian media, political culture, socialization and development. The broad focus here is to explain the intrinsic variables, factors or conditions that underline the complexity, elusiveness, fluidity and absurdity of poor grass-root political communication, mobilization and political violence, focusing essentially on the opposition parties and civil society as far as information dissemination is concerned. There exists therefore a very strong organic linkage or relationship between the media, effective grass-root political communication, mobilization, political violence, ethnic crisis and the issue of poverty, break-down of law and order, and vibrant opposition political parties, robust civil societies, and underdevelopment. With all reasonable validity and without prejudice to any legal court or institution, it is imperative to assert that the role played by the Nigerian opposition political parties and civil society, media, politicians, and political stakeholders regarding electioneering is ambivalent and it's nature and origin is deeply rooted in colonialism and imperialism. We need to change the narrative and reconstruct our political communication strategies for an effective grass-root mobilization during elections through identifying new political culture, socialization, participation, and representation. About *seventy three* political parties participated in the 2019 elections with not more the All Progressive Congress (APC), and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) with national spread, or any form of identities, other than the social media platforms campaigns.

There is a fundamental crisis of governance at all levels in Nigeria. The most graphic illustration of this is the tendency for the ruling elites at all levels to rule without some notion of governance as a social contract which is implicit in the mandate freely given during elections (Egwu, 2006). The primary explanation for this is that, democratic governance and sustainable development in Nigeria has been treated with levity without due regards to an effective grass-root political communication and mobilization of the electorate. This is the failure of opposition political parties and civil societies that are neither strong nor robust. Consequently, the fundamental objectives and direct principles of state policies between 1999 and 2019 both at the federal and state level were a crude record not of history, but of human fantasy arising from emotional need and desire for primitive accumulation of wealth and that the electoral, economic, political and

social reforms had not been of historical achievement and ethics (Akpotor, 2012, Enojo, 2010, and Eleojo, 2016). There is therefore a direct nexus or connection between democratic governance, sustainable development and vibrant opposition political parties and robust civil society. The consequence will promote an effective electioneering campaign, the rule of law, and due process of one man one vote policy as a rule-based international best practice.

At the core of the crisis of democratic governance in Nigeria Fourth Republic is the legacy of party system without ideologies, weak state, dysfunctional elites, externally designed political, economic and social reforms and of course, poverty, injustice, unemployment, inflation and ethno-religion conflicts (Egwemi, 2015). Conservatively, all these promote underdevelopment and encourage anthropological parity among ethnic group and nationalities. However, the cultures that compose it have ancient roots. That root is colonialism and imperialism. The country's ethnic, regional and religious divides have been in sharp focus of important, making political actors and players to suggest the breaking up of the country into a weak federation if a way cannot be found to distribute political and economic power in a manner all can accept. It is against this stark reality that parties and policies must be viewed in Nigeria from 1999-2019 with regards to lack of effective grass-root political communication and mobilization. Regrettably, the two major political parties failed to bring innovation on board.

Egwu (2006) argues, "In one sense, then, there are "many" Nigerians. That is there are distinct political cultures with pre-colonial origins, and there are varied colonial experiences of North, East and West". The pre-occupation of the World Bank with issues of good governance and a more accountable framework of democratic governance, which translates to a concern with sustainable development, is a positive response to the episodic history of development and democracy in post-independence Africa. The post-independence political leadership jettisoned democracy and resorted to the abuse of the public Space. They observed the constitution only in breach and replaced a culture of kleptocracy with a culture of prudence and frugality in the process; they perverted and subverted the process of development, and resorted to the abuse of laid down procedures for personal gains. Thus, the World Bank itself, once a supporter of "strong" governments and dictatorial regimes on the continent made a voltre face in the 1990s when it realized that the absence of democracy and a leadership that is accountable had robbed Africa of the opportunity to

overcome the basic crisis of development (Egwu, 2006, Akpotor, 2004, Nnoli 2003, Ibrahim, 2007, Ayoade, 2006 and Joseph, 1985).

Sustainable development cannot be achieved without democratic governance, accountable, transparent leadership and a holistic effective grass-root political communication and mobilization. These are the relative roles of opposition political parties and civil societies. This is perhaps, predicated upon the assumption that the conscious management of regime structures enhances the legitimacy of the public realm, and generates trust for citizenry. Structurally speaking, in its formulation on governance, the World Bank tends to put more emphasis on the management of the country's economic and social resources for development, and by so doing, divest the concept of its political overtones in favour of economic policy and management. The importance and strength of "good government" approach lies in the fact that it "promotes certain political factors, especially democracy, the rules of law, and human rights on the grounds that markets and government will only remain efficient if they are held to account by voters and consumers the public. The global economic recession is an issue (Enojo, 2018 and Agara, 2004).

What this then suggests is that, regardless of reservation, which we have about the notion of governance, there are positive values in the governance discourse to be cultivated and engaged with, in creative manner, and this is only possible through grass-root political communication and mobilization. Thus, embedded in the notion of governance are the values of accountability, transparency, respect for rule of law, and removing the culture of arbitrariness and crude impunity. The key elements of democratic governance are: accountability, transparency, openness, answerability, enforcement and responsiveness. It is within this meaning that democratic governance promotes the core values of democracy, which among others, include the following:

- Free, credible and fair election, independent electoral umpire and strong opposition
- Separation of power between the three major branches of government, which is most pronounced in the presidential system, but not strictly based on water tight compartment;
- The rule of law by which ensures that everyone is bound within the confines of the law irrespective of social standing places limit on the exercise of power by those in authority, and provides guarantee against all forms of arbitrariness;

- Accountability which requires that power holders and power spenders must account for their actions, and seeks to replace the culture of impunity in the public sphere;
- Independence and impartial judiciary, which gives the judicial arm the power of judicial review that could become the basis of enactment of new laws. But this requires that all citizens must have access and can find genuine avenues of seeking redress as a means of avoiding recourse to justice;
- The protection of the fundamental human rights of citizens such as the right to dignity of the human person, personal liberty, civil liberty and fair hearing;
- Political parties to advance the rights of citizens to make choices from exiting alternatives and as the infrastructure for competitive elections;
- Free mass media that disseminates information to the public based on some sense of social responsibility, supported by a legal environment that guarantees access to information;
- Constitutionalism; the requirement that all persons in a given state, especially, holders of public office, should adhere strictly to the spirit and letters of the law; (for instance, see Egwu, 2006:17, Akpotor, 2004-41, Nnoli, 2003:56, Appadorai, 1972:87; The 1999 Constitution, Banfied and Wilson, 1965, Weinsten, 2005, Wang and Kurzman, 2007)

Challenges and Contradictions of the African State on the 2019 Elections

The African socio-economic formation is different from that of the advanced industrial capitalist societies of Europe and America. The African socio-economic formation is characterized by uneven and combined development of the different modes of production. There is the capitalist sector which exists in combination with the pre-capitalist sector at various stages of disintegration. While the capitalist enclaves (urban areas) are engaged in the production of exchange values, the pre-capitalist formations are engaged in the production of subsistence. The relation among producers is mechanist, while specialization in production is rudimentary. Consequently exchange production and exchanged relations is limited and markets not fully develop (Ake, 1981). The State in Africa like in every other society is the organized instrument of the ruling class. However, the specific characteristic of the state in Africa is the result of the specific historical condition of its emergence and development. That historical condition is colonialism.

Colonialism shaped the nature of the state and society in Africa as well as the dynamics of the ruling class. The historical specificity of the colonial state in Africa ruled out certain similarities between it and the state in the advanced capitalist societies of Europe. In the advance capitalist societies of Europe, the state was the classic state in the sense that it was the instrument of the capitalist class which emerged with it from the feudal mode of production, to maintain its domination over the other classes in the capitalist society. On the other hand the task of the colonial state was two-folds and different. The task of the colonial state was to:

- Conquer and subdue the people of the African colonies in such a way as to make it easy and cheap to exploit their material and human resources.
- Establish capitalist relations of production in the African colonies in such a way as to guarantee surplus value to the capitalist in Europe (Enojo, 2012).

While the state in Europe maintained domination over the non-capitalist classes of Europe, the state in Africa exercised domination over the African people as a whole. And while the European state regulated the operation of the capitalist mode of production in favour of the bourgeois class, the state in Africa had first to create the capitalist mode of production, make it dominant in the society and make it yield profits for European, changed the character of the state directly, actively and more extensively in the economic, social, cultural and political life of the people than was the case in Europe. Furthermore, civil society associated with the institutions of state power and which support and reinforce these institutions had either not emerged or well developed. Thus civil society in Africa is not attentive and assertive. In Europe, civil society and the capitalist mode of production emerged before the capitalist state (Enojo, 2010). The weakness of civil society which has resulted in the non-autonomisation of the state limits the chances of mediating contradictions between members and fractions of the capitalist class.

In Nigeria, the weak nature of civil society means that the ruling class cannot establish its hegemony on the society. The consequence of this is decisively obvious; dominance of the fractious ruling class can mainly be maintained through force. This means that the coercive apparatuses of the state, namely the Army and the Police becomes pervasive in society, this becomes more so because of the high premium placed on politics and unrestrained nature of

political competition. Within the African state, the resources of physical coercion become a tool of a particular group, especially the dominant fraction of the ruling class. Since political competition is grim and norm-less, corruption is the surest consequence (Agara, 2017).

To fully grasp the nature of electoral and political violence in Africa, it is first important that we understood the nature of class forces that constitute the state. Capitalism in post-colonial Africa is largely an enclave capitalism restricted mainly to the urban areas, within these conscious though fragmented. The fragmentation of the indigenous capitalist class reflects the weak nature of the civil society. It is this weakness of civil society with among other things allow for the introduction of primary loyalties and ethnic particularize into political competition.

This is often re-played in every election since the first republic and the 2019 elections were not different from the usual hallow rituals of frauds. Weakness of the civil society which has resulted in the non-autonomisation of the state limits the ‘’chances’’ of mediating contradictions between members and fractions of the capitalist class. Consequently, the contradiction within this factitious class has made intra-class political competition very grim and placed high premium on political power, to the detriment of government of civil society and consequently the limited autonomisation of the system and mechanism of domination (Ake, 1981, and Nnoli, 2003). These views are expressed by the radical Marxist and Group theory.

The weakness of civil society and the resultant non-autonomisation of the state have accentuated the usual contradictions, rendering them particularly difficult to mediate. This particularly true with the persistence of primary Loyalties and ethnic solidarity has made the coherence within the dominant class more difficult. Furthermore, the weak nature of civil society makes for the nominal existence of Law; the Law does not pertain to all. It openly expresses the interest of any faction of the dominant class in government. In this circumstance, competition, whether economic or political is often norm-less. In so far as contradictions cannot be mediated and difference is made absolute, there is high premium on political power as the means of welfare and security, so that political competition becomes exceptionally intense and tangentially norm-less.

In Africa, the weak nature of civil society means that the ruling class cannot establish its hegemony on the society. The consequence of this is decisively obvious; dominance of the fractious ruling class can mainly be maintained through force. This means that the coercive apparatuses of the state, namely the Army and the Police becomes pervasive in society, this becomes more so because of the high premium placed on politics and unrestrained nature of political competition. Within the African state, the resources of physical coercion become a tool of a particular group, especially the situation in which Miliband (1973) referred to society as a battle field occurs; this is a process where-by class struggle is conducted by conservative forces in civil society which does not ultimately require direction and political articulation.

This is a situation of raw power, as security and right depends on the control of power. The struggle for power is everything and pursued by every means. The implication of the politics turning into a battle is the militarization of society by the fraction of the ruling class in government. Militarization is a process in which high value is placed on war and accords primacy in state and society to the armed forces. It exalts the function, the application of violence, and an institutional structure, and Police and Military establishment. It implies both a policy orientation and a power relationship (Ujo, 2004, and Olorinmoye, 2007).

Because of the Lucrative nature of state power both for state power both for welfare and security purpose the struggle for it, it so grim that those who control instrument of warfare are always in the force when moments of intercourse are confliction. Thus the consummation of the politics of warfare is the military itself. Hence in socio-economic formations with weak civil society everything revolves around. We have instances where labour unions across the country only protest about salaries related, while ignoring the very issues which affect the society as a whole.

Structural-Functional Approach

Structural-functional was developed from the work of the social anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955) and systematically formulated by the American Sociologist Talcott Parson (1902-1977) in his book, *The Social Action*. Structural-Functionalism seeks out the 'structural' aspects of the social system under consideration, and then studies the processes which function to maintain social structures. In this context, structures primarily refers to normative patterns of behaviour, regularized patterns of action in accordance with norms of party politics and electoral processes, while the inherent challenges and contradictions

of the 2019 elections explains how such patterns operate as system. However, over the years, the theory was made more popular.

Structural functionalism expanded by Gabriel Almond (1964), and has been found particularly useful in the comparison of political systems. Taking Easton's systems analysis as a starting point, Almond looks for the functions which could be included among the input and output functions of all political systems. On the input side are the functions of (1) interest articulation and (2) interest aggregation. Second, on the output side are the functions of (3) rule making, (4) rule-application and (5) rule ac1udication. The functions of (6) political communication is undertaken to inform all within the political system and outside of these diverse activities. Additionally, every system performs (7 systems maintenance and adaptation functions through political socialization and recruitment of people. According to Almond, the functioning of any political system may also be viewed in terms of its capabilities defined as 'the way it performs as a unit in its environment.' The concepts of regulative, extractive, distributive, and responsive capability are employed as criteria to assess how a system is performing within its environment, how it is shaping its environment, and how it is being shaped by it (Almond, 1964).

The Relative Deprivation, Rising Expectation, Frustration and Aggression

The second is the relative deprivation, rising expectation, frustration and aggression model. This is the most fundamental and generally accepted behavioural framework in the understanding and explanation of political violence in both social and natural sciences. It is otherwise referred to as integrative psychological approach. This framework is derived from the works of Ted Gurr (1970), John Dollard (1939), Leonard Berkowitz (1962), and Robert Rothberg (1989). The major assumption of this model is that aggression is always a consequence of discontent of expectation and desires.

The frustration-aggression hypothesis was first postulated by Dollard, who submitted that the primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be as a result of the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration is a motivating force that disposes man to aggression whenever anger is induced uncontrollably. Equally, drawing heavily from relative deprivation as a form of frustration, Ted Gurr (1970) has argued that relative deprivation is a necessary condition for violence. Gurr defined relative deprivation as "a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectation and their value capabilities". Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe

they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions consider and hope they are capable attaining and maintaining, given the social means available to them. Some of the variables that could affect the intensity of emotional response to the perception of deprivation are that:

- That the greater the extent of discrepancy that men see between what they seek and what seems to be attainable, the greater their anger and consequent disposition to aggression,
- Men who feel they have many ways to attain their goals are less likely to become angry when one is blocked than those who have few alternatives. Access to greater opportunities is an important factor here.
- That the greater the intensity of men's expectations, the greater their anger when they meet unexpected or increased resistance (Gurr, 1970).

The Elite Theory

Elite model was developed, first and foremost, as an alternative paradigm shift from the group or pluralism methodology, which rejected the pluralist standpoint of investigation concerning the distribution of power in society, in the alternative, elite points to the concentration of political power in the hands of a few minority group which, according to Mosca, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings. From the point elite, party politics and electoral process may be viewed as the values and preferences of governing elite. The assumption of elite theory shared by Pareto, Michael and captured by Thomas Dye and Harmon Ziegler as follows:

- Society is divided into the few (elite) who have power and the many (masses) who do not
- Only a small number of persons allocate values for society; the masses do not decide electoral political outcome
- The few who govern are not typical of the masses that are governed. Elites are drawn disproportionately from the upper socio-economic strata of society
- The movement of non-elites to elite positions must be slow and continuous to maintain stability and avoid revolution. Only non-elite who have accepted the basic elite consensus can be admitted to

governing circles

- Elites share a consensus on the basic values of the social system and the preservation of the system
- Political parties and electoral process does not demand of the masses but rather the prevailing values of the elites
- Changes in political system will be incremental rather than revolutionary
- Active elites are subject to relatively little direct influence from apathetic masses, elite influences masses more masses influence elites

Weakness and Strengths of the Theories

Structural-functional theory is flawed for so many reasons like other theories in social sciences. A recurrent criticism of the structural functionalist view is that functions seem to determine structures, with the consequences that it becomes impossible to derive structure from function in a coherent manner. This tendency of structural functionalist explanation has led to a resurgence of interest in the rival tradition of 'structuralism'. During the 2019 general elections, votes did not properly count or reflect the moods of the masses which represent the structures, and this is evidence from the performance of leaders which represents the functions by political parties at all levels of governance.

The study adopted another theory to complement the shortcomings. The relative deprivation, rising expectation and frustration aggression failed to academically address the challenges and contradictions of our political parties and electoral process in the following manners. The first assumption that the greater the extent of discrepancy that men see between what they seek and what seems to be attainable, the greater their anger and consequent disposition to aggression, was not correct in the last elections, rather, the relative violence were exhibited by political thugs recruited by politicians, not direct the principles and values of the electorate by to assist them in fraud of winning their votes. Voters were helpless, and became vulnerable, and abandoned the electoral process to politician with force, wealth and power.

The second assumptions, those men who feel they have many ways to attain their goals are less likely to become angry when one is blocked than those who have few alternatives. Access to greater opportunities is an important factor here. Here, the main issues facing the masses before the elections were poverty, inequality, unemployment, inflation and insecurity. All these were not properly articulated in the various manifestos of about seventy two political parties which

participated, and voters did not actually responded as reflected in the final results, due to lack of alternative options, or choices on the ballot paper during the electoral process.

Finally, the assumptions that the greater the intensity of men's expectations, the greater their anger when they meet unexpected or increased resistance, was deflated and punctured considering what happened in some states like Kogi, Lagos and Kano states. Considering these huge deficits, the paper adopted the third theory, which is the elite theory, and one of the fundamental flaw is that, the theory is orthodox in nature, as it favour government with the crucial role of carrying into effect, through its official and agencies, the values and preferences which the dominant few want reflected in political process. The worst underlying assumption about government and its institutions as an impartial mediator of political contest, conflict, and electoral process in society, and impliedly, a preserver of the social order, is not only a preposterous thesis but misleading and ethically flawed. During the 2019 elections, the President gave an order to shoot and ballot box snatchers, but this order was not obeyed, as political thugs not only snatched, but destroyed and burnt ballot boxes. In some instances, many voters were killed as reported in Anyigba, Kogi state. The Nigerian armed forces and the Nigerian Police were either helpless or lost control of the whole exercise before, during and after the elections.

The Challenges and Contradictions of Political parties and Electoral Process

The key to understanding the Nigerian political parties and electoral process since 1964 is to appreciate that changes over the periods have left many old institutions and traditions in place, while real political power have shifted to newer political parties. For example, Nigeria's judiciary, armed forces, police and independent electoral body have remained but political parties have either change in name, or identity. Except for a brief spell between 1999-2011, when the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) won the Presidential elections, the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections were won by the All Progressive Party (APC), the PDP once had virtually monopoly on political power, but began giving it up with President Goodluck Jonathan losing in the 2015 to President Mohammadu Buhari. However, we investigate the following thematic.

Nigerians voters during 2019 have relatively little choice at elections, faced as they are with a moderate APC, a moderate PDP, and smaller other political

parties without national spread that rarely win, unfortunately, the three political presidential candidates, Fela Durotoye (ANN), Oby Ezekwesili (ANCP), Kingsley Moghalu (YPP), that participated in the Presidential debate, January 19th, organized by the Nigerian Elections Debate Group (NEDG), and the Broadcasting Organizations of Nigeria (BON) moderated by Mark Eddo as anchor, did not more 15% of the total votes cast, rather, Omoyele Sowore of African Action Congress, that was not invited scored 0.12%, a total of 33,953 votes and stood at 10th position. Similarly, Chris Okotie's Fresh Democratic Party which had participated in more than three elections, stood at the 35th position. Conversely, the two leading presidential candidates that refused to participate in the presidential debate APC=15,191,847 representing 55.60%, PDP=11, 262, 978, representing 41.22%, scoring more votes than all the 71 political parties that took part in the elections (Vanguard Newspapers, March, 2091).

There has been a traditional dislike in the country of faction, which is why there are so many shades of opinions within the PDP and the APC, why parties are so not flexible and why many often refuse split their ballots, as in the case of Lagos, Benue, Imo, Delta, Rivers, and Kaduna states, especially with the presidential l and governorship elections result. The trends have been so since 1999, and much difference has not occurred, and not even in performance.

The elections proved to be the worst challenge and contradictions for political parties and electoral process judging from issue based electioneering campaign strategies by the two major political parties. The January 19th Presidential Debate was an avenue for the presentation of party manifestos. The three candidates that participated spoke on ranging issues from health, education, economy, infrastructural development, security, and foreign affairs policies, but none of these won the election, which explains the worst contradiction.

The process of the 2019 election was not different from the past, considering shielding of preferred presidential candidate by the media outfits across the spectrum of political communication. While the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) and the Channels Television (Cable Networks) projected the candidate of APC, the African Independent Television (AIT) was sympathetic to the opposition, the PDP, which it supported in the 2015. Unlike the Cable Network News (CNN) based in the United States of America, or the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC, radio and television) based in the United Kingdom, that project vibrant, sound and robust candidates with sophisticated ideology on

moving the country forward. To be perfectly honest, all exist poll favoured the PDP, with Atiku having 44% and Buhari 33%. The final results were different, and this smacks mutual contradiction of the electoral process. The final presidential results showed Buhari scoring 55.60% and Atiku scoring 41.22%. The question, is that, what went wrong, could the postponement changed the outcome, or what exactly?

Political party formation took different method during the 2019 with clouds of suspicion of 73 registered political parties, and about 84million registered voters. There has been an improvement from 1999 with three political parties, (Peoples Democratic Party, Olusegun Obasanjo, with about 18Million votes and Alliance for Democracy merging with All people's Party, Olu Falae, with about 11Million votes) which contested. 2003 Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP obtained 24Million votes, while Mohammadu Buhari of ANPP obtained about 12 Million votes. 2007 Umaru Yar'Adua of the PDP obtained about 24Million votes, Buhari of ANPP had about 6Million, his worst election performance in the history of Nigeria political history. However, Eighteen registered political parties contested the election, with Fresh Democratic Party of Chris Okotie, coming forth, after Atiku Abubakar of Action Congress, who came third, after Buhari, though the election was described as the worst electoral fraud in the history of Nigeria.

The 2011 election was contested by twenty registered political parties, with Goodluck Jonathan of PDP scoring about 22Million votes, and Buhari of the (Congress for Progress Change) CPC, scoring about 12Million votes, and finally, the 2015 general election had Fourteen registered political parties, President Buhari contested under the All Progressive Congress APC, obtaining about 15Million votes, and Goodluck Jonathan of PDP with 12Million. The election was received plethora excitement and jubilation. The fact is not far fetch, because of inflation, poverty, inequality, unemployment, insecurity and decay in infrastructures. It was on this premise that the 2019 elections were focused and to change the narratives. Unfortunately, the wishes, expectation and huge desired for change of leadership was not achieved especially for those who expected the desired change so much without looking the political parties and electoral process that was to effect positive democratization and sustainable transformation.

Summary and Conclusion

Critically examined, the aforementioned are linked to the idea of the robust Social Contract Theory as expounded by the early philosophers of the modern society and the State. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau probably provide clear ideas of the Social Contract as the moral basis of rule by which leaders and followers are mutually involved in a system of reciprocity of obligations and duties or what is referred to as a social construction of reality and a web of ideas. The development of the theory of representative democracy, the centrality of elections as the basis of conferring the mandated to rule disrespect the social contract the people have the moral obligation to question and change them as witnessed 2019.

In the Nigerian context, the people can exercise this right at periodic elections and can recall representatives that fail the people; after all periodic election is a political ritual. Here lie the contradictions. One of such is the nature of political participation and representation that exist in Nigerian fourth republic. The period witnessed so many crises relating to party politics without ideology and elections without electoral values or ethical standards. This situation made this paper to question the importance of politics in a democratic environment. Conflict and society are bound together in a complicated political, economic, religion and social web and to separate them is empirically and theoretically not robust; such an attempt would amount to a preposterous thesis, impressionistic, misleading and artificial. Unfortunately, the 2019 general elections have created more losers than winners and increased mutual distrust and anthropological disparity among the poor masses, thereby reducing governance to mystery.

When we consider the postulation of Aristotle when he said, men by nature, is a political animal, also document the various definitions given by so many scholars concerning the concept of politics in its true meaning, principle and values, we begin to doubt our collective actions, attitudes and reactions to political engineering, with mild or negative assumption that two things have happened in the recent election: Civilian rule not democracy, growth without development.

Harold and Kalpa (1950-17) argue that politics is the process of making and execution of governmental decisions or policies. Easton (1957: 383-400) sees politics as the authoritative allocation of values and resources within the political system. Merki (1967: 13) defines politics as the quest for power, order and justice within any given human society. Politics is seen as the art of influencing, manipulation and controlling other (Quincy, 1955:130).

Austin (1975:35-38) describes politics as the process of resolution of conflict in society. Vernom (1960:134) views politics as a struggle among actors pursuing conflicting desires on public issues. Politics means striving to shape power or striving to influence the distribution of power among individual and groups within a social state (Webber, 1947:145-154). These have been contradicted in the 2019 general elections.

Politics or a political event includes what happens around the decision-making central to government. Politics is the shaping and sharing of power and who gets what, when and how (Hamid, 1950:74-75). What is central to this study is that politics arises to resolve contradictions and this can perhaps be achieved in democratic environment. Such democratic space must accommodate political parties, pressure groups and politically conscious citizens that would participate in the democratic process either as electorates or representatives. At the core of this activities are the roles of ideology and the level of political consciousness of citizens (TMG report, 2015:2-5).

The absence of the aforementioned creates crisis and one of such crisis is bad governance, leadership and lack of development. Development in human society is a many-sided process. Rodney (1972:29-11) argues that at the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being. Some of these are difficult to evaluate -depending as they do on the age in which one lives, class origins, and one's personal code of what is right and what is wrong. At the level of social groups, therefore, development implies an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relationship. The implication of the above statement is that without an effective grass-root political communication and mobilization during elections, there cannot be development.

Central to this assumption also, is the core value of personal achievement and development in a holistic formation. What is indisputable is that the achievement of any of those aspects (Walter Rodney mentioned is of personal development is very much tied in with the state of the society as a whole. From earlier times, man found it convenient and necessary to come together in groups to hunt and for the sake of survival. The relations whom develop within any given social group are crucial to an understanding of the society as a whole. Freedom, responsibility, skill, etc have real meaning only in terms of the relations of men in society. Of course, each social group comes into contact with others. The relations between individuals in any two societies are regulated by

the form of the two societies. Their respective political structures are important because the ruling elements within each group are the ones that begin to dialogue, trade or fight, as the case may be.

Democracy is an open market where politics is played, this is where societal issues are discussed and solutions proffered. Within this context, we have political parties. Political party is a group of people or persons bounded in policy and option in support of a general cause, essentially to: pursue, capture and retain power. Political parties have the following intrinsic variables: Label, Organization and Leadership. Political party is a label in the minds of its members and the wider audience or public, especially the electorate. As an organization, Political party recruits and campaigns for candidates, seeking election and selection into public office.

Political party equally gets leaders who try to organize and control the legislature and executive branches of government. Briefly speaking, a political party does the following functions, whether as ruling or opposition political party, and they include, representation, elite formation/recruitment, goal formulation; interest articulation/interest aggregation, socialization and mobilization; and organization of government.

However, the contradiction of our democracy is that, political parties whether ruling or opposition are only concern about forming the government, thereby, leaving the real fundamental functions of what political party does. No doubt, this attitude has create two challenges for our democratization which are the promotion and sustenance of low political culture and socialization on the one hand, and on the other hand, making governance lack legitimacy and relevance, thereby making the promotion of peace difficult. This is where your organization is intellectually and empirically relevant and should be supported financially and otherwise.

Civil society is the aggregate of non-governmental organizations, and institutions that manifest interest and will of the citizens. Civil society includes the family and the private sphere, which is also referred to either as the ***Third Sector or Volunteer-land***. Civil society is further considered as a community of citizens linked by common interests and collective activity. Broadly speaking therefore, civil society is different from government, and business. Though they work in the interest of the citizens, they operate outside of the government as nonprofit organizations. Major focus should includes, social issues such as

liberties, better education systems, combating diseases, and climate change and raise money for less privileges. The media as the fourth estate of the realm should join hand in the promoting of peace.

The opposition comprises of one or more political parties or the other organized groups that are opposed to the government or administration. The opposition main role is to question the (ruling) government of the day and help them accountable to the people. Opposition represents an alternative government, and is responsible for challenging the policies of the government and providing alternative policies where appropriate. The summary is that, opposition provides practical criticism of the ruling party, engage in consultation when important appointments are made, and leader to represent the interests of the non-dominant parties. However, this should be done constructively, objectively and constitutionally, with the hope of promoting peace.

Civil society on the other hand exerts pressure on government for the interest of its members. They try to get the government or other bodies to take notice of certain things or do something by bringing pressure to bear on such government or body. To democratically exert pressure, civil societies employ the following tactics: lobbies and diplomacy to influence the government for the benefits of its members. It must be stated that, the group is not presenting itself as a potential replacement for the existing government, rather, it usually only seeks to pressurize government into taking a desired line of action.

The main difference between pressure and interest group is semantic. Finally, we must consider certain factors which make both the opposition and civil society vibrant and robust. These are, change in the economy, government policy, the level of activism of the government and lastly, the sophisticated of both opposition and the civil society, in terms of memberships, ideology and resources at their disposal. Civil society can be classified into the following: communal groups, institutional group, associational group and anomic group. Whatever the group, interest is the key word, and their guiding principle. Democracy as an open market where politics is played is an ideal process or a series of events leading to the change, course of action, or systems of government.

Democracy entrenches and expands or seeks to entrench and expand the right, ability and capacity of the people in any community, small or large to take

control of their lives through democratic participation, focusing essentially on issues and events that affect them and their community. However, one the absurdity of our political architecture is the nature of state formation. That historical evidence is colonialism which made our environment to unattractive and unpredictable. Let us briefly mention some of these contradictions.

It is imperative to note from the onset that, where as in the advanced industrial society, there is generalized commodity production and exchange, and thus, there are market societies. However, in Africa there is limited commodity production and exchange, consumption and distribution of goods and services are rudimentary. Secondly, in the advanced industrial societies, rule of law takes the form of legal-rational domination, while an economic relationship appears to embody the interest of all. In Africa, political rule cannot take the form of legal-rational domination, because, the rules of economic relations do not embody the interest of all which are non-existence, attentive, assertive, objective and justified. Finally, due to the colonial experiences of African states, one major abnormal development became the non separation of the state from economic activities. Also, it is clear that, it was on the basis of state power that surplus values were extracted by the colonizer.

Recommendations

- The political class should encourage stronger institutions
- Electoral process should be ideologically rooted and issues based
- Civil society should changing the national narratives that reflect national interest
- Political parties should focus on governance and development

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ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT DEFICITS SPENDING ON ECONOMIC STABILITY IN NIGERIA (2000-2019)

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ABSTRACT

Today, many countries strive to develop programmes that can make them attain economic growth and economic stability. Nigeria as country is not an exception in the similar economic programmes. This research work titled "Assessing the effects of Government Deficit Spending on Economic Stability in Nigeria (2000 – 2019)" was empirically designed to ascertain the effectiveness and the contributions of the various options of sources of deficit financing that were available to the Nigeria government. The objectives of the study were to identify scientifically the contribution of the external source of financing, the Bank system of deficit financing, the non-banking public deficit financing, Exchange rate and inflation rate. At what degrees have those sources of deficit financing affected the Nigerian economy in terms of economic stability within the period under study 2000 -2019. The study applied ex-post –facto research design with the use of secondary data majorly sourced from CBN Statistical Bulletin where quantitative facts were obtained. Regression Analysis and Karl Pearson Correlation Coefficient were used for data analysis. The study revealed that external deficit financing was not positively contributory to Nigeria GDP. Other sources (independent variables) revealed their positive contributions to the GDP of Nigeria as at that time of study: it was found that the contribution of bank system deficit financing to Nigeria GDP was significantly positive with the probability of 0.027 less than standard p - value of 0.05; the study found out that there was a significant positive relationship between the non-banking public deficit financing and the Nigeria GDP with the probability of 0.011 quite less than the p - value of 0.05; it was equally found out that there was an insignificant positive contribution by exchange rate to Nigeria GDP in the years

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reviewed with the probability of 0.156 more than the standard p - value of 0.05; and finally it was found that there was a positive, but insignificant contribution by inflation rate to Nigeria GDP during the period under review with the significance level of 0.081 more than the p – value of 0.05. The study recommended that external deficit financing should be discouraged by the government except it has become unavoidably necessary; it was equally recommended that the government of Nigeria should encourage the usage of bank system of deficit financing and non-banking public deficit financing; government must avoid external borrowing whenever the exchange rate is high but to increase the rate of exportation of her products to attract foreign reserves; and finally there must be encouragement for individual investment, firms and government investments whenever there is high inflation rate.

Keywords: Economic Stability, Deficit Spending, Nigeria Government, External Deficit, Domestic Borrowing.

1. Introduction

Economic stability over the years has been the concern of virtually all nations of the world. Some countries have relatively gotten to some appreciable level of economic growth, but still strive towards maintenance of that level. Meanwhile some other developing countries are struggling to have a steady economic growth and there after work on the economic stability. Economic stability is a term that has been in focus for the past several years mainly because of the economic downturn experienced globally in the recent past. Economic stability measures the worth or strength and competitiveness of a country with other countries and it plays a very important role in policies making.

Countries formulate economic policies in order to bring macroeconomic activities to appreciable level. These economic policies are purely government's duty irrespective of their political allegiance. The unfortunate thing is that most of the economic policies put in place will amount to spending some good funds on infrastructural projects which the government may not have adequate fund to fund it or implement them; and that always result to deficit budgeting that mostly lead the government into taking loans. Another challenge could be how effective will the borrowed money be used to meet the economic target?

Nigeria like any heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) has low economic income, which domestic savings is insufficient to meet developmental and other national goals and objectives. Nigerian exports were primarily cash crops with export earnings too small to finance imports which are mostly capital intensive

goods. According to Ude, Ugwu and Onwuka (2016), compounding the problem is Nigeria's drift to mono economy with the discovery of oil. The oil sector generates about 95% of foreign exchange earnings and about 80% of budgetary revenue. The inability to diversify her revenue sources coupled with corruption and mismanagement compels Nigeria to have inadequate fund for growth and developmental projects such as roads, electricity, pipe borne water and the like.

In the opinion of Ude, Ugwu and Onwuka (2016), the quest for economic growth and development compelled Nigeria to acquire external debts. The first major loan of US$28 million by the Nigeria was acquired from World Bank in 1958 to finance railway construction. Ever since then, there has been accumulation of loans aimed at various development projects without obvious results as expected. According to Akinpelu (2020), the Nigeria's rising debt profile as at September 30, 2019 was ₦26.2 trillion. Of this amount, a total domestic debt is about ₦18 trillion that is 68.45 per cent. About ₦8 trillion are owed to foreign lenders. In June, 2020 both National Houses approved ₦850 billion borrowing request made by President Muhammodu Buhari, which was to be sourced from domestic markets to fund critical Capital projects in the 2020 budget.

According to Nigeria's Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA 2007), governments at all tiers shall borrow for only capital expenditure and human development at concessional terms (Section 41, 1(a). Restricting new debt to concessional loans, the requirements guard against loans with expensive repayment terms, which could impoverish the country. Furthermore, Nigeria's procurement laws require that projects of this magnitude undergo a competitive bidding process to ensure that the government gets value for money. The practices on most new loans, not just the China loans, deviate from these requirements. Many planned loans taken in the recent past and some of the planned ones are not for capital or human development expenditure. Rather than offering grants or concessionary loans, China provides huge project-related loans at market-based rates, without transparency, much less environmental- or social impact assessments. Almost all the loans from China, including the one under controversy, are at commercial market rates, not concessional terms, which makes repayment terms very expensive.

According to Akinpelu (2020), the Procurement Act is hardly followed: no public information is available on how these infrastructure projects were conceived and what appraisal process they went through, other than Presidential

and Federal Executive Council's approvals. There are no architectural or structural drawings for interested members of the public to view. Unlike loans by multilaterals like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and regional development banks whose agreements are publicly available, no China-related loan agreements have ever been publicly shared by successive governments in Nigeria (or China) since the Jonathan administration, and the current one under controversy got into public space by chance. The two issues around the FRA Act and the Procurement Act alone make the loans illegal even if ratified by the National Assembly. Any subsequent government can renege on future obligations to China on the grounds that the contract was void ab initio. Based on the Nigeria's Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA), it will be constitutionally wrong to approve the loan

Following Premium Times (2020), China's modus operandi is a source of concern. China is associated with lack of transparency in its dealings with governments, especially in the developing world. With its "debt-trap diplomacy", China uses its financial muscle to achieve important strategic and global objectives. Financing projects abroad allows it to boost its exports of goods and services. Most of China's financing is in the form of commercial loans tied to projects, often at onerous terms. Unlike multilateral and bilateral organizations' lending, Chinese loans are collateralized by strategically important natural assets with high long-term value (even if they lack short-term commercial viability). This is because China chooses its projects according to their long-term strategic value, and so they may yield short-term returns that are insufficient for countries to repay their debts (Premium Times, 2020).

The consistent increase in external loan taking by Nigeria led to the establishment of Debt Management Office (DMO) in October in 2000. Prior to the establishment of DMO, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was responsible for the management of national debts. At the moment, DMO works in collaboration with CBN and Federal Ministry of Finance. Borrowing money for development is good but when it has become the main means of financing projects and more so that there is danger in mismanagement and couple with servicing the debt. These were the reasons Sanusi in 2003 warned that raising Nigeria's debt is an impediment to the economic growth and development.

Persistent government budget deficits and computing government debt have become a major concern in both developed and developing countries (Oladipo

& Akinbobola 2011). The budget deficit is more in developing countries than the developed countries. The reason is that where the developed countries have reached in terms of infrastructural development, technological advancement, per capital income, the developing countries have not gotten there yet; and both are struggling for economic stability.

The introduction of a budget deficit is always traced to the Keynesian inspired expenditure – led growth theory of 1970s. A good number of countries in the world adopted the Keynesian theory that government has to motivate the aggregate demand side of the economy in order to stimulate economic growth. Olomola and Olagunju (2004) opined that the consequences of Keynesian theory on macroeconomic variables cannot be underestimated in most countries of the world, Nigeria inclusive. Olomola and Olagunju (2004) further said in their study that monetary policy has over the years in Nigeria been largely expansionary with direct implications for price inflation and exchange rates. Over the years, there has been a persistent rise in private consumption expenditures and developments in the external sector have also impacted strongly on the budget deficit. This is obvious from the earlier argument that the government policy on budget deficit has never been without implications either positive or negative.

This study used data analysis concentrated on some variables such as external deficit financing, banking system deficit financing, non-banking public deficit financing and exchange rate that are independent in nature and their implications on the economic stability via gross domestic product whether they have contributed positively or negatively in the year under review (2000 – 2019); the independent variables include exchange rate, External debt, loans from the bank system, loans from Non-banking public; and Exchange rate while the dependent variable will be Real Gross Domestic product as proxy to economic stability in Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

Following the Keynesian theory that encourages the government of any country to inject money into the circulation through project implementation and investment thereby increasing the consumption rate of government and private firms, the issue of government deficit spending through loan from private sector and other sources of financing has become the instruments to use in projects

financing. Economic growth such as increase in gross domestic product, full employment, low inflation rate and stability proxy of Gross Domestic Product being constant, stable or low inflation of any country is dependent on the contributory output of individual investors, firms, industries and government corporations which equally depend on the external borrowing, domestic financing and exchange rate. However, are the available sources; external loans, domestic borrowings whereby the government could use to realize its deficit budget reliable? Are those deficits financing instruments contributory enough to bring about the expected economic stability? To what extent has both external and domestic debt contributed; the exchange rate and inflation rate affected the economic stability in Nigeria within the years reviewed (2000 – 2019)? To address the problems stated, there is need to state the objectives of this nature of study.

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to assess the effects of government deficit spending on economic stability in Nigeria (2000 – 2019). The specific objectives are as follows:

i. To investigate whether the external deficit spending significantly contributed positively to economic stability of Nigeria (2000 – 2019).
ii. To assess the contribution of bank system of deficit spending to economic stability of Nigeria (2000 – 2019).
iii. To examine the effect of non-banking public deficit spending on the economic stability of Nigeria (2000 – 2019).
iv. To examine the contribution of exchange rate in the economic stability of Nigeria (2000 – 2019).
v. To assess the role of inflation rate in the economic stability of Nigeria (2000 – 2019).

Budget Deficit (Deficit Spending)

Budget is a statement of revenue and expenditure of an organization at a given time usually a year is required to be prepared, presented and signed by the right authority of every economy. Budget is a quantitative expression for a set time period of a proposed future plan of action by management (Ojo, 2014). Budget

is a financial tool for the planning of an economy. It is also a guide for executing any project that involves finances.

According to Ojo (2014), budget deficit refers to a situation where the total expenditure of government exceeds total revenue. It is a financial situation where more money is going out than the money coming in inform of revenue. It is also the situation that the revenue collected by the government through tax and any other source of income other than debt is less than the expected money or funds to be expended. The term is mostly used for government spending rather than individual spending.

Sources of Government Deficit Financing

Jhingan (2002), in Adesuyi & Falowo (2013) defines deficit financing as financing of the deliberating created gap between public revenue and public expenditure or a budget any deficit, the method of financing being one that results in the net addition to national outlay or aggregate expenditure.

Fisher and Easterly (1990) in Adesuyi & Falowo (2013) identify four ways of financing the deficit:

***Printing money – ways and means*:** In practice, the term printing money is often used as shorthand for what economists call quantitative easing. Quantitative easing is an attempt to increase the money supply buying more and more assets from banks without regard to an interest-rate target. Major global economies are responding to the COVI-19 induced recession by adopting unorthodox stimulus measures, including printing money. The US, the European Central bank, Japan, and even emerging economies such as Turkey and Indonesia are printing money to bring economies back to life.

***The use of foreign reserves*:** Foreign reserves can include banker notes, deposits, bonds, treasury bills and other government securities. These assets serve many purposes but are most significantly held to ensure that a central government agency has backup funds if their national currency rapidly devalues or become all together insolvent.

For emphasis sake, there is need to elongate the explanation on two of sources of deficit financing namely, external debt and domestic debt.

External Debt

External debt is the portion of a country's debt that is borrowed from foreign lenders through commercial banks, governments, or international financial

institutions. If a county cannot repay its external debt, it faces a debt crisis. If a nation fails to repay its external debt, it is said to be in sovereign default.

Historical Perspectives of Nigeria's External Debt

Following the Debt Management Office, Nigeria's external loan dates back before independence but remained small or insignificant till 1978. The oil boom of 1970 -1973 shielded Nigeria. However, with the recession in 1977/1978, Nigeria raised the first US$1 billion loan known as 'Jumbo Loan' from International Capital Market to finance infrastructural projects. In 1982, the fall in price was welcomed with massive external borrowing by federal and state governments from International Capital Market without any conscious effort to address the main problem in the economy. Nigeria's external debt moved from US$ 0.763 billion in 1977 to US$ 5.09 in 1978 and US$ 8.855 in 1980 representing 73-96% between 1978 and 1980 (DMO). By 1985, external debt of Nigeria was US$ 19 billion. By December 2014, external debt stood at over US$ 34 billion. This has continue to grow in an increase dimension till 2005, when President Olusegun Obasanjo argued that Nigeria needed debt relief as it was clear that she could not service and pay her debts. This request was granted in 2006.

However, Nigeria debt has started accumulating again with debt as at June 2015 , it stood at US$ 10.317 (Debt Management Office) meanwhile, as at December, 2018 ₦ 7.7 billion (CBN Statistical Bulletin). Today as at 31st March, 2020 Nigerian both external and domestic stands as shown in the table below:

Table 2.1 Nigeria's Total Public Debt Portfolio as at March 31, 2020

	Debt Category	**Amount outstanding (US$'M)**	**Amount Outstanding (₦'M)**	**% of Total**

A	Total External Debt	27,665.66	9,987,303.26	34.89%
B	Total Domestic Debt	51,637.65	18,641,190.37	65.11%
	FGN only	40,262.46	14,534,746.84	50.77%
	States and FCT	11,375.19	4,106,443.53	14.34%
C	Total Public Debt (A+B)	79,303.31	28,628,493.63	100.00%

Source: Debt Management Office, March 2020.

From table 2.1, it is clear that Nigerian external debt has increased to 27.7 million US Dollars which represents 34.89% of the total public debt of 79.3 million US Dollars as at 31st March, 2020. It is an indication of the external debt building up again.

Domestic Debt (Borrowing)

Domestic Debt is when the government borrows within the country which involves the same currency. Therefore, all the amount of money that government owes intentionally such as Treasury Bills, Treasury Certificates, Federal Government Development Stock, Ways and Means Advances and Treasury Bonds is regarded as domestic debt (Elom – Obed et all 2017), the authors also stated that economic growth according to many economists refers to when total value of all final output that a country can produce within a year valued at market prices as adjusted for price changes plus the imputed value of the economy's produced goods and services that do not pass through the market channel minus net income from abroad. ***Expenditure Behaviour of Federal Government of Nigeria Since 1981 to 2019***

Sequence upon the need for the government of any country to finance its deficit budget, there is need to equally examine what the government spend the borrowed funds on whether majorly on the economic activities or social or on administrative functions which is basically recurrent expenditure. Prudently, funds must not be borrowed for consumption, but should be spent on capital projects and human development that can boost the economic stability of the country. Below is the statistical data of the Nigeria Federal Government Spending since 1981 to 2019 which clearly show to us whether the nation has been spending money on what it ought to spend so much money or not.

Table 2.2 Federal Government of Nigerian Capital Expenditure vs Recurrent Expenditure since 1981 to 2019

	Administration (₦' Billion)		**Economic services (₦' Billion)**		**Social Community Services(₦' Billion)**		**Transfers (₦' Billion)**	
Year	**Capital**	**Current**	**Capital**	**Current**	**Capital**	**Current**	**Capital**	**Current**
1981	0.72	0.91	3.63	0.18	1.30	0.29	0.92	3.46
1982	0.39	1.04	2.54	0.20	0.97	0.33	2.52	3.93
1983	1.10	0.90	2.29	0.17	1.03	0.29	0.47	3.39
1984	0.26	1.10	0.66	0.21	0.24	0.35	2.94	4.16
1985	0.46	1.43	0.89	0.27	1.15	0.46	2.96	5.41
1986	0.26	1.45	1.10	0.28	0.66	0.47	6.51	5.50
1987	1.82	3.84	2.16	0.69	0.62	0.30	1.78	10.81
1988	1.90	5.78	2.13	1.22	1.73	2.11	2.59	10.30
1989	2.62	6.27	3.93	1.42	1.84	4.23	6.65	14.07
1990	2.92	6.54	3.49	1.61	2.10	3.40	15.55	24.67
1991	3.35	6.95	3.15	1.30	1.49	2.68	20.36	27.31
1992	5.12	8.68	2.54		2.13		30.18	

		3.08	1.34	39.93
1993	8.08 10.57	18.34 7.75	3.58 14.66	24.50 83.75
1994	8.79 20.54	27.10 3.91	4.99 10.09	30.04 55.44
1995	13.34 28.76	43.15 5.92	9.22 13.82	55.44 79.13
1996	14.86 46.55	117.83 4.75	8.66 15.99	71.58 57.20
1997	49.55 56.18	169.61 6.20	6.90 22.06	43.59 74.12
1998	35.27 50.68	200.86 11.57	23.37 21.44	49.52 94.40
1999	42.74 183.64	323.58 87.08	17.25 71.37	114.46 107.58
2000	53.28 144.53	111.51 28.59	27.97 84.79	46.70 203.69
2001	49.25 180.80	259.76 53.01	53.34 79.63	76.35 265.86
2002	73.58 266.51	215.33 52.95	32.47 152..19	0.00 225.15
2003	87.96 307.97	97.98 96.07	55.74 102.61	0.01. 477.65
2004	137.77 306.77	167.72 58.78	30.03 134.39	15.73 610.70
2005	171.57 434.67	265.03 64.31	71.36 151.65	11.50 670.60
2006	185.22 522.20	262.21 79.69	78.68 194.17	26.27 594.05
2007	226.97 626.36	358.38 179.07	150.90 256.67	23.04 527.17

2008	287.10 731.02	504.29 313.75	152.17 332.93	17.33 739.66
2009	291.66 714.42	506.01 423.61	144.93 354.19	210.20 635.75
2010	260.20 1,117.44	412.20 562.75	151.77 550.90	59.70 878.34
2011	231.80 1,262.40	386.40 310.50	92.85 785.44	207.50 956.18
2012	190.50 1,159.40	320.90 230.10	97.40 790.06	265.90 1,145.60
2013	283.65 1,111.82	505.77 291.23	154.71 844.07	164.27 967.83
2014	229.63 992.84	393.45 266.40	111.29 774.77	48.75 1,392.93
2015	226.81 1,228.99	348.75 257.36	82.98 807.59	159.82 1,520.01
2016	147.72 1,277.08	278.95 255.78	68.80 775.55	158.14 1,851.77
2017	328.94 1,324.30	542.19 334.87	167.66 931.68	203.51 2,189.12
2018	446.25 1,584.06	753.49 372.55	203.43 1,083.73	278.94 2,634.86
2019	NA	NA	NA	NA

Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin 2018

From the Table 2.2, between 1981–1986, the capital expenditure under economic services of the government was in constant increase compared to other federal government expenditure headings. (Administration, Social Community Services, and Transfers). This could be as a result of government economic policies with less attention to others.

However, from 1986 when privatization and commercialization programme came on board, the government of Nigeria started spending more money on

transfers than any other sectors of the economy with the figure of 5.5 billion naira. In 1995, the figure rose up to 79.13 billion naira. By 1997, capital expenditure on government economic services picked up again with 117.83 billion naira till 1999 with the highest figure of 323.58 billion naira compared to others.

In 1999 when President Olusegun Obasanjo came on board as the president of Nigeria under democratically elected government, the government expenditure in administration started rising with amazing figures, capital expenditure came to 42.74 billion naira and re-current expenditure amounted to 183.64 billion naira till 2013 that the figure of 1,111.82 billion naira in re-current went up. In 2014, the following year it dropped to 992.84 billion naira. By 2015, it rose again to 1,228.99 billion naira.

One notable point under transfers is that from 2006 both the capital and re-current expenditures started dwindling. This was probably as a result of cancellation of Nigerian external debt during Obasanjo regime, on till 2011 when the transfers particularly under re-current became constantly increasing with the figure of 1,145.60 billion naira in 2012, and by 2018, it rose to 2,634-86billion naira.

The critical issue therefore is, why was a nation Nigeria was borrowing for the re-current budget higher than the capital budget knowing well that it is the capital budget that usually create employment, giving boost to investments which create jobs for the citizenry leading to national income. Can there be rationality in spending borrowed money on re-current expenses than capital expenses?

***Concept of Economic Stability*:** The concept of economic stability is the absence of frequent fluctuation in macroeconomic activities. Economic growth gives birth to economic stability. An economy is known to be growing when there is an increase or steady growth of annual output with low or stable inflation rate and with full employment. The economic growth or stability is normally measured using Gross Domestic Product (GDP. While the GDP measures the economic size of the economy, the Real Gross Domestic Product measures the stability of output, stability of inflation at low level and the stability of full employment.

***Exchange Rate*:** According to Scott (2020), an exchange rate is the value of one nation's currency versus the currency of another nation or economic size. For example, how many US dollars does it take to buy one euro? As of July 31st,

2020, the exchange rate was 1.18, meaning it takes $1.18 to buy €1. As at 22nd October, 2020, Naira exchange rate with US dollar was 1US to NGN 381.51

***Concept of Inflation Rate*:** Inflation is a quantitative measure of the rate of which the average price level of a basket of selected goods and services in an economy increases over some period of time, often expressed as a percentage, inflation thus indicates a decrease in the purchasing power of a nation's currency. Take a look at the Nigeria's inflation rate in the last five years.

Inflation Rate in Nigeria from 2016 to 2020

2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
15.65%	16.52%	12.09%	11.40%	13.71%

Source: CBN 2020 Statistical Bulletin

From the table above, Nigerian inflation rate has been dwindling since 2016 to 2020.

Concept of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Gross Domestic Product is the value of the goods and services produced within the geographic boundaries of a country during a specific period of time, normally a year. GDP growth rate is an important indicator of the economic performance of a country. According to World Bank (2019), the Nigerian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was worth $448.10 billion in 2018. Following the World Bank official data and projection from Trading Economics, the GDP value of Nigeria represents 0.37 percent of the world economy

Review of Empirical Literature

Series studies have been embarked upon on the subject matter of Government deficit spending over some years. However, differences emerged from the results of the various scholars. The need to highlight some of these in this study is necessary.

Elom, Odo and Anoke (2017) studied on the "Public Debt and Economic Growth in Nigeria" with empirical analysis the relationship between public debt and economic growth in Nigeria from 1980-2015. The study adopted Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) approach of econometric data analysis. The variables used in their study include Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP), foreign debt, domestic debt and domestic private savings. The study had its findings as: Domestic debt had significant negative impact on economic growth within the period under study, External debt and domestic debt granger cause RGDP in Nigeria with causality running from external debt and domestic debt to RGDP. The paper recommended that" Government should reduce external debt

and the ones obtained should be strictly used for purposes intended to ensure positive effect.

Nwaeze (2017) in his research work "Fiscal Deficit, Financing options and macroeconomic stability in Nigeria: A disaggregated Approach" examines the relationship between fiscal deficits and macroeconomic stability in Nigeria from 1970 to 2016. Secondary data was used. The study employed descriptive statistics, unit root test, co integration and VAR estimation methods to analyze his data. The results of the variance decomposition revealed that interest rate, overall fiscal deficits and the size of fiscal deficits financed by domestic borrowing are the main shocks causing the variation in inflation; while overall fiscal deficits, the size of fiscal deficits financed by external borrowing and the size of fiscal deficits financed by domestic borrowing are the main shocks causing the variation in exchange rate in Nigeria. The study concluded that the fiscal deficits have significant negative impact on macroeconomic stability vis-a-viz inflation and exchange rates in Nigeria.

Nwaeze (2017), in his study "Fiscal deficit, financing options and macroeconomic stability in Nigeria: a disaggregated approach" empirically examine the relationship between fiscal deficit and macroeconomic stability in Nigeria from 1970 to 2016. The data for the empirical analysis was sourced from secondary sources such as statistical bulletin. The study used inflation rate and exchange rate to proxy macroeconomic stability whereas overall fiscal deficits, fiscal deficit financed by external borrowing, interest rate, money supply, foreign direct investment and external reserve balance are used as the endogenous variables. The study employed descriptive statistics, unit root test, co-integration and VAR estimation method to analyse the data. The result of variance decomposition revealed that the interest rate. The overall fiscal deficits and the size of fiscal deficits financed by domestic borrowing are the main shunks causing the variation in exchange rate in Nigeria. The study concluded that fiscal deficits have significant negative impact on macroeconomic stability vis-a-viz inflation and exchange rates in Nigeria. The study recommended that fiscal deficits should be moderated and financed chiefly through bonds as empirical finding suggested that both domestic and external borrowing options are detrimental to the macroeconomic stability on the Nigerian economy.

Odubuasi, Uzoka and Anichebe (2018) Studied in their study "External Debt and Economic Growth in Nigeria". The study empirically investigated the effect of external debt on the economic growth of Nigeria. External debt stock,

external debt service cost and government capital expenditure as indices for independent variables and Gross Domestic Product as the dependent variable. Secondary data for the period of 1981 – 2017 was collected and used. The study employed the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) to test for the rationality of the data, Granger causality was used to obtain the cause effect relationship among the variables and Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) for the long and short run relationships. The results indicated that external debt stock and government capital expenditure have positive and significant effect on economic growth in Nigeria, while external debt service cost is not significant in explaining economic growth. The study recommended that adequate utilization of foreign loan on capital expenditure will continue to stimulate the Nigerian Economy. Gap: The study failed to indicate the effect of external debt on GDP whether it was on the short run or on the long run.

Kharusi and Mbah (2018) studied "External Debt and Economic Growth: The Case of Emerging Economy". The study investigated the relationship between government external borrowing and economic growth, prompted by continuous increase in Oman's external debt to finance its annual budget. Time series for the period 1990 – 2015 were collected from the World Bank and Central Bank of Oman. The study employed Autoregressive Distributed Lag Co integration approach explains the error correction mechanism to ascertain the short-run dynamic nature of external debt and economic growth. The study revealed a negative and significant influence of external debt on economic growth in Oman. It was further found out that gross fixed capital was positively significant in determining growth performance in Oman. It was recommended that there should be more productive use of the external debt fund in order to affect positive growth. Gap: the recommendation of the study was a general one without specific areas of production expansion.

Solawon & Adekunle (2018) in their study titled "deficit financing and economic growth: an autoregressive distributed lag approach" described that despite the several fiscal measures introduced by the government in curbing excessive deficit, the growth of the Nigerian economy still remained at bay with citizens suffering from high level of unemployment, insecurity and poverty remained wide spread both in the urban and rural areas. It was with that respect the researched work evaluated the short run and long effect of deficit financing on the economic growth of Nigeria. The study used secondary data sourced from central bank of Nigeria statistical bulletin from 1986-2016. A test for unit root and co-integration using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and bound

test were used to test for stationarity and long run relationship among variables (Given as gross domestic product, budget deficit, money supply and external debt). The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) was employed to examine the relationships among the variables used. The result of autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) revealed that all the explanatory variables (Budget deficit, money supply and external debts) had positive effect on economic growth with budget deficit being insignificant. It was also revealed that the Nigerian government has been experiencing fiscal deficit in the recent years which resulted from insufficient government to finance government rising expenditure. Gap.

Ibrahim & Fara (2020), in their study "External Debt Stock and Economic Growth in Somalia had an estimated 5.5 billion dollars outstanding, due to many reasons,but showed that it had contributed a little or almost nothing to the overall GDP, and continued to dwindle. Thus, the study investigated the relationship between the external debt stock and economic growth in Somalia (1990 – 2016) using the Error Correction Model (ECM). The Augmented Dickey – Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkawski – Phillips – Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) unit root tests were carried out on all variables to ascertain their stationarity in which all of them were found to be stationary at first difference. Co –integration results of Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue showed that there was a long run relationship between external debt stock and economic growth in Somalia for the period 1990 – 2016. The ECM result showed that external debt stock negatively affeceted economic growth. That implied that when external debt stock increased, the economic growth reduced. The study concluded that the problem of high external debt stock was associated with inadequate debt management; borrowing for social and political reasons; poor performance of export sector to increase foreign exchange earnings, and lack of transparent loan cycles to make projects compete for the scarce resources.

3. Methodology

The study is descriptive in nature, using the *Ex-post facto* research design with the use of secondary data majorly sourced from CBN Statistical Bulletin where numeral facts were obtained: the external source of deficit financing, Banking System source of Deficit financing, Non-Banking Public deficit financing, exchange rate and Inflation rate) and economic stability variable proxy Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The population of this study covered the behaviours between the dependent variable known as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and independent variables such as external deficit financing (EXF), bank system of

deficit financing (BSF), non-banking public deficit financing (NBF), exchange rate (EXR) and inflation rate (IFR) within the years under review 2000 – 2019.

Following the above statement, the model of the study takes the following form:

$GDPt = \beta_o + \beta_1 EXF_t + \beta_2 BSF_t + \beta_3 NBF_t + \beta_4 EXR_t + \beta_5 IFR + \mu_t$

Karl Pearson Model

To further assess the effects of government deficit spending on economic stability, the researcher equally used Karl Pearson Model – Correlation Coefficient. The correlation coefficient formula finds out the relation between the variables. It returns the values between -1 and +1. We used below Pearson Correlation calculator to measure the strength of two variables:

$$\gamma_{xy} = \frac{n\sum xy - (\sum x)(\sum y)}{\sqrt{(n\sum x^2 - (\sum x^2)(n\sum y^2 - (\sum y)^2}}$$

Using the Karl Pearson Model, dependent variable (y) is used Proxy of GDP while independent variable are represented by X_s that is, EXF_t, BSF_t, NBF_t EXR_t and IFR_t

The study made use of Regression Analysis Model with the application of Stata model for the analysis of the data and also applied Karl Pearson model of correlation coefficient matrix model to show the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.

4. Result and Discussion

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
GDP	**20**	**47320.3**	**19013.15**	**3564.32**	**71408.68**

EXF	**20**	**6155.012**	**14557.66**	**438.89**	**67152.79**
BSF	**20**	**2734.858**	**1820.616**	**843.81**	**7147.2**
NBF	**20**	**2338.637**	**2489.131**	**54.44**	**7595.83**
EXR	**20**	**500.1715**	**1508.931**	**101.77**	**6905.3**
IFR	**20**	**12.0915**	**3.692332**	**5.42**	**18**

Table 4.2 Pearson Correlation matrix of Variables

	GDP	**EXF**	**BSF**	**NBF**	**EXR**	**IFR**
GDP	**1.0000**					
EXF	**-0.5030**	**1.0000**				
BSF	**0.8197**	**-0.1009**	**1.0000**			
NBF	**0.6224**	**0.2865**	**0.7494**	**1.0000**		
EXR	**0.3048**	**0.0288**	**0.1665**	**0.4661**	**1.0000**	
IFR	**0.0748**	**-0.2020**	**0.1128**	**-0.0217**	**0.0111**	**1.0000**

Table 4.3 Variance Inflation Factor vif

Variable	**VIF**	**1/VIF**
NBF	**5.11**	**0.195837**
BSF	**3.79**	**0.263786**
EXF	**1.65**	**0.605338**
EXR	**1.60**	**0.623997**
IFR	**1.06**	**0.943674**
Mean VIF	**2.64**	

regress gdp logexf logbsf nbf exr ifr

Linear regression Number of obs = 20
F(5, 14) = 69.30
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.9123
Root MSE = 6560.7

Table 4.4 Multiple Linear Regression

gdp	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
logEXF	-22252.38	7055.976	-3.15	0.007	-37385.94	-7118.815
logBSF	22598.19	9127.379	2.48	0.027	3021.904	42174.47
NBF	4.769423	1.635639	2.92	0.011	1.261326	8.277521
EXR	1.107271	.7382175	1.50	0.156	-.4760479	2.69059
IFR	1004.65	534.6125	1.88	0.081	-141.9799	2151.28
_cons	22890.32	41842.01	0.55	0.593	-66851.86	112632.5

Source: Stata Statistcal Software

4.2. Data Analysis

The data analysis focused on the result of regression analysis which includes: descriptive statistics, Pearson Correlation Matrix, Multiple Linear Regression.

Descriptive Statistics of the Study

In the study, table 4.1 represents the descriptive statistics of variables. The variables are external deficit financing, bank system deficit financing, non-banking public deficit financing, exchange rate, inflation rate and the economic stability in Nigeria proxy gross domestic product (GDP).

Table 4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables

Variables	obs	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
GDP	20	47320.3	19013.15	3564.32	71408.68
EXF	20	6155.012	14557.66	438.89	67152.79
BSF	20	2734.858	1820.616	843.81	7147.2
NBF	20	2338.637	2489.131	54.44	7595.83
EXR	20	500.1715	1508.931	101.77	6905.3
IFR	20	12.0915	3.692332	5.42	18

Note: OBS = 20. GDP is Gross Domestic Product, EXF is External Deficit Financing, BSF is Bank System Deficit Financing, NBF is Non-Banking Public Deficit Financing, EXR is Exchange Rate and IFR is Inflation rate.

The mean of EXF in twenty years of observation is 6155.012 while the minimum and maximum loan taken from external sources by Nigeria are

438.89 and 67152.79 billions respectively. This is more if you compare the maximum external borrowing with the domestic borrowing within the 20 years of deficit financing. The mean of BSF in twenty years of borrowing is 2734.858 with the minimum of 843.81 and maximum of 7147.2 billion naira. As mentioned earlier, the difference is quite significant as compared with external borrowing. The NBF has the mean of 2338.637. Weighing BSF with NBF, you notice that in terms of maximum borrowing, there is no significant difference, but minimally, the gap between BSF and NBF is much. That means the patronage the Nigeria government gave to BSF was more than that of NBF with 88% difference.

Between 2000 and 2019, Nigeria had witness a high exchange rate (EXR) with the mean of 500.1715 which is on the high side. The indication is that Nigerian currency had been disvalued as compared with U S dollars. The minimum and maximum had, were 101.77 and 6905.3 respectively. IFR in 20 years has a mean of 12.0915 with minimum of 5.42 and maximum of 18. This is an indication of high inflation rate if the mean is 12.0915; inflation with single digit is always preferable in order to boost economic stability.

Table 4.2.1 Pearson Correlation Matrix of Variables

	1	GDP	EXF	BSF	NBF	EXR	IFR
GDP	1	1.0000					
EXF	1	-0.5030	1.0000				
BSF	1	0.8197	-0.1009	1.0000			
NBF	1	0.6224	0.2865	0.7494	1.0000		
EXR	1	0.3048	0.0288	0.1665	0.44661	1.0000	
IFR	1	0.0748	-0.2020	0.1128	0.0217	0.0111	1.0000

Table 4.2.1, Pearson Correlation Matrix shows how correlated are the independent variables with dependent variable. That is, how external deficit financing (EXF), bank system deficit financing (BSF), non-banking public deficit financing (NBF), exchange rate (EXR) and inflation rate (IFR) are correlated with gross domestic product (GDP). The table also shows the correlation among the independent variables.

In table 4.2.1, every variable both dependent and independent variable is positively correlated with itself with 1.0000; that is a perfect positive linearity. EXF has a negative correlation with GDP of -0.5030 or -50% correlation with GDP, what this means is that for any unit increase of external deficit financing, it will bring about 50% decrease of gross domestic product. BSF has a strong positive correlation with GDP of 0.8197 or 81%, meaning a unit increase in bank system deficit financing will bring an 81% increase in Nigerian gross domestic product. Non-banking public deficit financing (NBF) equally has a strong positive correlation with GDP of 0.6224 or 62%, that is, a unit increase in NBF will bring a 60% increase in gross domestic product in Nigeria. Exchange rate has a very low positive correlation with GDP of 0.3048 or 30%, meaning that a unit increase of exchange rate will bring a low increase in Nigerian gross domestic product. Inflation rate has a very low and weak positive correlation with Nigerian GDP of 0.0748 or 7%, this indicates that inflation rate does not contribute significantly to gross domestic product, if it does; it is when the government use the inflation period to do investment instead of borrowing funds.

Table 4.4.1 Variance Inflation Factor (Test of Multicollinearity)

Variable	1	VIF	1/VIF
NBF	1	5.11	0.195837
BSF	1	3.79	0.263786
EXF	1	1.65	0.605338
EXR	1	1.60	0.623997
IFR	1	1.06	0.93674
Mean	1	2.06	

In statistics, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is the quotient of the variance in a mode with multiple terms by the variance of a model with the term alone. It qualifies the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression. Multicollinearity is the occurrence of high intercorrelations among two or more interdependent variables in a multiple regression model.

The rule of the thumb for interpreting the variance inflation factor (VIF):

1 = not correlated;

Between1 and 5 = moderately correlated;

Greater than 5 = highly correlated.

This study conducted the multicollinearity test between the independent variables in order to check for the multicollinearity among the variables and to get the data prepared for further analysis. If the correlation is more than 0.80,

the next step is to test for variance inflation variance (VIF). There is serious multicollinearity problem if the VIF is greater than 4. The way to solve the problem is by dropping one variable. If you check the data, it shows that there is no multicollinearity problem for the data under study given that there is no correlation that is greater than 0.8 and the VIF in this study are all less than 6.

Table 4.5.1 Multiple Linear Regression

GDP	**Coef**	**Robust Std. Err**	**t**	**p>1 t 1**
logEXF	-22252.38	7055.976	-3.15	0.007
logBSF	22598.19	9127.379	2.48	0.027
NBF	4.769423	1.635639	2.92	0.011
EXR	1.107271	.7382175	1.50	0.156
IFR	1004.65	534.6125	1.88	0.081
CONS	22890.32	41842.01	0.55	0.593

Note:

Number of Obs= 20

F(5, 14) = 69.30

Prob > F = 0.0000

R – Squared = 0.9123

Root = 6560.7

Coefficient of Determination (R^2)

The result shows that about 91% of the systematic variation in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is explained by the explanatory variables. This shows a good fit of the model, hence the independent variables are statistically significant in explaining variation in the GDP.

F – Statistic

The F – statistic gives 69.30 with a probability distribution of 0.000%. The F – statistic explains that the regression passed the significance test at the 1% level of significance. This shows that the estimate of the parameters is significant. This is good for forecasting and policy making.

4.4 Discussion on Findings

i) From the regression model table 4.5.1 above, 1% increase in external source of deficit finance (EXF), it leads to a -22252.38 decrease in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which reflects the fact that they are negatively related. Not just negatively related, but significantly impactful with the probability of 0.007 which is less than $\alpha = 0.05$ standard significance. This In regression analysis, the contribution of external deficit financing to Nigeria GDP was significantly negative with the probability of 0.007 less than the standard p - value of 0.05.

ii) From the Regression result table 4.5.1, it was discovered that a 1% increase in Bank System of Deficit Financing (BSF) will lead to 22598.19 increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which reflect the obvious fact that they are positively related in the regression result. The contribution of BSF is significant with the probability level of 0.029 of BSF which is less than $\alpha = 0.05$ as a standard for measuring the significance of independent variable. It was found out in regression analysis that the contribution of bank system deficit financing to Nigeria GDP was significantly positive with the probability of 0.027 less than standard p - value of 0.05.

iii) In table 4.5.1 of the regression result, it was found out that 1% increase in non-banking public finance (NBF) will lead to 4.769 increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which actually display the positive relationship between NBF and GDP with the significant level of 0.011 which is less than $\alpha = 0.05$ standard. Meaning, non-banking public financing has a significant impact in the Gross Domestic Product under the studied years 2000 - 2019.

The study found out in regression analysis model that, there was a significant positive relationship between the non-banking public deficit financing and the Nigeria GDP with the probability of 0.011 quite less than the p - value of 0.05. This means that a unit increase in non-banking public deficit financing, will lead to a significant increase in the GDP.

iv) In the regression result table 4.4, a 1% increase in Exchange Rate (EXR), will lead to 1.107271 increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), meaning that they are positively related with insignificant figure of 0.156 more than $\alpha = 0.05$. This means that since the exchange rate has positive relationship with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Nigerian in the years under review (2000 – 2019). This research found out in regression analysis that there was an insignificant positive contribution by exchange rate to Nigeria GDP in the years reviewed with the probability of 0.156 more than the standard p - value of 0.05.

v) Finally, following the regression table 4.5.1, 1% increase in inflation rate (IFR) will lead to 1004.65 increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which means that they are positively, but insignificantly related, with the insignificant figure of 0.081 more than $\alpha = 0.05$. It therefore means that though inflation rate has a positive contribution to GDP, which represent the economic stability in Nigeria, the contribution is not quite significant.

It was found out in regression analysis result that there was a positive, but insignificant contribution by inflation rate to Nigeria GDP during the period under review with the significance level of 0.081 more than the p – value of 0.05. Showing that although there is positive contribution, it is insignificant. That is, when inflation rate rises, the GDP goes down; and when inflation rate falls, the GDP rises.

5. Conclusion/ recommendations

From the statistical data analysis, it is clearly seen and can be inferred that deficit financing of government projects is good, but not all sources of financing are viable or positively contributory to the Gross Domestic Product of the nation Nigeria considering the years in view (2000 – 2019); External debt deficit financing did not contribute positively to the economic stability of Nigeria. Meanwhile, Bank system deficit financing and non-bank public deficit financing were positively contributing to the economic stability of Nigeria. It is therefore advisable for the government to look into the implications of any means of deficit financing before applying for it.

Based on the entire study and the findings, the following recommendations have become imperative:

i) Since external deficit financing did not contribute positively to the economic stability in Nigeria, the government of Nigeria is hereby advised not to go for external deficit financing, except it becomes unavoidably necessary.

ii) The study encourages the government of Nigeria to patronize the Bank System deficit financing whenever there is need to bridge the financial gap in the budget deficit since it contribute significantly to the economic stability in Nigeria. The reason has been that both the borrowed funds and the repayment of the principal and interest contribute to the GDP of the debtor country.

iii) It is equally recommended that aside patronizing the bank system of deficit financing, the government of Nigeria should look inward to floating shares, issue bonds, treasury bills and other non-banking public deficit financing sources. This is because they contribute positively to the economic stability of Nigeria.

iv) It is advisable that the government should stop borrowing from international financial institutions when there is a high exchange rate, rather increase the exportation of her products to attract foreign currencies with high value in order to boost its foreign reserves.

v) When the inflation is high, it is recommended that the government of Nigeria should go into investments, and equally advise individual and private firms to invest instead of hoarding the money. Put differently, the government should discourage taking loans when inflation rate is high, resulting from the fact that it has insignificant/negative contribution to the economic stability in Nigeria.

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THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The paper focuses on the roles of civil societies and opposition political parties in Nigeria's democratic experiment from 1999 to 2019 and investigates why our democracy is flawed with many crisis ranging from poor electioneering campaign strategies to poor voting behaviour. However, the relative roles played by the opposition political parties and civil society, in such State, makes the difference, interesting, and calls for a surgical comparative analysis. The methodology adopted was secondary source of data collection. Our findings showed that there is a strong organic linkage between opposition political parties, civil society, and democratization process on the one hand, and between development and stronger institutions on the other hand. Our preliminary conclusion is that, without vibrant civil society, and robust opposition political parties, the State cannot function properly especially in providing governance. Equally, for Nigeria to have a sophisticated and ideologically driven democratization process, civil society, opposition political parties and institutions of the State should be stronger, responsive, attentive and assertive, also, the electorate should participate in the political processes without hiding under any ideological cover of ethnicity, religion or prejudice. Part of our recommendation is that, stronger institutions are imperative for democratization processes.

Keywords: Pressure Groups, Weaker institutions, and Political Behaviour

Background to the study

Democracy as an open market where politics is played, to a greater extent holds a strong appeal among the ordinary people because of its values or principles, which include though not limited to the following; transparency, constitutionalism, free, fair, periodic and credible elections, independent of the judiciary, accountability, media, the rule of law, separation of power, electoral

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umpire, ideological rooted political and opposition parties, and civil society (Enojo, 2016) Drawing heavily from the above, it's imperative to note that, democratic ideology is the fragrance of democratic leadership as it provides the template for an evasive examination of democracy especially with specific reference to organic roles of institutions of the State, governance and development (Egwu, 2018). Lack of governance leads to disagreement or conflict and this is normal in a political system; its resolution makes the difference in politics.

Conflict is an inherent feature of all societies, and it springs from two roots that cannot possibly be eliminated; these are, material scarcity and disagreement over values which are to be authoritatively allocated in any given society taking into consideration of who gets what, when, and how these values are evenly distributed (Agara, 2017). The reason is predicated on the simple assumption that the material resources are limited in quantity and different people and groups often subscribe to so many and different values, principles, hiding usually under the ideological cover of ethnicity and religion (Orogun, 2017). No doubt, this situation obfuscates the core values of democratic participation and popular representation. However, since the modern State is a welfare state, the hope of democracy usually is that the outcome of any political conflict in whatever form will eventually create more winners rather than losers. Consequently, it is on rational scaffold such as this, that an effective grass-root political communication and mobilization strategy during election in Nigeria is wheeled into an intellectual theatre for an invasive examination especially, as we prepare for the 2019 general elections. Our fears, as usual, are the consequences of stronger institutions, lack of vibrant opposition political parties, robust civil society and ideology. These have made our democratic experiences or democratization journey more mysterious and dangerous to analysts for two obvious reasons: the unpredictability and immeasurability of our electoral political architecture. The consequences have been, limiting the democratic space and producing dictatorship. This are evidential considering the level with which governance is treated with levity, broad and senseless impunity, and careless primitive accumulation of state resources.

Perhaps, Nigeria's electioneering campaign is a quintessential laboratory for the study of the role of the Nigerian media, political culture, socialization and development. These variables certainly have intrinsic and remarkable implications on democratization process. The broad focus here is to explain the intrinsic variables, factors or conditions that underline the complexity,

elusiveness, fluidity and absurdity of poor grass-root political communication, mobilization and political violence, focusing essentially on the opposition parties and civil society as far as information dissemination is concerned. There exists therefore a very strong organic linkage or relationship between the media, effective grass-root political communication, mobilization, political violence, ethnic crisis and the issue of poverty, break-down of law and order, and vibrant opposition political parties, robust civil societies, and underdevelopment. With all reasonable validity and without prejudice to any legal court or institution, it is imperative to assert that the role played by the Nigerian opposition political parties and civil society, media, politicians, and political stakeholders regarding electioneering is ambivalent and it's nature and origin is deeply rooted in colonialism and imperialism. We need to change the narratives and reconstruct our political communication strategies for an effective grass-root mobilization during and after elections through identifying new variables in contemporary or globally competitive political culture, socialization, participation, and representation.

Statement of the Problem

Civil society and opposition political parties in Nigeria have plethora challenges mutual contradictions on our democratization process beginning from 1999-2019 simply because they are not vibrant, robust and lack sophisticated ideology. These challenges have historical conditions, which include the followings: colonialism, imperialism, globalization, ethnicity, religion, and weaker institutions. The combinations of all these factors have made our political parties, opposition political and civil society not to provide moral supervision and intellectual leadership in our system. This situation has created tension, crisis, and conflicts as we relate and engage each other in one form of economic, political or social activities. Production, exchange of goods and services, distribution, consumption and service delivery are being distorted or hampered in a political cobweb of history. These have been the ritual of our political story.

There cannot be democracy without political parties, and civil society plays imperative role in democratization process. Beyond this, are the relative roles of opposition political parties, as vanguard of any democratic society or systems. Unfortunately, this is however, missing. Maybe, we should highlight some of those contradictions. There has been lack of infrastructural development and the resultant effects have been poverty, inequality, and unemployment with multiplier consequences on corruption, insecurity and distrust, thereby, making

governance appears like mystery. Apart from the 2012, January Occupied Nigeria (Pump Price increment by President Jonathan administration), ASUU strikes, NLC strikes and other strikes organized by either pressure groups, or labour unions, there has not been a serious attempt to make leaders at all level of governance keep to the promises made during elections or while taking oath of office. The implications of all these on the political system are obvious for numerous reasons, one of such is that, party policies and programmes would not be followed because there is no safety valves or monitoring agencies to compel or ask constructive questions on service delivery.

Our preliminary conclusion is that, lack of opposition political parties and civil society in our political architecture has created more democratic contradictions for our democratization process. Furthermore, we consider the issues of political culture, socialization process, and ideology as core factors that consolidate and compliment democratization process.

Research Questions

1. Could lack of stronger opposition political parties and vibrant civil society be attributed to poor absence of political culture and socialization process?

2. How do the relative roles of opposition parties and civil society affect democratization process?

3. What other alternative approach can be adopted to make our democratization process effective and ideologically rooted with emphasis on providing infrastructural development?

Objective of the Study

The broad objective of the study is investigating the contradictions of democratic governance in Nigeria from 1999 to date, with emphasis on lack of stronger opposition political parties and civil society. However, the specific objectives are to:

- Examine how lack of stronger opposition parties and civil society are direct consequences of poor political culture and socialization process.

- Determine how the roles of opposition political parties and civil society affect democratization.

- Suggest other alternatives approaches that will promote democratization process.

Literature Review

There is a fundamental crisis of governance at all levels in Nigeria, and the most graphic illustration of this is the tendency for the ruling elites at all levels to rule without some notion of governance as a social contract which is implicit in the mandate freely given during elections (Egwu, 2006). The primary explanation for this is that, democratic governance and sustainable development in Nigeria has been treated with levity without due regards to an effective grass-root political communication and mobilization of the electorate. This is the failure of opposition political parties and civil societies that are neither strong nor robust. Consequently, the fundamental objectives and direct principles of state policies between 1999 and 2017 both at the federal and state level were a crude record not of history, but of human fantasy arising from emotional need and desire for primitive accumulation of wealth and that the electoral, economic, political and social reforms had not been of historical achievement and ethics (Akpotor, 2004, Enojo, 2010, and Ndubisi, 2016). There is therefore a direct nexus or connection between democratic governance, sustainable development and vibrant opposition political parties and robust civil society. The consequence will promote an effective electioneering campaign, the rule of law, and due process of One Person, One PVC, and One Vote advocacy programme canvassed by many civil society and The Bliss Foundation, a non-governmental organization.

At the core of the crisis of democratic governance in Nigeria Fourth Republic is the legacy of party system without ideologies, weak state, dysfunctional elites, externally designed political, economic and social reforms and of course, poverty, injustice, unemployment, inflation and ethno-religion conflicts (Egwemi, 2015). Conservatively, all these promote underdevelopment and encourage anthropological parity among ethnic group and nationalities. However, the cultures that compose it have ancient roots. That root is colonialism and imperialism. The country's ethnic, regional and religious divides have been in sharp focus of important, making political actors and players to suggest the breaking up of the country into a weak federation if a way cannot be found to distribute political and economic power in a manner all can accept. It is against this stark reality that parties and policies must be viewed in

Nigeria from 1999-2015 with regards to lack of effective grass-root political communication and mobilization.

Egwu (2006) argues, “In one sense, then, there are "many” Nigerians. That is there are distinct political cultures with pre-colonial origins, and there are varied colonial experiences of North, East and West”. The pre-occupation of the World Bank with issues of good governance and a more accountable framework of democratic governance, which translates to a concern with sustainable development, is a positive response to the episodic history of development and democracy in post-independence Africa. The post-independence political leadership jettisoned democracy and resorted to the abuse of the public Space. They observed the constitution only in breach and replaced a culture of kleptocracy with a culture of prudence and frugality in the process; they perverted and subverted the process of development, and resorted to the abuse of laid down procedures for personal gains. Thus, the World Bank itself, once a supporter of “strong” governments and dictatorial regimes on the continent made a voltre face in the 1990s when it realized that the absence of democracy and a leadership that is accountable had robbed Africa of the opportunity to overcome the basic crisis of development (Egwu, 2006, Akpotor, 2004, Nnoli 2003).

Sustainable development leading to democratization process may not be achieved without democratic governance, accountable, transparent leadership and a holistic effective grass-root political communication and mobilization. These are the relative roles of opposition political parties and civil societies. This is perhaps, predicated upon the assumption that the conscious management of regime structures enhances the legitimacy of the public realm, and generates trust for citizenry. Structurally speaking, in its formulation on governance, the World Bank tends to put more emphasis on the management of the country’s economic and social resources for development, and by so doing, divest the concept of its political overtones in favour of economic policy and management. The importance and strength of “good government” approach lies in the fact that it “promotes certain political factors, especially democracy, the rules of law, and human rights on the grounds that markets and government will only remain efficient if they are held to account by voters and consumers the public. The global economic recession is an issue.

What this then suggests is that, regardless of reservation, which we have about the notion of governance, there are positive values in the governance discourse

to be cultivated and engaged with, in creative manner, and this is only possible through grass-root political communication and mobilization. Thus, embedded in the notion of governance are the values of accountability, transparency, respect for rule of law, and removing the culture of arbitrariness and crude impunity. The key elements of democratic governance are: accountability, transparency, openness, answerability, enforcement and responsiveness. It is within this meaning that democratic governance promotes the core values of democracy, which among others, include the following:

- Separation of power between the three major branches of government, which is most pronounced in the presidential system, but not strictly based on water tight compartment;

- The rule of law by which ensures that everyone is bound within the confines of the law irrespective of social standing places limit on the exercise of power by those in authority, and provides guarantee against all forms of arbitrariness;

- Accountability which requires that power holders and power spenders must account for their actions, and seeks to replace the culture of impunity in the public sphere;

- Independence and impartial judiciary, which gives the judicial arm the power of judicial review that could become the basis of enactment of new laws. But this requires that all citizens must have access and can find genuine avenues of seeking redress as a means of avoiding recourse to justice;

- The protection of the fundamental human rights of citizens such as the right to dignity of the human person, personal liberty, civil liberty and fair hearing;

- Political parties to advance the rights of citizens to make choices from exiting alternatives and as the infrastructure for competitive elections;

- Free mass media that disseminates information to the public based on some sense of social responsibility, supported by a legal environment that guarantees access to information;

- Constitutionalism; the requirement that all persons in a given state, especially, holders of public office, should adhere strictly to the spirit and letters

of the law; (for instance, see Egwu, 2006, Akpotor, 2004, Nnoli, 2003, Appadorai, 1972; The 1999 Constitution, and Sargent, 2001);

Critically examined, the aforementioned are linked to the idea of the robust Social Contract Theory as expounded by the early philosophers of the Modern society and the State. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau probably provide clear ideas of the Social Contract as the moral basis of rule by which leaders and followers are mutually involved in a system of reciprocity of obligations and duties or what is referred to as a social construction of reality and a web of ideas. The development of the theory of representative democracy, the centrality of elections as the basis of conferring the mandated to rule disrespect the social contract the people have the moral obligation to question and change them. In the Nigerian context, the people can exercise this right at periodic elections and can recall representatives that fail the people; after all periodic election is a political ritual. Here lie the contradictions. One of such is the nature of political participation and representation that exist in Nigerian fourth republic. The period witnessed so many crises relating to elections. This situation made many analysts to question the importance of politics in a democratic environment. Conflict and society are bound together in a complicated political, economic, religion and social web and to separate them is empirically and theoretically not robust; such an attempt would amount to a preposterous thesis, impressionistic, misleading and artificial.

When we consider the postulation of Aristotle when he said, man is a political animal, and then we remember the various definitions given by so many scholars concerning the concept of politics in its true meaning, principle and value. For instance, Harold and Kaplan (1950) argue that politics is the process of making and execution of governmental decisions or policies. Easton (1957) sees politics as the authoritative allocation of values and resources within the political system Merki (1967) defines politics as the quest for power, order and justice within any given human society. Politics is seen as the art of influencing, manipulation and controlling other (Quincy, 1955). Austin (1975) describes politics as the process of resolution of conflict in society. Vernom (1960) views politics as a struggle among actors pursuing conflicting desires on public issues. Politics means striving to shape power or striving to influence the distribution of power among individual and groups within a social state (Webber, 1947).

Politics or a political event includes what happens around the decision-making central to government. Politics is the shaping and sharing of power and who gets what, when and how (Hamid, 1950). What is central to this research is that politics arises to resolve contradictions and this can perhaps be achieved in democratic environment. Such democratic space must accommodate political parties, pressure groups and politically conscious citizens that would participate in the democratic process either as electorates or representatives. At the core of these activities are the roles of ideology and the level of political consciousness of citizens (TMG report, 2003).

The absence of the aforementioned creates crisis and one of such crisis is bad governance, leadership and lack of development. Development in human society is a many-sided process. Rodney (1972:29) argues that at the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being. Some of these are difficult to evaluate -depending as they do on the age in which one lives, class origins, and one's personal code of what is right and what is wrong. At the level of social groups, therefore, development implies an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relationship. The implication of the above statement is that without an effective grass-root political communication and mobilization during elections, there cannot be development.

Central to this assumption also, is the core value of personal achievement and development in a holistic formation. What is indisputable is that the achievement of any of those aspects (Walter Rodney mention reference to personal development is very much tied in with the state of the society as a whole. From earlier times, man found it convenient and necessary to come together in groups to hunt and for the sake of survival. The relations whom develop within any given social group are crucial to an understanding of the society as a whole. Freedom, responsibility, skill, etc have real meaning only in terms of the relations of men in society. Of course, each social group comes into contact with others. The relations between individuals in any two societies are regulated by the form of the two societies. Their respective political structures are important because the ruling elements within each group are the ones that begin to dialogue, trade or fight, as the case may be.

This study notes that, if we have learnt nothing about the development process, we have learnt that development cannot be imported. It is a process of deliberate change that must be sustained by the government and the people within each

country, a process that should work to the benefit of all. Consequently, a country was said or considered to be engaged in development planning if the government made deliberate and continuous attempt to accelerate the rate of economic and social progress and to alter institutional arrangement which were considered to block its attainment of this goals and objectives (Bhatia (2004). This suggests that, without adopting a new strategy of effective grass-root political communication and mobilization during elections, we cannot continue to claim that Nigeria is the giant of Africa. The situation has also made democratic governance and the crisis of sustainable development in Nigerian Fourth Republic a disinterested examination of our political system even though it has been a period of robust democratization experiment and validation The contradiction lies 1n the failure of our elected leaders at all levels to bring develop

ment starting from the grass-root through effective political communication and mobilization. This is because, the basic hypothesis and core assumption of democracy was that the richer and more prosperous development a country gets, the greater the chances of it will sustain human needs (Godwin and Abubakar, 2005). The central focus of this work is to consider some of the psychological motives which have been put forward as an explanation of unemployment, poverty and inequality in Nigerian Fourth Republic. While admitting that those factors might be relevant to the explanation of the crisis of governance especially as it relates to the management of elections, the study dismisses them as not constituting major causes rather the dominant motive is not far from the primitive accumulation of national wealth, peace and bellicosity. This resulted in poverty and other social vices. The work considers colonialism, imperialism and privatization reform. Colonialism and African politics deeply centered on certain values that have intrinsic implications on personality of Africans. Though, there exist some level of unity and harmony, it starts and ends as unity of race or pigmentation. Ethnicity and class have root in whatever anybody does. Perhaps, this explain why people voted the way they did in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015. Nigerians have achieved brilliance without conscience, high moral and ethical values. All these are only a flagrant demonstration of the most galling aspect of colonialism, imperialism, ethnicity and religions due to lack of effective grass-root communication, mobilization, political culture, representation, participation and socialization.

Nature of the African State

The African socio-economic formation is different from that of the advanced industrial capitalist societies of Europe and America. The African socio-economic formation is characterized by uneven and combined development of the different modes of production. There is the capitalist sector which exists in combination with the pre-capitalist sector at various stages of disintegration. While the capitalist enclaves (urban areas) are engaged in the production of exchange values, the pre-capitalist formations are engaged in the production of subsistence. The relation among producers is mechanist, while specialization in production is rudimentary. Consequently exchange production and exchanged relations is limited and markets not fully develop (Ake, 1981). The State in Africa like in every other society is the organized instrument of the ruling class. However, the specific characteristic of the state in Africa is the result of the specific historical condition of its emergence and development. That historical condition is colonialism.

Colonialism shaped the nature of the state and society in Africa as well as the dynamics of the ruling class. The historical specificity of the colonial state in Africa ruled out certain similarities between it and the state in the advanced capitalist societies of Europe. In the advance capitalist societies of Europe, the state was the classic state in the sense that it was the instrument of the capitalist class which emerged with it from the feudal mode of production, to maintain its domination over the other classes in the capitalist society. On the other hand the task of the colonial state was two-folds and different. The task of the colonial state was to:

- Conquer and subdue the people of the African colonies in such a way as to make it easy and cheap to exploit their material and human resources.

- Establish capitalist relations of production in the African colonies in such a way as to guarantee surplus value to the capitalist in Europe (Enojo, 2012).

While the state in Europe maintained domination over the non-capitalist classes of Europe, the state in Africa exercised domination over the African people as a whole. And while the European state regulated the operation of the capitalist mode of production in favour of the bourgeois class, the state in Africa had first to create the capitalist mode of production, make it dominant in the society and make it yield profits for European, changed the character of the state directly, actively and more extensively in the economic, social, cultural and political life

of the people than was the case in Europe. Furthermore, civil society associated with the institutions of state power and which support and reinforce these institutions had either not emerged or well developed. Thus civil society in Africa is not attentive and assertive. In Europe, civil society and the capitalist mode of production emerged before the capitalist state (Ake, 1996).

Consequently, the state in Africa lacks autonomy because its power base is not in society. Thus the state is not in a position to mediate class struggle, since it is itself involved in the struggle on the side of the dominant faction of the ruling class. In such a situation the realization of the law of value is hampered and the development of productive forces is slowed and primitive accumulation of resources reins with massive intervention of force in the labour process. At the political level, the struggle for the control of state power becomes warfare. Power is overvalued and security lies only in getting more power. Might is co-extensive with right, and the implication of all this for democratization process and sustainable development is obvious.

The weakness of civil society which has resulted in the non-autonomisation of the state limits the changes of mediating contradictions between members and fractions of the capitalist class. Consequently, the contradiction within this factitious class has made intra-class political competition very grim and placed high premium on political power, to the detriment of governmental and political stability. The tone of class struggle is at by the limited development of civil society and consequently the limited autonomisation of the system and mechanism of domination (Ake, 1981, Nnoli, 2003).

The weakness of civil society and the resultant non-autonomisation of the state have accentuated the usual contradictions, rendering them particularly difficult to mediate. This is particularly true with the persistence of primary loyalties and ethnic solidarity has made the coherence within the dominant class more difficult. Furthermore, the weak nature of civil society makes for the nominal existence of law; the law does not pertain to all. It openly expresses the interest of any faction of the dominant class in government. In this circumstance, competition, whether economic or political is often norm-less. In so far as contradictions, or conflicts cannot be mediated and differences are made absolute, there is high premium on political power as the means of welfare and security, so that political competition becomes exceptionally intense and tangentially norm-less.

In Nigeria, the weak nature of civil society means that the ruling class cannot establish its hegemony on the society. The consequence of this is decisively obvious; dominance of the fractious ruling class can mainly be maintained through force. This means that the coercive apparatuses of the state, namely the Army and the Police becomes pervasive in society, this becomes more so because of the high premium placed on politics and unrestrained nature of political competition. Within the African state, the resources of physical coercion become a tool of a particular group, especially the dominant fraction of the ruling class. Since political competition is grim and norm-less. This is a situation of raw power, as security and rights depends on the control of political or economic power. The struggle for power is everything and pursued by every means. The implication of politics turning into a battle is the militarization of society by the fraction of the ruling class in government.

Structural-Functional Approach

Structural functionalism has been found particularly useful in the comparison of political systems. Taking Easton's systems analysis as a starting point, Almond looks for the functions which could be included among the input and output functions of all political systems. On the input side are the functions of (1) interest articulation and (2) interest aggregation. Second, on the output side are the functions of (3) rule making, (4) rule-application and (5) rule ac1udication. The functions of (6) political communication is undertaken to inform all within the political system and outside of these diverse activities. Additionally, every system performs (7 systems maintenance and adaptation functions through political socialization and recruitment of people. According to Almond, the functioning of any political system may also be viewed in terms of its capabilities defined as 'the way it performs as a unit in its environment.' The concepts of regulative, extractive, distributive, and responsive capability are employed as criteria to assess how a system is performing within its environment, how it is shaping its environment, and how it is being shaped by it (Almond, 1964).

Almond's formulations have been faulted on three grounds by this study. First, it has been noted that it is not easy to distinguish between the 'deliberate aims of the participants and what takes place because the system seemed to achieve certain aims.' Second, the identification of functions is alleged to rest on the interpretation the analyst places on observed developments thus there cannot be complete objectivity. In effect, the number of the identified functions can be more or less than the seven listed by Almond. Third, the approach has been seen

as culture-bound since the functions attributed to the political system are too closely modeled on Western political systems. However, Almond's structural function approach has been recognized as the major existing tool for genuine comparative analysis of political systems and has been described as a 'fairly realistic interpretation of the political life.'

The Relative Deprivation, Rising Expectation, Frustration and Aggression

The second is the relative deprivation, rising expectation, frustration and aggression Model. This is the most fundamental and generally accepted behavioural framework in the understanding and explanation of political violence in both social and natural sciences. It is otherwise referred to as integrative psychological approach. This framework is derived from the works of Ted Gurr (1970), John Dollard (1939), Leonard Berkowitz (1962), and Robert Rotberg (1989). The major assumption of this model is that aggression is always a consequence of discontent of expectation and desires.

The frustration-aggression hypothesis was first postulated by Dollard, who submitted that the primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be as a result of the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration is a motivating force that disposes man to aggression whenever anger is induced uncontrollably. Equally, drawing heavily from relative deprivation as a form of frustration, Ted Gurr (1970) has argued that relative deprivation is a necessary condition for violence. Gurr defined relative deprivation as "a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectation and their value capabilities". Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions consider and hope they are capable attaining and maintaining, given the social means available to them. Some of the variables that could affect the intensity of emotional response to the perception of deprivation are that:

- That the greater the extent of discrepancy that men see between what they seek and what seems to be attainable, the greater their anger and consequent disposition to aggression,

- Men who feel they have many ways to attain their goals are less likely to become angry when one is blocked than those who have few alternatives. Access to greater opportunities is an important factor here.

- That the greater the intensity of men's expectations, the greater their anger when they meet unexpected or increased resistance (Gurr, 1970).

The Relevance of these Theories to our Discussion

The apparent collapse of the military regime in 1999 was the most dramatic development in the Nigerian politics, but it has made our political system less predictable, unstable and unrealistic. To add to the confusion, Nigeria democracy has been regularly misused and misunderstood. The political class has failed to bring development and governance at all levels of leadership, rather what we have is growth without development as poverty, insecurity, corruption, unemployment and poor service delivery has degenerated unprecedented on monumental scale and without any justified logic or reasons. Aside, we have political, economic and social activities centralized through the use of what we may refer to as ''Briefcase NGOs'' as conduit pipes for fraud without clear missions to the Nigerian people. There is also the issue of monopolization, centralization and organization of crimes or violence by the elites at all levels of governance as reflected in the various cases of state-murder without bringing the perpetrators to book or justice. Furthermore, there is the issue of lack of transparency, accountability and near absence of power generation, distribution and service to consumers. There are also the crises of near or total collapse of infrastructures such as roads, education, hospitals, markets, railways-lines and unhealthy economy. Though these challenges are not peculiar to Nigeria as an African country, yet, it contradicts democratic governance. Their explanation is deeply rooted in the two theories adopted. However, we have decided to focus on development, governance, politics and their consequences on national development and security of our cooperate existence.

Discussion, Findings and Analysis

The basic contradiction of our democracy is that, political parties whether ruling or opposition are only concern about forming the government, thereby, leaving the real fundamental functions of what political party does. No doubt, this attitude has create two challenges for our democratization which are the promotion and sustenance of low political culture and socialization on the one hand, and on the other hand, making governance lack legitimacy and relevance, thereby making the promotion of peace difficult.

Civil society is the aggregate of non-governmental organizations, and institutions that manifest interest and will of the citizens. Civil society includes the family and the private sphere, which is also referred to either as the Third Sector or Volunteer-land. Civil society is further considered as a community of citizens linked by common interests and collective activity. Broadly speaking therefore, civil society is different from government, and business. Though they

work in the interest of the citizens, they operate outside of the government as nonprofit organizations. Major focus should includes, social issues such as liberties, better education systems, combating diseases, and climate change and raise money for less privileges. The media as the fourth estate of the realm should join hand in the promoting democratization.

The opposition comprises of one or more political parties or the other organized groups that are opposed to the government or administration. The opposition main role is to question the (ruling) government of the day and help them accountable to the people. Opposition represents an alternative government, and is responsible for challenging the policies of the government and providing alternative policies where appropriate. The summary is that, opposition provides practical criticism of the ruling party, engage in consultation when important appointments are made, and leader to represent the interests of the non-dominant parties. However, this should be done constructively, objectively and constitutionally, with the hope of promoting governance.

Civil society on the other hand exerts pressure on government for the interest of its members. They try to get the government or other bodies to take notice of certain things or do something by bringing pressure to bear on such government or body. To democratically exert pressure, civil societies employ the following tactics: lobbies and diplomacy to influence the government for the benefits of its members. It must be stated that, the group is not presenting itself as a potential replacement for the existing government, rather, it usually only seeks to pressurize government into taking a desired line of action. The main difference between pressure and interest group is semantic. Finally, we must consider certain factors which make both the opposition and civil society vibrant and robust. These are, change in the economy, government policy, the level of activism of the government and lastly, the sophisticated of both opposition and the civil society, in terms of memberships, ideology and resources at their disposal. Civil society can be classified into the following: communal groups, institutional group, associational group and anomic group. Whatever the group, interest is the key word, and their guiding principle.

Summary and conclusion

Democracy as an open market where politics is played is an ideal process or a series of events leading to the change, course of action, or systems of government. Democracy entrenches and expands or seeks to entrench and

expand the right, ability and capacity of the people in any community, small or large to take control of their lives through democratic participation, focusing essentially on issues and events that affect them and their community. However, one the absurdity of our political architecture is the nature of state formation. That historical evidence is colonialism which made our environment to unattractive and unpredictable. Let us briefly mention some of these contradictions.

It is imperative to note from the onset that, where as in the advanced industrial society, there is generalized commodity production and exchange, and thus, there are market societies. However, in Africa there is limited commodity production and exchange, consumption and distribution of goods and services are rudimentary. Secondly, in the advanced industrial societies, rule of law takes the form of legal-rational domination, while an economic relationship appears to embody the interest of all. In Africa, political rule cannot take the form of legal-rational domination, because, the rules of economic relations do not embody the interest of all which are non-existence, attentive, assertive, objective and justified. Finally, due to the colonial experiences of African states, one major abnormal development became the non separation of the state from economic activities. Also, it is clear that, it was on the basis of state power that surplus values were extracted by the colonizer.

With the aforementioned, most opposition political parties and civil societies in Africa sees government as mystery either because of pork barrel politics or primordial sentiments. With this attitude, it is difficult to create, sustain and promote desired peace. There is lack of legitimacy and consensus on the minds of the citizens, because, the activities of the opposition and civil society are not clearly defined.

Peace is not the absence of war, but rather, it also implies tranquility, freedom from disturbance. Peace is the concept of harmony and absence of hostility, lack of conflict and freedom from known and unknown fears. Ted Gurr, in his book, Why Men Rebel, located the cause of conflict as relative deprivation, rising expectation, frustration, aggression and anger. We strongly see land as an important factor of production. Unfortunately, population is increasing, more and more people are drifting to urban cities, and pressure is much for both the family and government. We therefore recommend three areas of focus for both the opposition apolitical parties and the civil societies as a way to promoting peace and unity in our environment. Discussions should be ideologically rooted,

and must be issues based. Emphasis should be on development and governance. Development to Dudley Seers should focus the following questions: what has been happening to the level of poverty, inequality and unemployment. If two out of the three has improved, there is development, but if otherwise, there is no development. Walter Rodney noted that development is a two sided process, at the level of the individuals; it implies increased skills and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, responsibility, self discipline, and material wellbeing, while at the level of the social groups (Dudley, 1987 and Rodney, 1972).

Ability for the state to harness the potential to be able to defend, protect the territorial integrity from internal and external invasion while promoting peace and keeping the environment safer. Both the opposition and civil societies need to make such emphasis very clear. Closely related is the concept of governance which focuses on the following: voice accountability, absence of political violence, assassination and terrorism, regulatory control, effectiveness, the rule of law, and reducing corruption. These should the templates to gauge the political temperature of the ruling poling party. With this knowledge, they will be holding institutions to account and promoting transparency, raising awareness of social issues, delivery services to meet education, health, food and security needs. Furthermore, implementing and preventing disaster management, preparedness and emergency response, bringing expert knowledge to shape policy and strategy of government.

To consolidate and defend democracy people participate through representation. This is why political parties (ruling and opposition) and civil societies exist. Both are the heart and engine of democracy, because of their relative roles in promoting infrastructural development. If we concentrate on the structural functional model of analysis, and relative deprivation, rising expectation, frustration and aggression model, we are likely to have a preliminary conclusion that inputs and outputs from the systems is imperative to promoting political growth and development. One the hand we have interest articulation and interest aggregation (Performed by the People), and on the other hand, we have rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication (Performed by the three arms of government).

However, political communication and systems maintenance role is undertaken by both the opposition political parties and civil societies groups through the traditional media outlets, such as, radio, television, newspapers, journals, magazines, and recently, the social medial platforms. Opposition should not rely

on the social platforms, which have limited audience. Since we cannot give what we do not have, ideology makes the difference. Political culture and socialization process must be promoted, and agents of socialization (family, peer group, media, school, and religion bodies) should live by example, by providing intellectual leadership and moral supervision. If we collectively promote democracy, governance will be vibrant, robust and ideologically rooted.

Finally, we want to preface our conclusion by making idle remarks, which is that, we all need stronger opposition political parties and civil society which will change the present narrative of our social co-existence, otherwise, it is like assuming brown water as tea, or planning child spacing for people without children, it is not only preposterous but rather absurdity.

Recommendations

- Opposition political parties and civil society should be stronger, vibrant and effective because they have direct consequences on poor political culture and socialization process;

- Drawing heavily from the relative roles of opposition political parties and civil society in any democratization, it is therefore imperative their roles should be objective and ideologically rooted;

- Alternatives approaches that will promote democratization process such as stronger institutions and stronger economy will reduce pork barrel politics or primordial sentiments. Since democracy is a journey, efforts should be made by all stakeholders to have democratic credentials, this will promote efficient representation and participation.

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URBANIZATION AND ITS INVIRONMENTAL DEGRADETION AND OVERPOPULATION PROBLEMS: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

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ABSTRACT

The paper focused on the problem of urbanization and its implication for population increase, and the challenge of waste management and pollution increase in the area. The paper was of the opinion that as people begins to move from the rural to urban resulting to urbanization, it attract both positive and negative consequences. The reason is because of the government neglect of the rural in preference to the urban area, and people have to move to the urban in search of economic and other means of livelihood, which many a time results to crime and other vices. It used urban biased theory by Michael Lipton and Robert Bates to analyze the study. It concludes by advising that there should be adequate measure to develop the rural areas to stop the mad rush of the people to the urban areas. The way foreword is that since urbanization is synonymous with over population and unemployment, the best option is for the government to put in place structures that will make people remain where they are without rushing to the urban areas.

Keyword: Urbanization, over population, pollution, poverty and unemployment

Introduction

The problem of most developing cities in the world today is evil effect of urbanization. As the cities begin to expand, it begins to attract population increase. People start to move into such areas for means of livelihood. These population increase attract with it both positive and negative consequences. Traditionally, as the cities and places begin to expand or as the urbanization

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process starts, market forces tend to attract more people and industries to the urban areas. It will lead to rural to urban migration. The process will attract the supplies of both skilled and unskilled labour forces and the availability of supplementary plant and industries. Akpovi (2012) defined urban as a separate society whose geographical base is particularly restrained for the size of its population or whose territorial element is relatively meager in amount compared to that of its human element. The recent drift has become a serious concern to many, most particularly when the effect is considered to be most dangerous than the advantages Ndjemanze (2010).

Urbanization of towns and cities are not a recent phenomenon. Also, movement of people or expansion of urban areas has always been part of man's effort to develop and acquire more resources. Many factors could be attributed as reasons for recent upsurge in urbanization in Nigeria and probably everywhere in the world. The factors may include economic, political, religion and social factors. Urbanization or urban drift or expansion occurs because of economic activities. People cluster in a particular area in search for food and sources of livelihood. To the individual, the urban city offer a serious and a wide range of services, such as security and a well paid employment job, most particularly this period where the universities turn out large number of unemployed graduates looking for sources of livelihood and white cola jobs. Ibude (2003)

Unconsciously, urbanization develop, where government neglect the rural areas and lack of infrastructural development (NOUN 2006), people cluster for the purpose of generation of food and fiber sources to the overall population of the National rural development strategy. It is a foundation upon which any meaningful and sustainable national development can be built with emphasis and the alleviation of rural poverty and enhancement of the quality of life.

Urbanization attract a lot of problems, some of these problems include the rising over population which brings with it activities of thief and criminals. As the area begins to expand and increase, more and more people begin to flaunt in to the area causing rural urban migration, some of them in search of better condition of life. The major causes of urbanization is high incidence of unemployment, hunger, bad policies of government, over population, problem of insecurity and in some cases, war strike zones of the world move in to the urban area for safety and sources of food and jobs, including others good things of life.

Statement of the Problem

In most part of Nigeria and in some other underdeveloped, areas of the world, the rate of urbanization is attracted by a high rate of popular increase. The factors and other pressing issues responsible for increase in urbanization are as a result of the shift in the balance between the urban and the rural areas. The reason is nothing but according to Hope (2008) economic factors and activity, and the changing pattern of employment towards the urban areas, while there is less development in the rural areas. In the urban areas, you notice a high growth in transportation, education and the presence of different types of infrastructures in the urban areas quite detrimental to the rural areas.

In recent times, there has been a high incidence of poverty and underdevelopment in the rural areas thereby causing a high rate of influx of people in the urban areas narrowing the gap between the rural and urban poverty, this has resulted in to a natural call or demand for government to do something quickly to rescue the people in the rural areas from dying of hunger and diseases Nandi (2012). If there should be a consideration of the implication of this urbanization on the population distribution, the most salient of these will be the different availability of employment and labour, differential pressure on the demand for social services like hospitals, housing, health care and food of different kinds in an attempt to foster even development and planned location of social services to prevent congestion in urban areas, even the nature of population distribution Thomas (2007) has suggested that the rate of urbanization recently has exceeded the rate of employment generations in most of the developing nations. Nwanna (2004), has also noted that the socio-economic facilities now are grossly inadequate for the said inhabitant of the urban areas especially the youth between the ages of 18 and 29 years who are mostly affected by socio-economic factors cluster in the urban areas thereby causing one problem or the other.

Some of these problems of urbanization include refuse disposal and prostitution. In most of these urban areas, lack refuse bins together with the problem of over filled containers causing health hazard to the citizens living around the place. Part of the major problem of urbanization is industrial pollution as a result of large influx of people with different health problems. The most dangerous of it all is that of young girls or cities girls turning themselves into prostitute. Some take to this because of lack jobs and in order to find source of livelihood they have to indulge in this evil act, since the government of the day has no tangible plans for the youth, most of them take to other evil act thereby causing problems to themselves and those around them.

Those appointed for the disposed of waste or the waste management officials have turned their job into system of collecting money from the people before disposing their waste, thereby causing environmental health hazard in the area. The greatest problem of urbanization in Nigeria is that of negligence by those in authority to put in a sound policy that will make its citizens to take the issue of environmental hygiene and health living seriously. Environmental sanitation is a set of actions geared towards improving the quality of the environment and reducing the amount of diseases infection in the area, the environmental sanitation should be made a daily directive aimed at making the locality cleaner and healthier because of the large influx of people as a result of urbanization.

Conceptual Clarification

Ezeani and Elekwu (2000) see urbanization as the large concentration of people within a given territory, causing people to migrate from rural to urban cities, in search of food and employment among others. Since most of the important necessities of life are lacking in the rural villages, people have to migrate to the urban area where there is light to power their hard equipment.

Brett (2006) was of the opinion that the problems created by underdevelopment gave rise to overpopulation in the urban centers. Agawano (2008) provided out the effects of urbanization in the sense that it changes and influences the basic life of the people at all levels from economic perspective to culture being a social movement in its essence. In other words, according to them, urbanization is not only the relocation and concentration of people in a site, but it's also a phenomenon closely associated with many elements and problems of social structure including poverty, hunger and underdevelopment. When people migrate to urban areas it becomes a concern which the sociologists described as an issue which affects the generality of the society. It engenders other societal problems in the cities where they cluster or migrate to and it affects interaction processes such as adaptation, cooperation and conflict take place within the area Brett (2006). Thomas (2007) stated the reasons for such urbanization problem are for economic purposes when people gather together; there are many things the individual has to contend with. These include the security of life and property, lack of freedom of expression particularly where the nation is a terrorist infected area.

Nnamdi (2012) pointing out the problem of urbanization, stated that while Nigeria continues to experience rapid urban population growth, unfortunately, this has not been matched with adequate constitutional, legal, institutional

provisions and establishment at the three tier of government levels for promoting sustainable human settlement, planning and management. According to him, development is being carried out at the expense of adopting the required physical planning. Many Nigerian towns and urban areas do not have up to date city development strategies due to lack of capacity and resources to plan effective development control.

Ebo (2015), in his reasons for urbanization, stated that Nigeria earned N2.512 trillion from the export of petroleum products in three months between April and June 2015, the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in its foreign trade statistics for the second quarter of 2015, also stated that Nigeria recorded a total merchandise trade of ₦4.372 trillion and trade surplus of ₦1.4 trillion in the same year. This factor of significant oil wealth and the economic increase led to the abandonment of agriculture for oil, hence the young people could not stay where the necessary social amenities were not provided unlike the urban areas where these amenities were readily available, and these gave a severe rise in the urbanization in the areas.

Theoretical Framework of Analysis

The major theory rightly suited for this study is the Lipton and Roberts urban biased theory. The theory has been accepted to be the major reason why there is influx of people in the urban areas. They were of the opinion that in the relationship between the rural and the urban areas most governments of the day show preference in developing the urban areas while the rural poor continue to lavish in poverty. Michael Lipton and Robert Bates (1977) advanced the urban biased theory to explain the complex and unwholesome interaction between the urban and rural areas that has given rise to the development of the urban areas while the rural villages languish in poverty and underdevelopment. It is a biased against the rural areas. Lipton stated that this was one of the reasons for the famine that occurred in the rural areas during the 1970s, because of the urbanization policies of the leaders and government of those underdeveloped nations.

The argument here is that development is hampered in the rural areas by groups who by their central location in urban areas, they decided to pressurize the government of the day to protect their interests. This is the reason for the over saturation of the urban areas. He went on to state that even the political parties, labour unions students groups, civil servants and manufacturers all these prefer urban areas better than the rural areas since the end of the civil war in Nigeria in

1970, there has been a tremendous increase in the number of urban centers and inhabitants there had been an exodus of people from rural to urban areas and even from river rine areas to urban centres. Majority of the rural dwellers continuously moves on a daily basis to big cities, like Lagos, Abuja and Port-Harcourt in search for better condition of live. The reason is that the government has not made provision for better condition of lives in their rural areas.

In this urban areas, political parties transport facilities, industrial establishment that can absorb people for employment are present, also people who have hand work and needed electricity to power their equipment have opportunity to do so, which are lacking in the rural areas. In Nigeria today, most of the higher institutions and technical education centres are located in the urban centres instead of the rural areas. Hence most of the teachers and civil servants prefer to stay where the electricity and other facilities are present rather than in the rural areas.

Birch (1988) stated that the policy of urban biased is popular among those who advocate neoliberal economic policies. He stated that many important personalities, World Bank officials and many civil servants who do not want to work in the rural areas are in support of the urban biased policy oriented towards export of agriculture.

Magid (2004), in his own part stated that the comprehensive approach to avoid serious urbanization and development of the rural areas involving detailed planning, based on a careful definition of the needs and resources of the tangled population and the setting up of appropriate institutions for implementing rural development policy. The purpose will be to reawaken the citizen's awareness and improve on their agricultural activities and enhance self-sufficiency in agricultural production.

Lack of Development Strategies in the Rural Areas

The international dependency models has gained increasing support, especially among the third world intellectuals, as a result of a growing disenchantment with both the stages and the structural change models. Essentially, international dependence models view third world countries as beset with institutional, political, and economic rigidities, both domestic and international and caught up in a dependent and dominance relationship to rich countries. We also have Neo classical dependence models. This is an indirect outgrowth of Marxist thinking. It attributes the existence and continuance of the third world underdevelopment

primarily to the historical evolution of a highly unequal international capitalist system of rich countries.

The modernization theorists tried to justify the rural migration and the problem in the third world nations as a result of poverty and the nature of political system in these areas, describing their economy as a closed system conditioned by pattern variables of universality versus particularism, they argue that the reason for the state of affairs in the third world nations is because they lack what they described as absence of cultural secularization and lack of subsystem autonomy. By this, they mean under the third world nations, all their decision are not based on rational decision Ekong (2003). These American and Western social scientists failed to understand that the original cause of poverty and lack of growth resulting to migration is as a result of colonization and neo colonization, which kept Africa and most third world nations in the situation they find themselves today.

The nature of development strategies, and the attitude of government towards the rural areas this kind of development and structural adjustment policies which has nothing to do with the people and never carried them along and was never people-oriented. Only the small proportion of the urban based educated elite benefited from the programs that were meant to mobilize majority of the people in the rural areas (Daze et al 2009) majority of the people who reside in the rural areas were marginalized and neglected. No-wonder Harvey (2010) sees mobilization as pre-eminently an attitude of the mind. It is consistent expression of the belief that it is within the power of the political elite to organize, coordinate and control their human and natural resources for the attainment of an internally generated and self-reliant socio-economic development. Presently, the rate of rural-urban drift is on the increase because people including school leavers, run to the urban centres because of white collar jobs. But today, the jobs are no longer there, and most of the youth get disappointed and frustrated at the situation hence, this has led to cultism, armed robbery and kidnapping of innocent citizens either for money or for ritual purposes.

Summary

The paper has outlined most of the reasons for increase urbanization in Nigeria. The most dangerous factor is corruption. This has eaten very deep into the fabric of the Nigerian society. When we talk of corruption, it is linked with the character of the state. The money that was supposed to developed the rural areas

and better the life of the generation of the people is embezzled by certain individuals or very few people, this has made the rural areas to continue to remain poor and impoverished hence the citizens have to vacate and run to the urban areas in search of better condition of life, where they could not succeed, decided to indulge in criminal and criminality.

The deplorable situation in the rural areas, whereby, there are absence of light, good roads, lack employment opportunities and hunger and poverty. The attitude of civil servants who would want to work in the urban areas where the amenities are present in preference to the rural areas where there is no light and electricity.

If the high institutions are located in the urban areas, the tendency is that those who would seek for admission must go to those areas and will also live or relocate to such areas thereby, increasing the size of the urban areas.

Conclusion

If what people are looking for in the urban areas are provided in the villages, there would be no reason for mad rush to urban centres. It will even reduce the rate of crime and criminality in the urban areas when people migrate to cities and could not see what they are looking for; they turn into prostitute particularly the girls, armed robbers and kidnapping.

The Nigerian situation shows that there is a very big gap between the expectations of the people and what the local administration are able to offer. One of the reasons is because people at the grassroots are not mobilized. There is no proper directive mobilization must aimed at improving the life of the people. There must be reduction between the rich and the poor.

In Nigeria, today, there is no better disposal of waste, no good health centres in the rural areas accept in the urban centres. There are some communities in Nigeria for the past six months or more years, they have not seen electricity. There are limit to where you can use generator to power some machines. Therefore they have to migrate to the urban centres where some of these amenities are present.

Finally, there is need for government to put adequate measure in place since the reason for urbanization is in search of economic factors for livelihood, if adequate control measure is put in place and the provision of proper network of road system and policy to encourage people in the rural areas by making

provision of amenities available, it will reduce this upsurge and this massive exodus of people to the urban areas. This will equally save the government of the day the problem of fighting and checking cultism and high level of criminal and kidnapping on our high ways.

The Way forward

Since urbanization is synonymous with overpopulation and unemployment system. The best option for the government of the day is to put in place structures that will make people remain where they are or something that will drag the people back to the rural areas such as improvement in agriculture, better network of road system and electricity.

If the civil servants are encouraged by providing housing, schools and accommodation with better salaries they have no option than to seek for transfer to those new areas where the government is fast development.

Most visitors want where they will see and experience recreational centres and relaxation. This cannot be possible in the urban centres with noise and disturbances, villages with better management of facilities and network of hotels becomes the available option.

Reduction of poverty through proper development of human and material resources in both the urban and rural areas.

Proper method of checking corruption which is quite different from the already existing one in Nigeria, where the EFCC ICPC officials who suppose to fight corruption have in themselves become supervisors of corruption and corrupt acts. Nigeria now is the country with the highest level of unemployed graduates. A system should be placed to reduce this.

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TERTIARY EDUCATION TRUST FUND (TETFund) INTERVENTION POLICY AND STAFF DEVELOPMENT IN SELECTED FEDERAL UNIVERSITIES OF SOUTHWESTERN NIGERIA: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

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Abstract

Education financing, especially tertiary education, in Africa and Nigeria, in particular, has remained a pressing and topical issue. Indeed, inadequate financing of tertiary education, most especially university education, remains on the front burner of Nigeria's educational system. The challenge of inadequate financing of universities in Nigeria is majorly a result of phenomenal increase in students' enrolment and rapid expansion over the years in our nation's universities without a corresponding increase in the allocation of financial resources that will cater for the required consequential infrastructure, facilities, staffing and other exigencies. The Federal Government, in one of its spirited efforts of combating tertiary education underfunding, established an intervention policy tagged Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) to embark on revitalization of tertiary education and staff development across various tertiary institutions in the country. This empirical study therefore, reviewed the content of Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) intervention policy and also determined the effects of TETFund intervention on staff development using training and retraining of staff members, conference attendance by academic staff members as proxy on staff development. The study was carried out in three purposively selected federal universities of southwestern Nigeria. The study population (13,345) comprised all academic and non-teaching staff in University of Ibadan (5,214); Obafemi Awolowo University Ile-Ife (4,769) and University of Lagos (3,362). A sample size of 1,098 respondents were purposively selected for questionnaire administration, using Taro Yamane formular: U.I. (372); O.A.U. (369) and UNILAG (357). In addition, interviews

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were conducted with the Deputy Vice-Chancellors (Academic) and TETFund desk officers of the selected federal universities. Secondary data were obtained from academic journals, the internet and annual publications from TETFund head office. Data collected were analysed using descriptive statistics such as percentages and relative impact index, inferential statistics such as correlation coefficient and content analysis. Findings revealed that the TETFund policy intervention document focused, among others, on revamping collapsed infrastructure, providing new infrastructure and training and retraining of staff. The study also revealed that the TETFund policy intervention had significant effect on staff development in the study areas ($r_s = 0.1399$, $p < 0.05$). The study concluded that TETFund intervention policy enhanced staff development in the selected federal universities of southwestern Nigeria.

Keywords: Tertiary Education, Tertiary Education Fund, Policy Implementation, Staff Development.

Introduction

Staff development programmes include various means by which all categories of staff working in an organization are encouraged to improve their capabilities and be more effective in job performance. In Nigerian universities, staff development programmes refer to opportunities provided for staff to increase their knowledge, skills, experiences and understanding, thereby, improving their job performances. These opportunities according to the National Universities Commission (NUC) (2008) include educational programmes ranging from Bachelor's Degree (B.Sc., B.A., B.Tech., B.Ed.), Post Graduate Diploma (PGD), Masters' Degrees to Doctor of Philosophy Degree. Others include short training courses such as conferences, seminars and workshops; writing of articles in educational journals; visiting appointments and induction training programmes for newly employed staff. In addition to these progammes, members of staff in Nigerian universities are also exposed to various activities such as staff meetings at various levels, serving in different university committees, coaching by more experienced staff and working on delegated authorities. These activities are deliberately planned to develop staff professionally and to encourage them to achieve job satisfaction (Cole 2002, Lucey, 2005, Mathis & Jackson 2006).

The World Bank in a study in 2010 discovered that the problem of poor funding of tertiary institutions is largely prominent in nations of Africa (Nigeria inclusive) than in the other nations of the world. Poor funding of tertiary

education in Nigeria is prominent. Aside the globally witnessed economic recession ravaging the economy of Nigeria, other factors include, oil sector decline in revenue (greatly depended on by Nigeria), economic resources being mismanaged, non-oil sectors revenue decline as a result of neglect and increase in corruption rate which exists in various sectors of the Nigerian economy. The Nigerian government has been hindered by the aforementioned from generating resources adequate enough to finance the country's higher educational sector (Jaja, 2013). In this light, the need arises for the management of higher institutions to internally source for funds in order to augment the subventions from government.

In line with the 1993 Education Tax Act, No 7, the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) was set up as an intervention agency. The Tertiary Education Trust Fund Establishment Act, 2011 replaces the 2003 Education Tax Fund Act No. 17 and the Education Tax Act, Cap. E4, laws of the Nigerian federation, 2004. It establishes the Tertiary Education Trust Fund agency, giving it the mandate to oversee, distribute and monitor the education tax to government owned Nigerian tertiary institutions.

In order to allow TETFund policy fulfill its objectives, the 2011 TETFund Act imposes a 2% education tax on the assessable profits of each registered organisations in Nigeria. The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) is committed to assessing and collecting education tax under the Act. The fund manages the tax imposed by the Act and allocates the fund to federal and state educational institutions. It also evaluates the projects carried out with the finances granted to the beneficiaries (TETFund Act, 2011).

The agency's mandate, as set out in paragraphs 7(1)(a) to (e) of the 2011 TETFund Act, is to supervise and distribute the money generated in the fund to federal and state institutions of higher education, in particular to provide and maintain the following:

i) significant physical facilities for education and learning;

ii) educational equipment and materials;

iii) research uptake and publishing;

iv) academic and non-teaching staff training and development;

v) any other requirement which the Board of Trustees considers to be fundamental and necessary for maintaining quality and norms in tertiary educational institutions. (TETFund Act, 2011).

The important mandates of tertiary institutions are research, teaching and learning. The success determinants in the goals and objectives of education of a society can be traced to the quality of learning and teaching of that society. The

teachers and students act majorly in the aspect of learning and teaching process. As these teachers are required in having the necessary competent skills in curriculum delivery, the students on their part are also expected to exhibit a level of high commitment and dedication to learning (Ukpai & Ereh, 2016).

Ukpai and Ereh (2016) revealed that, there is the need for university education to get investments via high-level financing, in order to be effectively managed. Nigerian yearly budget makes provision of funding mainly for universities' administration, universities' authority is also required to alternatively source for funding to support allocations from the government at all tiers. These revenues may be sourced from private organisations, business investments in the university, aids and grants from foreign countries, payment for university services, endowment funds and many others. Revenues that are realised from these numerous sources should be accounted for transparently and judiciously put to use in meeting the institution's needs (Ukpai & Ereh, 2016).

It would be evident from the above that the primary goal of the TETFund is to generate additional income to support tertiary educational institutions in Nigeria, provide grants and scholarships to excellent students and staff, enhancing and rechanneling the financial reserves of higher institutions to improve the value and performance of Nigerian higher education.

Literature Review

Public universities, in Nigeria, depend entirely on the federal or state government to give them their required resources, with around 90 percent of the income originating from the coffers of the government. This is conversely with what is realistic in the privately-owned universities in which just 3.5 percent of the income is originating from the proprietor, the greater part of the funds are originating from the students' educational cost expenses (Akinyemi, 2013). This variety is reasonable taking a look at the benefit rationale of the private universities and the social advantage thought process of the government owned universities. However, the government universities ought to likewise acquire from their partners in the private sector a few systems that they believe merit imitation.

University education in this modern-day Nigeria has found itself in a dilemma due to the continuous inadequate financing from conventional sources even though it's so glaring that education in itself is a very important and feasible industry for development of almost all cutting edge economy (Nkwede, 2009).

Insufficient financing of educational system has resulted in short supply of teaching and learning facilities like the library, research laboratories, conducive lecture rooms, student halls of residence and staff quarters, decaying and dilapidation of few existing facilities and infrastructure. Traditional methods of teaching and learning still persist while the modern-day approach to teaching and learning such as equipment for Information Communication Technology (ICT), use of internet, computers, projectors, simulators and so many more, are vividly inadequate.

The Nigerian government over the years, as revealed by Ajayi and Ekundayo (2006), seems to have failed in adhering to the recommendation of UNESCO's recommendation of 15 - 20% of the aggregate budget earmarked to the educational sector. Nigerian universities still suffer so many setbacks despite the budget allocation government invests in education and the persistent rise in school fees. Despite the yearly budgetary allocations, infrastructural facilities available in various universities are still in a decayed state, various research and capital projects are left uncompleted and abandoned, libraries and laboratories are ill-equipped, academic and non-teaching staff members are not regularly attending conferences and research grants / fellowships award have greatly reduced.

The Nigerian federal government is progressively thinking that, it is hard in meeting the huge cost of subsidizing Nigerian higher education and if higher institutions in this nation need to get by, there will be an earnest need to search out methods for enhancing their financing. It is informative to note that education is a privilege and not a benefit and if this is to end up a reality in the Nigerian setting, then education should be financed and supported better at the tertiary tier. Notwithstanding, the decreasing budgetary asset allotment to the sector of education, there will be a need for elective sources of financing that will guarantee quality education and alumni from tertiary institutions in Nigeria (Ajayi & Ekundayo, 2006).

Human beings are the universal resource found in all kinds of organizations because there is no organization that functions without people. It is often possible for these people commonly referred to as staff to identify some areas of weaknesses in their job performance and may likely improve by observing the performance of other experienced staff. It is also possible for some staff to rely on more experienced colleagues to identify their areas of weaknesses for them. Whichever way it is done, once there is a difference between the actual performance and the required standard, productivity is negatively affected and this suggests the need for improvement (Adamu, 1998 & Kangiwa, 1998). In all

kinds of organizations, this improvement is achieved through what is called staff development programmes. Staff development programmes refer to varied educational and training/retraining activities that are created purposely to give members of staff an added knowledge, experiences, attitudes, understanding and skills needed to effectively perform to a standard required. This implies that changing the behaviour of members of staff depends largely on training and development, while the end result or objective is to assist the organization in achieving its specific objectives (Ahmad, 1999).

Scholars and researchers have a similar understanding of staff development programmes. For instance, the central idea running through the definitions provided by (Kusari, 1995; Abdu, 1998; Abah, 1999) is that staff development programmes are the means by which all cadre of staff are ready to abide by the tasks and challenges that lie before them from initial employment to retirement age. In Nigerian universities, staff development programmes refer to the opportunities made available by the Federal Ministry of Education, States Ministry of Education and proprietors of private universities to enhance the performance level of all members of staff through various training methods that will eventually contribute to personal and professional enhancement of staff. These opportunities usually include a variety of programmes such as educational training courses, short training courses (such as conferences, seminars and workshops), writing articles in educational journals, sabbatical leave and staff induction training programmes. Members of staff in Nigerian universities are also developed through various activities such as serving in committees, attendance to staff meetings, delegation of authority, coaching and mentoring by more knowledgeable and experienced staff. All these imply that staff development programmes in universities are with expected outcomes, the outcome being to enhance teaching quality and students learning experience (Hussain, 2000).

The implementation of the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) policy has gained increasing attention over time in Nigerian tertiary institutions. Scholars are also conducting studies on the implementation strategies of the Tertiary Education Trust Fund to determine its impacts on tertiary institutions in Nigeria as well as the challenges which the policy faces during implementation.

Ugwuanyi (2014), in her study on taxation and tertiary education enhancement in Nigeria: an evaluation of the Education Trust Fund (ETF) between 1999 – 2010, found out that the Education Trust Fund has had remarkable beneficial outcome towards enhancing the educational sector in Nigeria through the development of different intervention projects and enhancing the teaching and

learning states of both teaching members of staff and students, and that every higher institution has its own standard (subject to TETFund mandates) for figuring out which teaching staff becomes a recipient. In any case, the researcher additionally discovered that, the principal officers, for example, Vice-Chancellors, Provosts, Rectors, Registrars, Bursars, Librarians, the Directors of works, e.t.c, are not to be incorporated as recipients. The study likewise uncovered that the Education Trust Fund distribution formula across the nation's higher institutions were 25 percent, 12.5 percent and 12.5 percent for Colleges of Education, Polytechnics and Universities respectively while the 50 percent left was appropriated to Secondary and Primary Schools. In conclusion, the researcher opined that the Education Trust Fund has the capability of easing the endless under-financing of education, now and in the future. If legitimately used, the fund will proceed in no little measure towards renewing the Nigerian educational sector. The researcher subsequently suggested that, the intervention agency ought to be supported towards quick tax accumulation and budget allotments and joint action from Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS) for a productive service that can prompt more brilliant result from Education Trust Fund endeavors.

Udu and Nkwede (2014), in their study on Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) interventions and sustainable development in Nigerian universities: prove from Ebonyi State University in Abakaliki, discovered that TETFund allocations in Nigerian higher educational institutions especially Ebonyi State University have affected decidedly on the human and infrastructural advancement of the institution. The consequence of the aforementioned for sustainable development is likewise positive. The study additionally discovered that TETFund allocations are tied down on: development of infrastructures, library advancement, research grants, teaching staff training and advancement, journal publication, conference attendance and development of manuscript. From the study, the researchers additionally found that TETFund has done abundantly well in the areas highlighted. It is up to the management of Ebonyi State University to heighten endeavours on meeting every single vital necessity for access and release of every single affirmed finance from TETFund. The study further posited that being aware of the importance of education in the advancement of any country, the Nigerian governments should not yield in guaranteeing a relentless and sufficient funding of tertiary education in the nation. Although, there is no government that can sufficiently finance tertiary education in the genuine feeling of the word, financing of education ought to be of great importance in the financial plans of the nation so as to make it moderate

to all Nigerian citizens. The researchers accordingly suggested among others, a lessening as well as aggregate disposal of unpleasant administrative bottlenecks associated with getting TETFund, usage of legitimate and professional contractors in carrying out TETFund activities and contribution of donor agencies to help governments in financing Nigerian higher education. This, if industriously clung to, will dispatch Nigerian Universities to a superior balance.

Famurewa (2014), in his study on insufficient financing as the worst thing about higher education in Nigeria, revealed that, higher institutions in Nigeria need to raise finances to supplement government financing and appropriate checking of how such finances are being utilized wisely due to the corrupt nature of authorities in the African landmass, most particularly Nigeria. It is in doing this that Nigerian higher institutions, particularly universities will have the capacity to direct quality and significant researches, enhance the nature of graduates being created and make practical commitments to the national advancement of Nigeria. The study further inspected wellsprings of financing tertiary education, issues and prospects and concludes that a way out is to center around Internally Generated Revenue ventures which can be utilised for research works and developmental projects. This, the researcher believes, will catalyse government's part and make an empowering domain for consistency and better educational standard in Nigeria. The researcher trusts the endeavours will address the low rankings of universities in Nigeria both locally and universally, low quality of graduates and unessential research results to national advancement will be definitely diminished if not totally banished.

Ali and Bara (2015), in their study on the impact of Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) on tertiary institutions in Nigeria: a case study of tertiary institutions in three North Eastern states (Yobe, Bauchi and Gombe) revealed that, despite TETFund intervention which has immensely improved the three northeastern tertiary institutions in terms of trained and qualified staff since its inception, there is still need for improvement in the institutions. The study also gathered that, though an interesting level has been reached in conducting academic research, however, more efforts need to be made by the academic staff of the tertiary institutions in conducting regular research. The study asserts that enough research and lecture materials (such as research fund, textbooks, internet, laboratory kits, etc.) are now available in libraries, laboratories, and offices as a result of the TETFund intervention enjoyed by the tertiary institutions in the study area. The researchers discovered that, there is unequal allocation of staff training and or conference fund to state institutions and also to

individual beneficiaries and suggested that equal fund allocation formula should be implemented and followed.

In addition, the study also found out that contracts are awarded to non-professional contractors, which leads to substandard projects. The researchers recommend that contracts be awarded based on contractor`s experience and record. Nevertheless, the researchers further suggested that both teaching and non-teaching staff should have representatives in the TETFund management body of tertiary institutions.

Adavbiele (2016), in her study on the effect of Education Trust Fund (ETF) on tertiary institutions present in Nigeria, using Ekiadolor Edo State College of Education as case study, reveals that despite the overall decline in material and human assets in Nigerian higher educational institutions owing to inadequate financing, the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) is an agency of intervention under the Education Trust Fund (ETF) meant to assist all tertiary institutions in Nigeria to develop with the provision of infrastructural facilities. The Education Trust Fund (ETF), as further revealed from the study, was a way out of crises in the educational sector in Nigeria. Funding of education has become a big problem and hence, the Longe committee report and subsequently the negotiations among unions and the Nigerian government. The study found out that, despite the developmental impact in institutions of learning, ETF lacks effective internal control and this has given rise to numerous ills, the institution stands high risk of losing large portion of its resources through wastage and misappropriation. The study also revealed the problems that ETF is facing which is lack of proper accounting records, lopsidedness in the management of ETF, lack of proper sharing formula of the fund among the tertiary institutions.

Members of staff in Nigerian universities are usually interested in participating in conferences, trainings and workshops, because it is one of the determinants for staff promotion. The staff development policy in some universities state that each staff would be sponsored annually to participate in at least one conference or workshop. In actual practice however, not all staff who apply are sponsored for conferences (Fadipe, 2001). With regard to international conferences, trainings and workshops, only a few university members of staff get sponsorship for such development programmes. In some of these Nigerian universities, there have been complaints and allegations of favouritism against the management that, it is only members of the staff management and their allies that are constantly sponsored to attend such training and development programmes.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopted the Resource Dependence Theory as a technique for supporting university funding. The theory originates from organizational and management behaviour disciplines, and it states that "the behaviours of organisations are shaped by the availability of external resources upon which the organization relies for survival" (Fowles, 2014). Various scholars have applied this theory to tertiary educational funding (Fowles, 2014; Pilbeam, 2012; Santos, 2007). Resource Dependency Theory, according to Fowles (2014), is based on the principle that an institution, organisation or firm should take part in transactions with different organisations and actors in its domain keeping in mind the end goal to procure resources.

The Resource Dependency Theory which opines to the need for an institution, organisation or firm to engage in dealings with other organisations and actors in its working space in order to procure resources as a means of combating underfunding and inadequate resources appears to be more relevant to the Nigerian higher education situation hence, it is being applied to this study. This is because the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund), which is the case study of this work, agrees to the above theory as the intervention agency, on inception, was saddled with the responsibility of giving additional financial assistance to all levels of public higher institutions with the principal target of utilising financing together with project management for the rehabilitation, recovery and enhancement of Higher Education in Nigeria (TETFund Act, 2011).

The theory of Resource Dependence has also been used to evaluate the low observable impact on higher educational institutions of performance-based financing (Nisar, 2015). Nisar (2015) argues, based on the perspective of Resource Dependence theory, that "the success or failure of such policies depends upon the amount of money tied with such resources and the dependence of universities on such sources of revenue". Nisar (2015) suggests that one reason why performance-based financing has restricted impact is "only a small portion of state appropriations was tied with performance-based funding which was not large enough to meaningfully influence institutional behaviour".

This is seen in the agency's disbursement of funds for the general improvement of public higher educational institutions in Nigeria, particularly for the provision or preservation of fundamental physical infrastructural facilities for teaching and learning, institutional equipment and material, research uptake and publications, training and development of academic staff, and whatever other need which is basic and important for the enhancement and preservation of standards in

tertiary educational institutions in Nigeria. The basic source of income accessible to the agency is the 2% education tax paid from the assessable profit of organisations incorporated in Nigeria. The Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS) evaluates and gathers the tax for the benefit of the TETFund intervention agency (TETFund Act, 2011).

Methodology

The members of staff of the three selected federal universities of southwestern Nigeria constituted the study population which was 13,345. These were University of Ibadan (U.I), Ibadan, Oyo State; Obafemi Awolowo University (O.A.U) Ile-Ife, Osun State and University of Lagos (UNILAG), Lagos State. The purpose of selection of these three federal universities was because they were the first-generation universities founded in southwestern Nigeria and have been in existence for over 50 years. In 1948, the University of Ibadan was founded. In 1962, University of Lagos and Obafemi Awolowo University were both founded respectively. These three universities also have a higher number of staff strength compared to other universities in southwestern Nigeria

There were two objectives of the study. These were: (1) to review the content of the TETFund Intervention Policy and (2) to determine effects of TETFund Intervention Policy on Staff Development in the Universities.

Purposive sampling procedure was utilized to select respondents from the area of study so as to ensure that members of staff that have benefited from TETFund intervention policy and those that applied but have not been granted were selected for the study. Questionnaire were administered to members of staff of the three study area as follows: 372 in the University of Ibadan, 369 in Obafemi Awolowo University Ile-Ife and 357 in University of Lagos, making a total of 1,098 respondents. In all, 6 respondents were selected for interview. Data generated through primary and secondary sources were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics.

Primary and secondary data sources were both employed for this research work.

a) Primary data: primary data such as questionnaire and interview methods were

employed for this study.

i. Questionnaire: A carefully structured questionnaire was administered to randomly selected members of staff in the three federal universities of

Southwestern Nigeria. Questionnaire was administered to 1,098 selected members of staff of the three selected federal universities;

ii. Interview: Two members of staff, each, from the three selected federal universities of southwestern Nigeria (totaling 6) were interviewed on content and impacts of the implementation of TETFund policy on staff development in their respective universities. These included the Deputy Vice-chancellors (Academic) and the TETFund Desk Officers.

b) Secondary data: Relevant textbooks, journals, internet sources and publications of TETFund desk offices of the three selected federal universities were consulted.

Data generated through primary and secondary sources were analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics. TETFund policy content was extensively reviewed to achieve objective one. Objective three involved inferential statistics i.e. correlation. Content analysis was used for the interview responses.

Results

Objective 1: Review the content of the TETFund Intervention Policy

Table 1: Table showing a Review of the Content of the TETFund Intervention Policy

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Revamping collapsed infrastructures in the Universities		
Strongly Agree	748	66.8
Agree	297	29.2
Strongly Disagree	37	2.8
Disagree	16	1.2
Reviving structural development in Tertiary education in Nigeria		
Strongly Agree	382	32.4
Agree	690	65.6
Strongly Disagree	18	1.5
Disagree	8	0.6
Making Nigerian Universities develop at par with reputable Universities across the globe		
Strongly Agree	432	37.3
Agree	604	55.7
Strongly Disagree	41	5.4
Disagree	21	1.6
Training and retraining of members of staff in tertiary institutions		

Strongly Agree	326	31.6
Agree	605	52.7
Strongly Disagree	135	11.8
Disagree	32	4.0
Regular upkeep of quality and maintenance of standards in the Nigerian Institutions of higher learning		
Strongly Agree	412	37.9
Agree	588	50.0
Strongly Disagree	68	8.7
Disagree	30	3.9
Provision of adequate infrastructural facilities		
Strongly Agree	388	34.6
Agree	576	55.3
Strongly Disagree	87	6.7
Disagree	47	3.4

Source: Field Survey

Table 1 shows a review of the contents of the TETFund intervention policy. Majority of the respondents (67%) strongly agreed that TETFund was supposed to revamp the collapsed infrastructures in Nigerian Universities while just 2% strongly disagreed to this content of the TETFund intervention policy. More than half (65%) agreed that the content of the TETFund policy intervention was to revive the structural development of tertiary institutions in Nigeria. It was further revealed that about 30% of the respondents strongly agreed that revamping of infrastructures was one of the contents of the TETFund intervention policy. Making Nigerian universities develop at par with other reputable universities around the world was one of the contents of the TETFund intervention policy and this was agreed to by 55% of the respondents while 37% claimed to agree with this content of TETFund intervention policy. 53% of the respondents agreed that regular training and retraining of academic staff of Nigerian universities was one of the contents of the intervention policy, even as about 12% strongly disagreed to this fact. Half of the respondents agreed that regular upkeep of the quality and maintenance of standards in Nigerian universities was one of the contents of the TETFund intervention policy, while about 9% of the respondents strongly disagreed to this as a content of the intervention policy. Lastly, 55% of the respondents agreed that provision of infrastructural facilities was one of the contents of the TETFund intervention

policy, 35% strongly agreed while less than 7% of the respondents strongly disagreed.

Table 2: More Content of the TETFund Intervention Policy

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Provision of research books	52	18.7
Quality training of staff	102	26.9
Financial Management	107	30.4
Provision of other materials	40	10.4
Construction of Buildings	34	11.4

Source: Field Survey

For the response on more contents of the TETFund, the analysis on Table 2 showed that 30% of the respondents claimed that financial management was another content of the TETFund intervention policy. 26% said, quality training of staff of higher institutions was another content of the TETFund policy, 19% claimed that provision of research books was another content of the policy while less than 12% were of the opinion that TETFund policy also included the construction of buildings in the form of lecture halls, hostels and so on.

Objective 2: Determine the effects of TETFund Intervention Policy on Staff Development in

The Universities

In determining the effects of TETFund intervention policy on staff development, the correlation analysis was employed using the teaching of students as a proxy for staff development due to attendance of conferences and other interventions by TETFund. Due to the nature of the data, the spearman rank correlation was used to test the effects of TETFund intervention policy on staff development.

Table 3: Effects of TETFund Intervention Policy on Staff Development in the Universities

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Grants to carry out research to solve societal problems		
Strongly Agree	396	35.2
Agree	569	54.9
Strongly Disagree	99	7.7
Disagree	34	2.1
Outcomes of researches have brought development		
Strongly Agree	279	28.6
Agree	687	60.8
Strongly Disagree	92	7.5
Disagree	40	3.1
Grant has broadened research capacity		
Strongly Agree	325	25.4
Agree	646	66.1
Strongly Disagree	92	6.4
Disagree	35	2.1
Conference attendance has broadened knowledge		
Strongly Agree	348	30.5
Agree	634	61.0
Strongly Disagree	90	6.5
Disagree	26	2.0
Students are being taught better through acquired knowledge in conferences participation		
Strongly Agree	289	27.6
Agree	626	54.4
Strongly Disagree	145	15.0
Disagree	38	2.97
Conducive offices enable effective research and other academic services		
Strongly Agree	369	32.5
Agree	580	55.9
Strongly Disagree	107	8.4
Disagree	42	3.3
Engaging in Community Development		
Strongly Agree	337	28.6

Agree	609	60.8
Strongly Disagree	106	7.5
Disagree	46	3.1
Writing various papers and materials		
Strongly Agree	325	31.4
Agree	576	50.1
Strongly Disagree	147	14.9
Disagree	46	3.6
Innovations in Science and Technology		
Strongly Agree	317	25.6
Agree	660	65.0
Strongly Disagree	83	6.5
Disagree	38	3.0
University produces well baked graduates		
Strongly Agree	263	27.1
Agree	517	40.7
Strongly Disagree	249	25.3
Disagree	69	6.9

Source: Field Survey

Table 3 shows the responses of the respondents to the effects of TETFund intervention policy on staff development in the Universities. The first question was on whether the grants provided to academic staff of the universities have enabled them to be able to carry out research that can solve societal problems. More than half of the respondents agreed that it had helped solve societal problems; about one-third of the respondents agreed, about 8% of the respondents strongly disagreed. About two-third of the respondents agreed that outcomes of various researches had brought development to the community and the country at large. 29% strongly agreed that the outcomes of research had brought development while less than 8% strongly disagreed. More than 60% of the respondents agreed that the research grants being provided had broadened the research capacity of academic staff members, for the same question, 6% of the respondents strongly disagreed to the opinion that grant had increased the research capacity of the academic staff members.

Further, more than 60% of the respondents agreed that conference attendance had broadened the knowledge of staff members in their various fields. 31% strongly agreed, about 7% strongly disagreed while exactly 2% disagreed to

this. More than half of the respondents agreed that students were being taught better as a result of the conferences attended by the staff members. 27% strongly agreed that students were now being taught better due to conference attendance. 56% of the respondents agreed that conducive offices enabled effective research and other academic services, even as 33% of the respondents also agreed to the same statement. Less than 10% of the respondents strongly disagreed that conducive offices enabled effective research and other academic works. The table also reveals that 61% of the respondents agreed that research and conferences had enabled engagement in community development, 29% strongly agreed to this while less than 8% strongly disagreed. Half of the respondents agreed that TETFund intervention had enabled academic staff to be able to write various papers and materials for the students and community at large, 15% of the respondents strongly disagreed. About one-third of the respondents strongly agreed that TETFund intervention had enabled academic staff to be able to write various papers and materials for the students and community at large. More than two-third of the respondents agreed that innovation in the area of science and technology had given access to adequate materials by staff members to successfully discharge their duties. A quarter of the respondents strongly agreed, 7% of the respondents strongly disagreed and 3% disagreed that innovation in the area of science and technology had given access to adequate materials by staff members to successfully discharge their duties. A quarter of the respondents strongly disagreed that universities now produced well informed and fully baked graduates, about 41% agreed that universities now produced well informed and fully baked graduates, 27% of the respondents strongly agreed that universities now produced well informed and fully baked graduates.

Table 4: Effects of TETFund Intervention Policy Using Training and Retraining of Staff Members as Proxy on Staff Development

Number of observations	1,098
Spearman's Rho	0.0414
Prob > |t|	0.1403

Source: Field Survey

A Spearman's rank correlation was run to determine the effects of TETFund intervention using training and retraining as proxy on staff development, using better way of teaching students as proxy. Using a sample of 1,098 staff of the three selected universities, there was a positive correlation

between TETFund intervention and staff development which was not statistically significant, $r_s = 0.0414$, $p = 0.1403$. Based on the findings from the analysis, it means that TETFund intervention has positive effects on staff development in universities.

Table 5: Effects of TETFund Intervention Policy Using Conference Attendance by Academic Staff Members as Proxy on Staff Development

Number of observations	1,098
Spearman's Rho	0.0414
Prob > |t|	0.1403

Source: Field Survey

A spearman's correlation analysis was performed to determine the effect of another TETFund intervention on staff development using conference attendance as a measure of TETFund intervention, it was found that there is a positive correlation between conference attendance and teaching of students by the staff which was found to be statistically significant as the $r_s = 0.1399$, $p = 0.000$, the p-value is less than $p < 0.05$.

Analysis of Interview Responses

As earlier stated, the study employed a mixed method research design of using questionnaire and interview. The responses of the interviewees have been summarized below with key insights taken for the purpose of research. The qualitative section of this study was analysed using the content analysis. In this method of analysis, the responses of the respondents to the questions were examined and specific comments that related to the research questions were taken out.

The Desk Office staff at TETFund desk offices in these institutions were asked questions. One of the questions they were asked was;

Respondents were asked to kindly state more contents of the TETFund policy

In response to this question, a significant number of the respondents were of the opinion that apart from the already identified contents of the TETFund policy intervention, other contents of the TETFund policy which are very important for the intervention policy to be a huge success in the selected universities include: provision of research books, training of academic staff members and other allied staff members, financial management of the funds provided for the institutions,

provision of other materials for laboratories, construction of halls of residence which was one of the major challenges facing the universities as many of the students in these universities were in dire need of hostel facilities to accommodate the ever increasing number of students in Nigerian universities across the country.

Respondents were asked about further comments on TETFund policy intervention's performance in their institution

The respondents replied by saying that the TETFund intervention policy in the three selected tertiary institutions in the country had performed well. Most of the interviewees stated Good, Better, Fair and Average on their assessment of the performance of the TETFund intervention policy while a few respondents stated that the TETFund policy intervention had performed poorly and bad due to some of the issues such as corruption and late release of funds that were later stated as the challenges facing the implementation of the TETFund intervention policy.

Respondents were asked to state effects of TETFund policy interventions on staff development in their institutions

The respondents were unanimous in their opinion that TETFund policy intervention had enabled the academic staff of the universities in particular to be able to teach students well due to more exposure in terms of conference attendance and trainings of different types. Unanimously, majority of the interviewees in the study area stated that some of the other effects of the TETFund policy intervention on staff development included; Innovation in terms of research outputs, supportive and better ways of teaching which had made the students to be able to compete against students from other top class universities across the world.

Major Findings

In a fast paced and ever competitive world where education is important for the development and empowerment of citizens of the country in order for them to be able to master their social and natural environment and to compete for survival or make the best use of what can be found in their environment, there is the need for a significant investment in the educational sector at all levels. The tertiary education that churns out research findings that have great impact on the economy and the society at large requires greater financial investment and attention to ensure that these funds are being judiciously utilised.

This present study centered majorly on the TETFund policy intervention in three selected federal universities in southwestern Nigeria namely University of

Ibadan (U.I.), University of Lagos (UNILAG) and Obafemi Awolowo University (O.A.U.) Ile-Ife. The main objectives were to review the content of TETFund intervention policy and determine the effects of TETFund intervention policy on staff development. In this study, the major findings have shown that more than the stated role, TETFund policy intervention has some other roles and contents that have been highlighted by the respondents as the other important roles of the policy intervention like provision of research books, quality teaching and research, construction of hostels and other structures and most importantly the financial management of financial resources available for disbursement for conducting research and other obligations.

The study also found out that many respondents agreed that TETFund policy intervention has positive effect on staff development, with the respondents further agreeing that the effect of the TETFund policy can be regarded as either good or better, average or fair.

On this, in other institutions, funding is one of the focal points of intervention of TETFund policy and submissions of other studies have supported this. For TETFund policy intervention to have effect on staff development and other aspects of tertiary education that is of importance to the TETFund policy, funds are very important for the policy to achieve its aims and objectives in Nigerian universities and in the educational sector at large. It has been reported that chief among the constraints bedeviling the educational sector in Nigeria is the issue of poor funding. The TETFund agency needs to note that proper funding is centered on the ability of such funds to meet the needs for which it was planned. Some of the major impact of an intervention on staff development is that it can boost the teachers' and lecturers' morale and rekindle their interest in teaching and mentoring even in the face of the current challenges facing higher education such as incessant strikes among the academic and non-teaching staff members of tertiary institutions in Nigeria. It also has the capability of increasing the rate of students' enrolment and improved reading culture in these tertiary institutions due to an improvement in the standard of teaching and learning.

1. Conclusion and recommendations

The TETFund policy intervention has had an impact on staff development and this shows that the policy intervention has performed as would have been expected in these universities especially in the area of building the capacity of the staff of these universities as this is what the statistical analysis revealed. The data collected through the semi-structured questionnaire from these selected universities were analysed and the conclusions are offered based on each

objective and the general objective of the study. For the first objective of the study which was to review the content of the TETFund intervention policy, it can be concluded based on the review that TETFund policy was developed to revamp collapsed infrastructures in the Universities, revive structural development and other duties and contents of the intervention policy that have been stated in the policy documents. Further, the second objective was with a view to determining the effects of TETFund intervention on the development of staff. As earlier stated, the TETFund policy intervention has had an impact on staff development.

Based on the findings of this research, TETfund policy intervention is making giant steps towards achieving its aims and objectives in Nigerian universities. It is recommended that the policy be allowed to continue in the pursuit of improving the quality and standard of higher education in tertiary institutions in Nigeria and to bring them at par with their counterparts around the world. If these universities are doing well, it would ensure a transformation of the country's economy as research activities in universities will help in the development of industries and realization of other economic goals. The TETFumd agency should also ensure that more funds are allocated to staff development in tertiary institutions so that more members of staff may benefit. Finally, it is recommended that all efforts must be put in place to ensure that the intervention policy continues for years to come in all government owned and even privately-owned universities in Nigeria in order to eventually achieve the main aims of the policy in Nigeria.

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THE DIVIDENDS OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA; THE SITUATION IN NIGERIAN

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ABSTRACT

This paper discuss the relevance and importance of dividend of democracy in our democratic system. The paper was of the view that because of the way and manner the leaders and politicians handle leadership position and government in Nigeria, the real meaning of the term dividend of democracy is not only lost but also thrown away. The term dividend of democracy is now understood and seen by most Nigerians and common man as the benefits of those in government, the politicians and those who are close to them and members of their family. It is no Longer for the benefits of the masses. No wonder there is now big doubt whether dividend of democracy is really possible in our Nigerian democratic dispensation. The papers was of the view that instead of dividend of democracy what we see now is democratic failures and divide and rule policy of those in government. The paper concludes by saying that most of the conflicts and electoral violence we see in Nigeria today is as a result of our neglect and betrayal of the dividend of democracy. Elections in Nigeria have become"do or die" affairs. It finally, recommended a way forward which includes a fight against corruption, and removal of this special class called the godfathers who make sure their godsons win elections by all means so that they will be there to service them. Finally, the pattern of appointing people to the position of authority ministers and commissioners should stop.

Introduction

In recent times, the term dividend of democracy has become a regular political term among the Nigerian political elite. It has become so common among the politicians that it has lost its real meaning, proper usage and application. It is seen today by the ordinary Nigerian to mean benefits for the upper class of the political elite who used it quite often, while the ordinary Nigerian is yet to

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realize and benefit from it. In fact we can trace the origin of modern democracy to Greek City States of Athens where democracy is coined from two Greek words demos (people) and krakem (rule by), Ikelegbe (2005). Ordinarily it means the rule by the people and for the people.

Most people who use the term dividend of democracy today do not even understand what they say and the meaning of the word; hence its proper application is not only thrown away but also lost. No wonder they see and refers to it as the benefit of the upper class of the politicians in our Nigerian society. In its Greek understanding, it means the right of the people to participate directly in the act of election and governance Ardo (2000). From all these, it means that dividend of democracy suppose to mean the gains or Profits realized from democracy. Jamo (2013) stated that democracy all over the world is fast spreading due to its ability to provide basic requirements for good governance and development, this development has brought an end to the struggle for supremacy as to which system of government is best due to hegemonic emergence of liberal democracy as the final human government. Nigeria is not an exception, the process of democratic change that occurred through the Nigerian state was largely the product of internal and external pressures exerted on the Nation state of Nigeria. This occurred because, it is believed that democracy should encourage and stimulate development.

So when we mention dividend of democracy, it is supposed to mean a situation where the masses are getting some benefits as a result of the system. This benefit which occurs or brings development happen in the area of good roads, electricity, provision of housing, good portable water, free education etc. But in Nigeria, when you mention dividend of democracy, everybody will quickly understand it to be for those who are connected to those in power, the accumulation of wealth by certain group of people in the society. It is against this background that many people celebrated the return of Nigeria to democratic rule in 1999 after a long period of military rule. The reason why people celebrated the return to civilian rule was in anticipation that this will usher in the dividend of democracy which they have been denied of all these period of military dictatorship with the transfer of power from the civilian to civilian will usher in good governance and democratic dividend (Jamo, 2009). However, uptill now, the expectation of the majority of Nigerians have failed, this development is nowhere to be experienced. This has brought a situation where many people still doubt whether development is achievable or not under democratic dispensation. The doubts have grown very high because of the

present insecurity, poverty, corruption, ethnic disturbances, Boko haram insurgences and underdevelopment.

They have come to realize that the issue or the word dividend of democracy is a term borrowed to complete the missing word in the dictionary. It is a jargon used by the politicians to deceive the masses or the electorate who have lost hope of benefiting anything from the present administrations or rulers of the people.

Nigerians now can not differentiate the difference between the military regime of Sani Abacha, A period that witnessed high level of insecurity with the activities of the so called NADECO in 1993 with what is happening now Abacha wanted to transfer power to himself. He decided to put the whole of the country to tension. This happened because, the process of democratization in Nigeria failed during the period of Ibrahim Babangida the IBB political bureau in 1986 (Omolola, 2007). This was a failure because of the announcement of the June 12, 1993 presidential election which was considered by many observers as the fairest election in the political history of Nigerian (Izan, 2003) Babangida was not strong enough to withstand and resist the demonstrations, and peoples agitation for democratic governance, He decided to hand over to chief Ernest Shonekon (Ojo, 1998) however Abacha did not allow that Administration last with the coming of democratic system in Nigeria after words, everybody thought that this was going to usher in development and dividend of democracy but this have not taken place, we are now in another level of military in civilian clothe the same conditions we experienced during the military era of Babangida and others are still very much with us now, even worse.

The Nigerians now instead of dividend of democracy, what we are witness is severe recession and high level of corruption. Most Nigerians are suffering because of lack of food stocks in the market, the very few ones are very costly to lay hands on. (Smith 2007) the cost of transportation is very unbearable, high level of unemployment; most big companies have left Nigeria to have their base in the Neighboring countries kidnapping is now on the increasing. The dividend of democracy that Nigerians are witnessing now is high cost of living, while the politicians continue to parade themselves around in very flashing cars and flamboyant living in fact the process of carrying electioneering campaign in Nigeria becomes very costly and very alarming.

Statement of the Problem

All over the world dividend of democracy represents better life for the rural people, providing welfare packages for the generality of the masses, and basic amenities including social and welfare packages for the people. According to the (UNDP, 2007) what democratic governance represents includes participation of the people, adherent to the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation equity effectiveness and efficiency, accountability and strategic vision. In all these, there is non that is applicable and working in Nigeria. Democracy, which is supposed to be for the people is now for the rich politicians in the country Ademoyi, Olawole 2009).

Some believe that democracy that suppose to be for the development of the citizens rather than the restraint, curtailment, suppression and oppression, authoritarian governments and regimes witnessed in the Nigerian society. (Igba 2012). The worse is the activities of the Boko Harem set, that have destroyed so main people in the Northern part of Nigeria (Anarfi 2004). The set has heightened fears among the populace and the international community, their activities have eaten deep into our economy and as a matter of fact the hostility has gone beyond religions and political coronation.

Instead of the dividend of democracy what we can interpret the situation in Nigeria today is democratic failures, poor standard of living, infrastructural decay and fallen standard of education Omotola, (2007) most big politicians in Nigeria now take their children abroad to Neighbouring African and European countries for better standard of Education.

The economic recession in Nigeria has grown worse and this has affected seriously the average Nigeria person. The recent reports shows that Nigeria that used to lead other African countries has gone very much badly, Nigeria is now considered one of the 20th poorest countries in the world with over 70% of its population classified as poor with 35% living in absolute poverty (UNDP 2006). Also report indicates that 59% of women die during or soon after childbirth every year, the second highest in the world after India Chay, (2008). This is as a result of poverty and non provision of essential medical care. Meanwhile majority of the Nigerian politicians and parliamentarians live in effluence and immense wealth through corruption. No wonder Soyinka described this arm of government as the Apex of corruption in Nigeria. In Tribune Wednesday, 20th October 2010, he used the term hydra and Octopus as images to define the kind of graft confronting the country. Mojeed (2010), speaking at the Lagos Town

hall meeting organized by the save Nigeria Group and its allies with the "theme Endemic corruption; The Bane of good Governance (2012) According to him the Nigerian legislative system is hydro-pus.

Therefore, the intension and focus of this paper is to find out what dividend of democracy was supposed to mean and what factors that militate against the provision of dividend of democracy to the generality of the people. Finally, to find out whether there is a relationship between democracy and National development Corruption and lack of accountability have hindered the provision of dividend of democracy in Nigeria

The word democracy is coined from two Greek words: Demos (the people) and Kratos (rule) which simply means people's rule. In its Greek perception means rights of the citizens of the Greek city states to participate directly in an act of governance. Ardo, (2000) added that, there is no universally acceptable definition of the word democracy. In the same vein, Chambers Encyclopedia (1970) also maintained that, there are different conceptions of democracy and no agreement as to its true nature.

However, Jega (2007) observed that, if there is any consensus about what democracy means, it is perhaps in relation to the understanding that, it is not personal rule, and that, it is different from authoritarian/dictatorial rule. It can also be said that democracy is based on some forms of perception and or representation.

Powell (1992) as cited in Mallam (2009) opined that, democratic governments have the following characteristics. The legitimacy of the government rests on a claim to represent the desires of its citizens; That is the claim of government assertion to be doing what the people want it to do; The organization arrangement that regulates this bargain of legitimacy is the competitive political election; Leaders are elected at regular intervals, and voters can choose among alternative candidates in practice, at least two political parties that have a chance of winning are needed to make such choices meaning full; Most adults can participate in the electoral process, both as voters and candidate for important political offices; Citizens and leaders enjoy basic freedom of speech, press, assembly and organization; Both established parties and new ones can work to gain members and whenever democracy exists, political disagreements subsist.

Likewise Ajibewa (2006) described it as the ability of the electorate to choose freely on a regular basis between competing groups of potential leaders who want to conduct the affairs of the state.

Huntington (1991) described it as the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote.

From the above it is clear that, in a democratic state government must be legitimate, free and fair elections, existence of more than one political party and fundamental human rights. Edigheji (2005) added separation of power, political tolerance, accountability, transparency, rule of law and equality as essential features for democratic government. Samuel (1991) as cited in Edigheji (2005) conceptualized democracy as a form of political system in which the decision makers are selected through fair, honest, periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adult population is eligible for vote. Democracy therefore involves popular participation in the process of governance, equality among citizens, sovereignty of the people, promotion and protection of human rights and essential freedoms, limited government, supremacy of the rule of law, and separation of powers between the three arms of government (Malan, 2009).

Theoretical Framework

Neo-Patrimonial Theory

This theory explains a situation where a political leader uses his or her position to enrich himself and his relations not minding what the law says. This is a replica of the life of most average Nigerian in position of authority. It accentuates public corruption as it fails to distinguish acceptable conduct in the public and private life. Most leaders in Nigeria and third world nations accepts it as normal to use the positions the occupy to fill their pockets. In fact, even if such leaders do not do it, their people will not accept them. They see public office as opportunity to enrich them. Neo-patrimonialism are particularly obvious according to "Clapharm (1985:45) "the speed with which the following claimants gather round a successful politicians and the readiness with which the abuse of officials is accepted as normal behaviour condemned only in so far as it benefits someone else rather than oneself". This concept is mostly pre-eminent in the developing nations of the world especially Africa and Asia (Mehler 1998). In this model, exercise of power is erratic and unpredictable as opposed

to the calculable exercise of power in the Weberian terms. Here, the political leader uses his position for personal gains. The political office holder considers his personal desires more than what the law says. He uses his office as family affairs (Hansen 2003). In other words, under patrimonialism there is no separation of authority in terms of ruler's application of extent laws and his personal desires, everything was based on his preferences and sentiment rather than the law. Scholars like (Hansen 2003, Snyder 1992) were of the view that there is an extensive network of personal patronage, rather than ruling through ideology or impersonal law as the determining character of patrimonies rule.

In Nigeria, a typical example of leaders like Abacha, and Babangida can be described to have used their position to enrich them without considering what the law looks like. It is during the reign of these leaders that Nigeria suffered so much and there emerged a different class of elites who fragrantly displaced their wealth not minding the consequences.

On the other side, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) held that Patrimonial systems are associated with three informal political institutions. The first is presidentialism, which could be referred to as the concentration of leadership power in the hand of single person who may be un-willing to delegate any of the power to anybody except the most trivial task of decision making.
The second informal institution is systematic clientelism, which means that the chief executive relies on the administration or distribution of benefits such as contracts, projects and appointments. This is a typical civilian ruler, which have dealt a blow to the economy of Nigeria and have given rise to the emergence of class of multi-billionaires.

The third informal institutions are the use of state resources for legitimization, which Joseph (1987) refers to as politics of patronage. This is the perception of public offices as prebendes that can be appropriated and used by its occupants to generate personal benefits and also for the distribution of contracts projects and top government positions to people in their regions, district or ethnic Nationality (Hansen 2003). This third position could be equated to the Shagari regime of the second republic of Nigeria, where positions were distributed to people whether qualified or not as long as the person is close to the president and contract were awarded whether executed or not, in fact, this was the period where people imported "sand" in the form of essential commodities and goods. This contributed to impoverishing the country. The purpose of the patronage

politics is essentially to secure the loyalty, support and solidarity of clients or followers in the general population. The pattern of patronage in the state is structured down to individual in small villages (Hansen 2003).

In Neo-Patrimonialism, the issue of accountability is out of the question and who so ever wants to or questions the attitude of the leader is dealt with decisively. The leader distributes positions and state money and fund at his command. This was actually the reason for the death of most Third World economy and the sit-tight-to-position syndrome of which any attempt to remove them from power is highly resisted. It presupposes that the existence of extensive network of patronage personal relations and systematic clientelism undermines the effective action against corruption. The politicization of the rival proximate enclaves provides the stealing political leader impunity shelter to loot public funds.

Looking at the impact and effect of Neo-patrimonialism in Nigeria and most third world nations on economy and the extent it fueled corruption in these area, one would quickly conclude that it is basically an Africa phenomenon. It is also seen in the Europe and America. This is because the proximate and clientelistic groups and pressures are not peculiar to African states. They exist also in the advanced countries of the world such as the United States of America and Italy. As Gyekye (1997) noted every "society is traditional in as much as it maintain and cherishes values, practices, outlook and institutions" In fact, there are suggestions and opinions that advanced country such as the United States of America have remarkably high network of non-profit organizations and strips tradition of volunteers work and provide gift giving to clarities and relatives. However, there still exist adherence to regulations limiting self-dealing (Ackarman, 1999).

Clienteles Theory

Clientelism is used to explain the nature of corruption in Nigeria. It is related to Neo-patrimonialism, specific services and resources for political support often in the form of votes. It is a relationship between unequal, in which the major benefits accrue to the patron; redistributive effects are considered to be very limited. Clientelism rests on the notion that the expectations and behaviour of public officials are ordered in the redistribution of resources from the patron to the clients. To always rally support and solidarity, the clients expect the big patron to settle them (Ifeka, 2000).

Clientelism is an aspect of Neo-patrimonialism used interchangeably with patronage. It is important to note that both do not mean the same thing. Essentially clientelism is a dyadic and asymmetric relationship between patron and client it is often based on kinship and other social traditional relations but do exist without it. On the other hand, patronage is the relationship essentially between the individual and larger group. Furthermore, both concepts are distinct in terms of their beneficiaries. The individual benefits in the form of appointment and contracts in clientelism while in the patronage system, collective (group) such as ethnic nationality; district is the recipient of benefits in the form of roads. Instructively, the distribution of benefits in both is essentially based on personal interest rather than universal rules (Erdmann & Engel 2007). In both systems, the right to rule is essentially derived through non-conventional and illegal means such as election manipulation and military coup. The illegal acquisition of power of the state encourages the rulers to dispense favour to client. In the quest for legitimacy, successive administrations compromise mechanisms of accountability. The weakness of institutions for conventional conduct fuels clientelism and patronage system. It serves as a means for political mobilization, access to state resources and class formation (Szeftel, 2000b). In several African countries including Nigeria, clientelism is based on identity politics, primordial appeal, exchange relation and tribalism. In such societies kinship, ethnicity, religion and other forms of identity are used to rally support for factional leaders involved in corruption.

Also, public officials in the third world countries are often under serious clientelistic pressure to use their position to serve personal interest and those of the members of their constituencies. They are constantly requested and reminded by their kinsmen and women that their position is temporary and that the opportunities it provides would soon vanish. Thus, they feel compelled to apply public goods to serve personal or section ends – through embezzlement, bribery (Brownsberger (1983). Also, on account of the privileged position they occupy they feel compelled to maintain high visible standard of living. This encourages appropriation of state resources (Szeftel, 2000b).

Clientelism is tends to provide a platform for the people (masses) in the various groups to express themselves. However, this seeming democratic credential is ambiguous and contradictory (Szeftel 2000b). This is because in the practical sense it gives greater authority, power, influence, control and wealth to the leader (David, 2008).

History of Democratic Rule in Nigeria

Nigeria became an independent state on October 1st 1960. The country adopted the federal constitution by which its citizens were governed. No sooner the country attained independence than crises started. As noted by Ojigbo (1980), a number of reasons were responsible for these crises. These included a shaky tripartite federal structure with strong regionalism; disparity in sizes and population of the three regions; three major rationally based and tribally sustained political structures; cut- throat politicians, most of whom hadn't the vaguest idea about the act of politics and a weak constitution. The most notable crises were the general elections of 1965. The election crises resulted in a coup d'etat on January 15, 1966 which brought an end to the first republic. As such, democratic rule was abolished in favour of military rule. In July 29th there was another coup that brought the regime of Colonel Yakubu Gowan to power. He restored the federal system. By July 1967 civil war started as a result of the attempt of the eastern region to secede.

The Gowan administration managed to bring the war to an end on January 12, 1970. However, on July 29, 1975 the third coup brought to an end Gowan's regime. Murtala Mohammed came to power and he announced a 5-stage programme for return to civil rule. On February 13th, Murtala Mohammed was assassinated and Olusegun Obasanjo came to power. It was during the military reign of Obasanjo that an election to constituent assembly took place.
Between July 7 and August 11, 1979, general elections were conducted and the country returned to democratic rule on October 1, 1979. Between October 1, 1979 and December 1983, Nigeria witnessed presidential system of governance under Shehu Shagari. However the military came to power again in 1984 with Mohamed Buhari as the head of State. The regime of Buhari was short lived, as a coup brought an end to his regime and General Babangida came to power in August 27, 1985. Babaginda announced a transition programme which culminated in an election in 1993. Babangida, however, steped aside in 1993 after the annulment of the 1993 elections. An interim government was put in place headed by Ernest Shonekan. His regime was brought to an end in 1994 by General Sani Abacha. Abacha ruled the country as a military Head of State until he died in 1998. General Abdulsalam came to power after the death of Abacha and he handed over power back to civilians in 1999. The elections of 1999 brought Obasanjo back to power as civilian president of Federal Republic of Nigeria. Promising signs of democratic change came swiftly on the heels of Obasanjo's inauguration. It included the creation of panels to investigate past

corrupt leaders and human right abuses and the forced retirement of key military officers involved in previous military regimes (Adesoji and Matthew, 2010).

At inauguration, Obasanjo appeared well prepared for the tasks ahead since he was not a stranger to power. In 1979, he was the military head of state that handed over power to Alhaji Shehu Shagari as the first elected president. Obasanjo bemoaned the situation he met the nation in, particularly as it related to governance in areas like economy, education, security, and infrastructure.
He gave his commitment to put things right and make Nigerians to see the benefits of democratic rule.

Nigerian political space and indeed the country's democracy than any Nigerian dead or alive. The fulcrum of governance and democracy in Nigeria within the period under review without any doubt is the foundation laid by the Obasanjo administration. As noted earlier, Obasanjo showed commitment towards bringing the country on the right track. As such, he initiated so many policies, programmes and reforms which were geared towards the growth and development of the country.

The plethora of reforms, policies and programmes highlighted above as introduced by the administration were geared towards developing the country socio-economically and ensuring that Nigerians derive maximum benefit there from. The formulation of these policies and programmes is laudable, but the execution of most of them ended in fiasco. Nigerians were frustrated and made more impoverished. The challenges are legion, but we shall examine only a few considered to be the crux of the of the nation's governance crisis (Femi, 2013).

The State and the Failure of Democratic Experiments in Nigeria

Problematizing Nigeria's efforts at democratization would require a re-examination of the historical events that created the Nigerian entity. The 'forceful and thoughtless' marriage of the Northern and Southern protectorates by the British colonial rule had done more damage than good to the Nigerian society even before the granting of independence in 1960. It can be historically sustained that the Nigerian entity did not exist in vacuum before the British conquest of 1861. Different Nationalities had existed with their respective and distinguishing values, traditions, cultures, norms, and in fact governmental system. These Nationalities had attained different levels of economic and socio-political developments before colonialism truncated such process (Akinboye and

Anifowose, 1999, Rodney, 1972). Therefore, to amalgamate such nationalities in a marriage of inconvenience was to anticipate a failed relationship, a relationship which no doubt has been characterized inter alia by mutual suspicion, hatred, deep animosity, violence, sectionalism and ethnic chauvinism till date. Any democratization effort based on this strained relationship has, and is still frustrating any meaningful attempt at attaining full democracy.

The nature and character of the Nigerian state has not helped matters since the Nigerian state started out during colonialism. Colonialism in whatever forms, intends to achieve the twin objectives of exploration and exploitation of the colonized territories. As instructively observed by Young (1988), Colonial Nigerian state was oppressive and authoritarian in its conduct and was not in a position to bridge its alien and distant nature from the Nigerian people. This, he argued was in line with the general nature of colonial state which sits atop a conquered entity.

Unfortunately, local elites that inherited the post colonial Nigerian state continued with the authoritarian and alienating nature of the colonial Nigerian state for the one reason that the state did not evolve from the society and/or consensual agreement of the inhabiting nationalities. Because of the fragile nature of the Nigerian state encapsulated in weak institutional capacities to discharge state functions, political dramatis personae have over time personalized and usurped state apparatuses to the detriment of democratic practice and sustenance. State institutions and apparatuses including the police, electoral bodies, judiciary and political parties have demonstrated their weaknesses and incapacity in ensuring a virile democratic Nigeria as witnessed in the 1964-65, 1979, 1983 and regrettably 1993 elections.

The character of the Nigerian state has been exploited by the operators of state affairs to achieve particularist and sectional interests. Managers of state affairs have often times assumed the position of the state thereby rendering the state paralyzed and in fact subjecting it to their whim and caprice. The situation became more pathetic under military regimes, with their unitary, hierarchical and commanding nature largely affecting the operation of the Nigerian state. Wale Olaitan (1997) lends credence to this in his summation of the Nigerian state and the Babangida military regime:

Olaitan (1997) concluded that the surviving character of the Nigerian state defined by its lack of autonomy, the immensity of its power, its proneness to

abuse and the lack of immunity against it, constitutes a road block to democracy.

Perception of People towards Dividends of Democracy

Dividends can simply be called the gains or profits realized from democracy. It is an obvious fact that military government operates by decrees while in an ideal democratic government, law operates. Rule of law is what is unique to democracy. It includes supremacy of the law, equality before the law and fundamental human rights. It is only in democracy that rule of law can be obtained.

Therefore, rule of law can be said to be part of the dividends of democracy. Many policies, programmes and plans have been termed "dividends of democracy" by politicians and people since the beginning of the fourth republic till date. They include the introduction of new salary scale for civil servants by the Obasanjo led Administration, multi-party system, deregulation of the communication sector that led to the introduction of Global System for Mobile telecommunication (GSM) was introduced and debt relief during the same administration, the seven point agenda of President Umar Yaradua. The passage of the freedom of press bill, the establishment of nine federal universities and the recent action of the federal government to deregulate the downstream sector in this Goodluck Jonathan's were also seen as "dividends of democracy" (Igba, 2012).

According to Omotola (2007) by dividends of democracy we mean the benefit and positive gestures which the new environment of democracy has brought to bear on the state and society.

Ideally, it would include rising legitimacy of the state; improved standard of living for the majority of the populace; improved climate of human rights in all its ramification; all culminating in popular empowerment, participation and enhanced atmosphere of peace and stability as a prerequisite for development.

Conclusion

The outcome of this study offers an important insight into an assessment of dividend of democracy in Nigeria. From this study, we observed that there is a significant relationship between democracy and societal development. We also observed that problem of accountability and embezzlement of public funds reduces dividend of democracy, as well as godfatherism constitutes impediment to dividend of democracy. Thus, these findings are encouraging enough to set

forth future research agenda on a large sample of state, in other to further explore the issue of dividend of democracy in Nigeria.

The Way forward

1. It must be emphasized that in Nigeria today there is pervasive and biting poverty. Therefore, for democracy to engender good governance there is the need for massive infrastructural development across the country in the areas of road, electricity, pipe borne water, and so forth. In addition, issue of poverty eradication must be addressed frontally.
2. Governments at all levels must also exhibit budgetary discipline. Budget in the country is gradually becoming an annual ritual without any effect on government's revenue and expenditure profile.
3. Also, there must be a need for strengthening the legislative arm of government, so as to effectively and efficiently perform its assigned responsibilities, particularly its oversight functions, to put the executive on its toes in its service delivery functions. Furthermore, legal and electoral reforms should be carried out, to do away with defective aspects as well as promote good governance. Sectoral service delivery and capacity building are equally essential to empower and strengthen sectors such as health, agriculture service, education, trade and industry, and so forth. Without these sectors optimally performing their roles, good governance may be difficult to achieve. The officers in charge of these sectors must be mobilised, motivated and trained to enable them rededicate themselves to the service of the state.
4. Civil society actors also must be alive to their responsibilities, particularly as the bulwark against corruption, inefficiency, ineffectiveness and general maladministration. Citizens as well must be well mobilised to always demand accountability and transparency from their leaders
5. Both the leaders and followers must learn the art and discipline of democracy, cultivate the habit and virtue of honesty and imbibe democratic ethos as these remain the only antidote to the crises of national development.

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HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND INTERPLAY IN KOGI STATE UNIVERSITY, ANYIGBA NIGERIA.

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ABSTRACT

The study titled "Human Capital Development Performance: ssues Challenges and Interplay in Kogi State University" is intended to examine the establishment and the core mandate of the university, the extent of compliance with achievement in conformity with global practice. It was nevertheless discovered that certain interplay arising from government interferences rendered the institution as shadow of its mandate. The study concludes that a more improved human capital development through routine or regular evaluation of human capital development programme is a must and a requirement.

Introduction

Human Resources are the most valuable assets of any organization. With the machines, materials, land and money, nothing get done without human effort. The potentials of human efforts are simply what are termed Human Capital. These are the set of people that an organisation hires to achieve her set goals and objectives. (Abiodun 2012).

Therefore, the effectiveness and success of an organisation lies on the people who form the workforce of the organisation. It follows therefore, that for the employees in an organisation to be able to perform their duties and make meaningful contributions to the success of the organisational gaols, they need to acquire relevant skills and knowledge (Abiodun 2012). Human Capital Development is thus, the systematic acquisition of relevant skills, knowledge and expertise in other to be able to function effectively,

[1] Kogi State University, Anyigba

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efficiently and optimally in an organisation for the overall success of that organisation.

Establishment of the University and the Core Mandate

Accordingly, Kogi State University, Anyigba was established against the statistical data that every year, less than one-third of the annual total number of prospective students from Kogi State seeking admission into universities in the country are able to get placements. Moreover, it is accepted that Kogi State is educationally backward (KSU 2008). This does not necessarily suggest that, upon being established, only indigenes of Kogi State would be admitted as students or employed as staff by the university. Thus, the university formally came into being on November 18, 1999. The bill establishing the university was signed into law by the then Executive Governor of Kogi State, Late Prince Abubakar Audu.

Kogi State University, Anyigba was established as a centre of academic excellence that will stimulate accelerated development through research and Human Capital Development. The university was designed to primarily meet the needs of Kogi State, the nation (Nigeria) and the globe in high-level human capital and development. Its philosophy was premised on academic and intellectual excellence. Accordingly, the philosophy and objectives of Kogi State University, Anyigba includes the following:

1. As an institution of high learning committed to scholarly pursuits with special relevance to the development of Kogi State in particular and Nigeria in general.
2. To provide training that is relevant to the social, cultural, economic, scientific and technological needs of Kogi State in particular and Nigeria in general.
3. To encourage the advancement of learning at the highest level.
4. To provide course of instruction and other facilities for acquisition of knowledge in all fields.
5. To encourage and promote scholarship and conduct research in all areas of learning and human endeavour.
6. To act as centre of academic excellence that will stimulate development through research and human capital development and to relate its activities to the local environment.
7. To undertake any other academic pursuits for accelerated development in the new millennium. (KSU, 2008).

Therefore, the importance of Human capital to the establishment, growth and development of any organization cannot be over-emphasized. Kogi State University, Anyiba as an academic institution needs quality Human capital whether as academic staff or as non-teaching supportive staff.

The vision of Kogi State University, Anyigba is to be a highly rated academic centre of excellence and leadership for a better world. Conversely also, the mission of the university is to advance appropriate and effective learning and explore the frontiers of knowledge through (a) effective teaching, research and dissemination of research-based knowledge

(b) positively influencing and nurturing local, national and international partnerships and integration and

(c) serving as positive model in learning, teaching and research. (KSU 2016)

As stated earlier, for Kogi State University, Anyigba, the core of human capital constitutes the academic staff who are involved in teaching and research supported by a large numbers of non-teaching staff. Unfortunately, in recent times, there seems to be a huge problem in the human capital that is seriously affecting her development and the overall performance of the University such as, salaries and allowances are irregular for those in the pay-roll while great percentages are left un-paid for upwards of two (2) years and above. A major consequence of these includes: low morale to work, brain-drain and inability of the University to achieve her vision and mission. (Atiomo, 2012).

A case in point, as a matter of concrete example, is the slow pace of postgraduate programmes. For instance, the 2017/2018 session whose sales of application advert went out on the 3rd of Dec 2017, is yet to take off in October 2018. Most departments lack, the very senior cadre of academics- the Professors, Readers and Senior Lecturers. In 2017, there was a mass lay-off of about 150 academic staff by the State Government arising from the ASUU/State Government face-off. Perhaps, in the bid to remedy that great

vacuum, there was a mass recruitment exercise, but unfortunately, almost 95% of those recruited are lower level lecturers: Graduate Assistants and Assistant lecturers (KSU Establishments Office, 2019). No doubt, these and many more are bound to affect the quality and performance of the University if the trend continues unabated. This is what forms the basis for this study.

Further more, in established organizations, especially tertiary institutions; both the services of academic and non academic staff are employed to contribute to the overall success of the institution. But despite the fact that various studies have been conducted to assess human capital development on employees in organizations, few or none has been carried out on Kogi State University, Anyigba where employees, especially both academic and non academic staff continue to show dissatisfaction after the appraisal exercise.

Issues, Challenges and Interplay

The early developmental stages of Kogi State University, Anyigba was characterised by a myriad of anomalies. Besides the over-bloated student population, academic staff strength and quality in the university was grossly inadequate to support viable academic programmes. According to (KSU 2008), in terms of numerical strength, while the National Universities Commission (NUC) student/staff ratio stood at 24:1, the student/staff ration for Kogi State University, Anyigba as at June 2005 stood at 80:1. It stated that this was more than the number of ratio prescribed by NUC per lecturer.

However, it is instructive to mention here that, the NUC updated Basic Minimum Academic Standard (BMAS) 2019 has the following Staff: Student ratio. Management and Administration= 1:30, Education= 1:30, Engineering and Technology= 1:15, Agriculture- 1:15, Law= 1:15, Sciences= 1:15.

It went further to state that, in terms of quality, it was a scandalous situation to have Assistant Lecturers as Heads of some Departments. It was equally unbelievable that some departments did not have a single Ph.D holder as lecturer (KSU 2008), a situation that that is totally un-acceptable in a university. The consequence of this ugly

situation was the abysmal failure of NUC accreditation exercises'. No programme of the university, after five years of her existence had full NUC accreditation. It was a thoroughly demoralised and confused university community whose reputation and public image had plummeted. In fact, it was termed a 'glorified secondary school' (KSU 2008).

Thus for the university to survive in such volatile environment, the quality of the human element ought to be attended to and continuously upgraded through training and development. The provision of service especially as does academic institution like Kogi State University, Anyigba requires up-to-date knowledge and Information from givers (lecturers), beneficiaries (students) and administrators hence, the need for the establishment of a process of learning, training and re-training which is here-in termed Human Capital Development. As Fajana (2012) puts it, in most of today's organisations, the ability to learn and change faster than the competitor is the key to survival.

Overview of Kogi State University, Anyigba

Kogi State University, located at Anyigba, is the state-owned university of Kogi, Nigeria. It was established in 1999 by Prince Abubakar Audu, the former governor of the state. At the time of its establishment, it was known as Kogi State University, it was named Prince Abubakar Audu University (PAAU) in 2002 and later renamed Kogi State University in 2003 (KSU).

Professor S.K. Okwute (Professor of Chemistry) was the pioneer Vice Chancellor (2000 - 2005). Professor F.S. Idachaba (OFR), Professor of Agric-Economics, took over between 2005 and 2008.

Professor H. Isah (Professor of Chemical Pathology), from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, took over in October 2008 to September 2015. Then Professor M.S. Abdulkadir (Professor of Economic History) from Bayero University, Kano took over from October 2015 to April 2020. The incumbent Vice Chancellor, Professor M.O. Tenuche (Professor of Political Science) took over from April, 2020 to date. It is on record that she is the first female Vice Chancellor

and the first indigenous staff of Kogi State University, Anyigba to get to this exalted position in the University system.

Kogi State University commenced academic activities in April, 2000 with six faculties: Faculties of Agriculture, Arts and Humanities, Law, Management Sciences, Natural Sciences and Social Sciences. The university established Faculty of Medicine in 2012 with extensive office and laboratory complexes. Unfortunately, it could not scale the hurdle of accreditation; therefore, it was converted into the College of Health Sciences offering courses in Basic Medical Sciences. The Centre for Pre-Degree and Diploma Studies was established in 2010 to run diploma and pre-degree programmes. Students of the pre-degree programme could gain admission into the degree programme if they are successful in the internal examination and JAMB/UTME but are excluded from the Post-UTME examination.

The university offers the following courses across her eight (8) faculties: **College of Health Sciences** (Department of Anatomy, Department of Community Health, Department of Human physiology, Department of Ear, Nose and Throat, Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Department of Pharmacology and Department of Medical Biochemistry);

Faculty of Agricultural Sciences (Department of Animal Production, Department of Agric Economics & Extension, Department of Crop Production, Department of Food nutrition and Home sciences, Department of Fishery & Aqua culture, Department of Forestry & wild life and Department of Soil & Environmental Management);

Faculty of Law (Department of Public Law and Islamic Law);

Faculty of Arts & Humanities (Department of Arabic Studies, Department of Islamic Studies, Department of English and Literary studies, Department of History and International Studies, Department of Philosophy, Department of Religious studies and Department of Theatre Arts);

Faculty of Social Sciences (Department of Economics, Department of Geography & Environmental Management, Department of Sociology, Department of Mass Communication and Department of Political Science);

Faculty of Natural Sciences (Department of Biological Sciences, Department of Biochemistry, Department of Chemistry, Department of Earth Sciences, Department of Mathematical Sciences, Department of Computer Sciences, Department of Micro Biology and Department of Physics);

Faculty of Management Sciences (Department of Accounting, Department of Business Administration, Department of Banking and Finance and Department of Public Administration) and

Faculty of Education (Department of Arts Education, Department of Educational Foundations, Department of Business Education, Department of Kinetics & Physical Education, Department of Social Studies and Department of Science Education). About 98% of the courses offered in the university are accredited by the Nigeria University Commission (NUC).

The university is said to be one of the best in Africa, with some of its departments being ranked by Nigerian professional bodies. In 2010, the Faculty of law was pronounced as the best in Nigeria, and has remained among the best in subsequent years. Also, its department of Geology has been rated as one of the best in Africa, alongside Obafemi Awolowo University, and the University of Ibadan. Presently, it hosts a library which is home to a large collection of expensive specialized books, materials, and a Geological station, both contributed by Shell Petroleum Development Company in appreciation of the department's exceptionally-strong intellectual capacity development attitude (Ojo, 2016).

The university also boasts of facilities which according to NUC, (2016) are accessible to students for academic research, a privilege very uncommon among Nigerian state universities. Despite funding which is not as large as those coming from the federal government,

(as is, with state universities), it has been named the university with the best implementation of resources for development by Knowledge for Impact Foundation.

The university has been very popular in the corporate world for producing highly intellectual students or typical geniuses, employed by these corporate organizations.

Often, major companies have often written to the school for granting exceptionally-intelligent graduates with grades like First class and Second class upper division or even graduates with Second class lower divisions. In this, the University has responded: "that is how they measured us against the school's standard". The Institution started with a student population of about 700 in 2000, but which as at 2009/2010 admission exercise has grown to about 16,000, and now stands at 50,000 in 2016. It is also known as one of the fairest universities in its admission exercise, admitting students strictly by merit.

It has been ranked as Nigeria's fastest developing university, and one of such, in Africa. Although not as popular as its federal counterparts like the University of Lagos, Obafemi Awolowo University, and Ahmadu Bello University, Kogi State University has been named by many multinational Corporate bodies as one of Africa's BEST universities based on the exceptional intellectual pedigree of its employed graduates (UNC, 2016).

Thus, in response to changes in human life, organizations have embraced the notion of human capital development as a good competitive advantage that will enhance higher performance. Human capital development becomes a part of an overall effort to achieve cost-effective and employee performance. Hence, institutions need to understand human capital that would enhance employee satisfaction and improve performance. Although there is a broad assumption that human capital has positive effects on employee’s performance, the notion of performance for human capital remains largely untested. Hence, this study attempts to look into the connection between human capital development and

organisation's performance with particular reference to Kogi State University, Anyigba

The Academic Ranking of Kogi State University Anyigba according to Nigeria University Commission (2019) ranked Kogi State University Anyigba in 42 position. The ranking is relying solely on research indicators", and "the ranking is heavily weighted toward institutions whose faculty have adequate learning facilities. It does not measure "the quality of teaching or the quality of humanities.

The Nigerian university system is a necessary tool in this dialectic for determining the extent to which investment in human capital can be used in transforming and improving performance in Organisation. Despite the huge investment made in human resources in Nigeria so far, the performance of the Nigerian Universities has remained generally disappointing. This is not to say that there has not been any transformation or any impressive achievement (Lawal,2014).

University rankings are rankings of institutions in higher education which have been ranked on the basis of various combinations of various factors. None of the rankings give a comprehensive overview of the strengths of the institutions ranked because all select a range of easily quantifiable characteristics to base their results on. Rankings have most often been conducted by magazines, newspapers, websites, governments, or academics.

In addition to ranking entire institutions, organizations perform rankings of specific programs, departments, and schools. Various rankings consider combinations of measures of funding and endowment, research excellence and/or influence, specialization expertise, admissions, student options, award numbers, internationalization, graduate employment, industrial linkage, historical reputation and other criteria. Various rankings mostly evaluate on institutional output by research. Some rankings evaluate institutions within a single country, while others assess institutions worldwide. The subject has produced much debate about rankings' usefulness and accuracy (Aderounmu, 2007). However, the importance of university ranking can not be over-emphasised.

Although it does not indicate level of performance, it does speak volumes that the university is being recognised world-wide.

The expanding diversity in rating methodologies and accompanying criticisms of each indicate the lack of consensus in the field. Further, it seems possible to game the ranking systems through excessive self-citations (Almendarez, 2011) or by researchers supporting each other in surveys. UNESCO has questioned whether rankings "do more harm than good", while acknowledging that "Rightly or wrongly, they are perceived as a measure of quality and so create intense competition between universities all over the world (Aswathappa,2008)

The Human Resources &Labour Review (HRLR), which measure the performance of top universities' graduates in Nigeria, sadly, Kogi State University was not really ranked based on these (Barney,1991). The High Impact Universities Research Performance Index (RPI) is a 2010 initiative by Nigeria University Commission (Baruch, 2001). that studies university research performance. The pilot project involved a trial of over 1,000 universities or institutions and 5,000 constituent faculties (in various disciplines) worldwide. The top 500 results for universities and faculties were reported at the project website (Brum, 2007).

The project promotes simplicity, transparency and fairness. The assessment analyzes research performance as measured by publications and citations. Publication and citation data is drawn from Scopus. The project uses standard bibliometric indicators, namely the 10-year g-index and h-index. RPI equally weighs contributions from the five faculties. Kogi State University, Anyigba could not find her foot among the Nigeria University that was ranked based on Research performance.

Hence, the main problem is to expose those variables that are inherent in human potentials that when proper investments are made in human capital development, and such skills are wisely and usefully exploited, productivity is ensured and thus ensuring performance in Organisation.

Conclusion and Recommendations

For human capital development on organisational performance to achieve its primary objectives in any setup particularly in Kogi State University, to achieve designed development goal, the inputs and outputs of the institutions must be unambiguously specified to rhyme with international standard. It is also worthy of note that the institution must not loose sight of different output indicators with rapt attention. This is in view of the fact that the university performance is measured; taken into cognisance that the effectiveness and success of every organisation is a function of the people who form the workforce. It is hoped that Kogi State University, and it's workforce will henceforth beginning tot experience a more improved human capital development through regular evaluation of human capital development programme.

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ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN NIGERIAN TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS (2009-2019)

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ABSTRACT

This study titled "Assessment of Human Capital Development Challenges in Nigeria Tertiary Institution" is critically intended to x-ray the various factors that influence human capital development in Nigerian higher institutions. It is understood from the study that human capital development is bedevilled with government policies, level of globalisation and others which constitute inimical environment to the Nigerian tertiary institutions. The study concludes with recommendation amongst others that hence human capital constitutions teaching, there is need for teaching workforce to be developed by the tertiary institutions to meet current global academic challenges.

Introduction

Human capital can then be defined as the skills, general or specific, acquired by an individual in the cause of vocational and technical education and on-the-job training in the industrial work place (Enyekit, Amaehule & Teerah, 2011).To corroborate this definition, Becker (1992) argued that investments in education and training are the most relevant types of investments in human capital. He further opined that human capital is linked to economic growth, from individual to national levels. It therefore follows that human capital development has to do with the education, skill levels, and problem-solving abilities that will enable an individual to be a productive worker in the global economy of the twenty-first century.

Delaney and Huselid (1996) also defined that in HRM practices, commitment plays a key role. In simple term, the aim of HRM is

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enhancing the skills of employee, increasing their level of commitment which leads to increase the organization performance, output and efficiency. Globalization and job market saturation has resulted in greater focus on human capital. All the countries reiterate more human capital growth towards speeding up the economic development by allocating essential time and hard work. According to Marimuthu, (2009), Human capital means important aspect in alleviating a firm possessions and employees in order to boost productiveness as well as maintain competitive benefits. To continue and maintain competitiveness in the organization, human capital is key.

Human capital is related to procedure that includes training, education and other professional initiatives so that level of knowledge, skills, abilities and social values of employees are increased. This will relate to employee's satisfaction and performance and ultimately firm performance. Marimuthu, (2009) therefore opined that human capital is vital key for organization mainly for employees' constant enhancement in term of knowledge, skills, and abilities.

Individual and organization are two main components of human capital. According to Garavan, (2001) human capital has four characteristics namely, flexibility and adaptability, enhancement of individual competencies, the development of organizational competencies and individual employability. These characteristics can increase value and output of organization and individual (Noudhaug, 1998); higher performance of human capital leads to achieve competitive advantage (Iles, 1990); higher organizational commitment and improved organizational retention (Robertson et al., 1991). Collis and Montgomery (1995) explained that Human capital is more focused on creation of competitive advantage.

The concept of "human capital" has acquired tremendous attention in today`s study. Bontis (1999) defines human capital as representing the human factor in an organization; the combined intelligence, skills and expertise that gives the organization its distinctive character. Armstrong (2006) defines human capital as all human abilities whether innate or acquired attributes, whose value could be enlarged by appropriate development investments. Davenport (1999) observed that human capital consists of intangible skills that workers provide for their employers.

Human capital can also be defined as knowledge, skills, aptitudes and other acquired traits contributing to production (Goode,1959). Skills represent individual capacities contributing to production as an argument in the production function(Bowles,Gintis and Osborne,2001).

According to Blundell, Deardean,Meghir and Sianesi (1999),there are two main components of human capital with strong complimentarily; early ability (whether acquired or innate) and skills acquired through formal education or training on the job. Human capital differs from other assets because it yields market returns only in proportion to the workers supply of labour (Bundi, 2007).

Human capital has been defined variously by different authors. To Scultz (1993), it is a key element in improving a firm assets and employees in order to increase productivity as well as sustain competitive advantage. Marimuthu, Arokiasamy and Ismail (2009) opined that to sustain competitiveness in any organization, human capital becomes an instrument use to increase productivity. The study by Marimuthu, Arokiasamy and Ismail (2009) further maintained that human capital refer to processes that relate to training, education and other professional initiatives in order to increase levels of knowledge, skills, abilities, values and social assets of an employee that will ultimately lead to the employee's satisfaction and performance and eventually on firm's performance.

According to Rastogi (2000), human capital is an important input for organization especially for employee's continuous improvement mainly on knowledge, skills and abilities. Furthermore, Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2001) defined human capital as "knowledge, skills, competences and attributes embodied individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic well-being.

In school system, a human capital constitutes the teaching workforce. As a result of global innovativeness and competitiveness in technology and research, there is need for teaching workforce to be developed by the universities to meet current academic challenges. This can be achieved through in-service training and regular conference and workshop attendance. Noe, Hollenbeck Gerhart and Wright (2003) maintained that

human capital development and enhancement impacts positively on organizational performance.

Etor (2011) projects some reasons why many workers need professional and further education. They include need to update their knowledge, skills, work habit in line with changes in technology and techniques of production and so on. For instance, in the university system, there initial training was not taught certain courses. But as a result of constant curriculum reviews, certain courses or instructional method are now novel to them. The only way such can still remain relevant in the system is to retrained, through workshops and conferences. A typical example is the introduction of information and communication technology (ICT) and entrepreneurial skill courses in the universities. How can lecturers (the human capital) be agent of transformation if they themselves are not further developed to meet current challenges in the educational sector.

Today, the use of the portal is being advocated for university accreditations. All these lead to a transformation in the education system but the Human capital that have to handle these things must be trained and retrained so as to acquire the skills and competences required to do the job. UNESCO (2002) affirms that the introduction of open distance learning (ODL) has stimulated the interest of educators and trainers in the use of the internet based and multi-media technologies and by recognizing that the traditional ways of organizing education requires reinforcement by innovative methods of the fundamental rights of all people to learn is to be fulfilled.

Apart from training programmes, Whitehead (1990) pointed out that attending conferences and workshops improved head teachers' efficiency as it gives opportunity to relate with one another from different schools, share problems. Akpan (2008) found that conferences and workshop attendance provided a common ground for problem-handling initiative and therefore related significantly with high productivity. Human Resource Management first emerged as a clearly defined concept in the mid-1980s as a natural development of personnel management. Human Resources are the most critical factor in development. As active agent of production, Human Resources are not only a major cost of doing business, they also determine success of enterprise through the ability to raise, exploit and manipulate other factors/resources, Brown, (2004). Its increasing

popularity in Nigeria is a recent development dating back to the last two decades.

Factors that Influence Human Capital Development

As stated earlier, the essence of human capital development is to train workers to become relevant in their place of work for individual and organizational relevance. However, the development of human capital in various sectors of the economy is usually influenced by one or more of the following factors:

Government Policies: The policies of government either at the federal, state of local government level plays a significant role in determining the options and opportunities available for workers to develop their abilities at work. UNCTAD (2000) suggested that the extent to which transactional corporations upgrade their technology and skill base depends on the interaction of host-country government policies. In the same way, government policies determine to a great extent the type and level of skills and technical knowledge acquired by the citizens. The establishment of the right atmosphere through appropriate government policies is needed for the development of human capital.

Level of Globalization: Another factor that influences human capital development is the level of globalization. The amount of rapport between citizens and other advanced countries also provide an opportunity for an enhanced human capital development. Globalization assists in the transfer of new and efficient knowledge for individuals within and outside the country (Dakpo 2010).

Level of Competition: The level of completion in the various industries within the country also determines the level of human capital development. Competition in the business environment encourages research; and research result to the development of new knowledge. It is therefore important to note that the height of competition in the various sectors of the economy will contribute to the improvement of the value of human capital within the society (Dakpo 2010)..

Technological Advancement: Since the inception of the 21st Century, technology is becoming a very important tool for meeting human needs. Similarly, with the instruction of the World Wide Web (WWW), the transfer of knowledge has become easier and more obtainable. However,

the unavailability of internet facilities and other technological gadgets has militated against the ability of individuals to develop. Almendarez (2011) identified technological change as one of the factors that help to develop the economic relevance of human capital. The volume of information and idea gotten through modern technology helps to increase the relevance of human capital.

Religious and Socio-Cultural Demand: Religious, social and cultural demands also influence human capital development. Religion, culture and social beliefs usually determine willingness and access to the various opportunities utilized by individuals for their development. The culture of people as well as their religious inclination will either encourage or repel them from improving on their human capital (Dada 2011).

Level of Enrolment: According to Egbue (2002) low rate of enrolment at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of education poses human capital problem for both gender(s) in Nigeria. Education according to the National Policy on Education (2004) is important for individual and societal growth and development. The level of enrolment into any of the educational levels will contribute immensely to the development of human capital. Education is an important tool for the development of human capital. As such, the level of education and the quality of education acquired will contribute to the huge development of human capital.

Challenges Confronting Human Capital Development in Nigerian Higher Institutions

Despite the position of higher institutions in Nigeria as the most important instrument for the development of human capital in the country, very little progress has been recorded. Some of the factors that have limited the ability of higher institutions in contributing to the development of human capital in the country are as follows:

Mismanagement: One of the challenges that is ravaging most sectors of the Nigerian economy is that of mismanagement. According to Auty (1993) most countries with plenty of natural resources are usually less developed economically than others due to the mismanagement of resources. Human, material and financial resources available in higher institutions are used for other purposes aside that of human capital development. Sometimes, resources available in higher institutions are

used for selfish interest or misappropriated. This trend will negatively affect the move for the development of human development.

Poverty: Aderounmu (2007) pointed out that poverty remains one of the biggest problems confronting Nigerians. Poverty is the inability of a person to carry out the basic necessities of life. This includes the inability of a person to acquire enough money required to acquire formal education. When such important programmes cannot be achieved, most of the citizens will remain irrelevant in a changing environment. Most students in the school system are so poor that they cannot afford a good meal. As such, the ability to acquire textbooks, computers and other learning materials becomes a mirage.

Inadequate Infrastructures: Dike (2012) stated that "Any person familiar with Nigeria would agree that among the challenges facing the economy is ineffective institutions and dilapidated infrastructure (bad roads, erratic power supply, limited access to potable water and basic healthcare, and ineffective regulatory agencies, et cetera". All of these facilities are important in the self -development of students. When the appropriate facilities are provided, it will create an enabling environment for students to on self-development. These infrastructures include computer laboratories, workshops and well-equipped libraries.

Inadequate Funding: Fund is a very important resource that is needed for the procurement of basic resources needed for developing human capital. Funding is needed for the purchase of all that is required to acquire those human and material resources that are needed to development the status of other human resource. The inadequacy or unavailability of fund will forestall the growth and development of human resources in various higher institutions in the country when funds are unavailable, it will be difficult for most higher institutions in the country to carry out plans, projects and programmes that will enhance students and community development (Dada 2011)..

Low Level of Individual Interest: Individual interest in developing their abilities plays a significant role in determining the level of human capital development in the country. The willingness of students in acquiring quality education will contribute to the development of their relevance. However, when students are unwilling to change, it will result to a slow or

total absence of development of the quality and quantity of human capital within the country. Students in the nation's higher institutions need to develop a passion for self-development before change can occur (Dauda2010)

Strategies to Overcome the Problem of Human Capital Development in Nigerian Higher Institutions

The creation of an enabling environment for higher institutions to thrive in the country is highly instrumental for the development of human capital in the country. It is therefore important that the challenges limiting higher institutions from contributing to the development of human capital in the country should be addressed. This can be achieved through the following strategies:

Development of Appropriate Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Facilities

The use of ICT in improving the quality of service delivery in the various sectors of the economy is gaining increasing attention. According to Epodoi (2003) ICT serves as an instrument which assists in increasing productivity and improving service delivery. It is therefore important that adequate ICT facilities be provided for the training of students and teachers for effective human capital development.

Review of Curriculum: Hershberg 1996 in (Dada 2011), suggested that we should be comparing the human capital of our children to the skills required by the jobs of the twenty-first century global economy. However, in order for the skills and abilities of students to be developed, the curriculum of most of the higher institutions in the country needs to be reviewed to meet contemporary economic demands. This will help in enhancing the relevance of students in the 21st century.

On the Job Training: The need for constant training among employees in any formal organization cannot be over-emphasized. Developmental programmes and activities play a significant role in making employees more effective in the work environment. On-the-job training is one of the avenues through which the expertise of workers can be improved upon. Seminars, conferences, workshops and other training programmes need to be provided for lecturers to improve their quality. A student can hardly rise above the competence of the teacher; it is therefore necessary that

lecturers in higher institutions should be exposed to on the job training to acquire modern teaching techniques (Dada 2011)..

Job Enrichment: The work environment should be equipped with modern and important facilities and equipment that will allow staff and students to go on knowledge search. Higher institutions in the country should be provided with the necessary human and material resources that will assist in the development of all educational stakeholders within the environment of the institution (Dada 2011).

Organizational Restructuring: The structural arrangement of an organization can contribute to the success or failure of the organization. When people and activities are merged based on areas of strength, it will result into increased efficiency. The various faculties and departments in the school should be properly structured in such a way that new staff can learn from other experts in the faculty or department. Such an arrangement will assist in the improvement of the quality of service provided by the various staff. Also, it will assist in improving the skills and abilities of all lecturers. This will make them better-off than when they were initially employed. It will also help to improve the quality of their students (Dada 2011).

Conclusion

In view of the issues raised above, the study concludes that acquisition of sufficient education and training is fundamental such that every organisation must embark upon in order to make a worker productive in problem solving especially in the twenty first century of global economy. It is hoped that education and training will not only enhanced the skills of employee but with also increase their level of commitment which will leads to increase in organisational performance, output and efficiency.

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IMPACTS OF OIL BUNKERING IN THE NIGER-DELTA REGION ON THE NIGERIAN STATE

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ABSTRACT

The region of the Niger-Delta is unique in the Nigerian state based on the fact that, it is naturally endowed in abundance with oil and gas which have continued to be the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. Therefore, the study examines the impacts of oil bunkering in the Niger-Delta region on the Nigerian state. The study argues that, the presence of oil has made the region valuable to the country but unfortunately, the region lacks development. This insensitivity on the part of government often leads to persistent agitations and grievances against the state. The study, however, establishes that, due to this ugly situation, the militant groups are involved in acts of criminalities and economic sabotage, particularly the oil bunkering which undermines the economic prosperity of the state. The study is situated within the ambit of the Marxist Political Economy Theory while secondary sources were used to expantiate on the developments in the region. It concludes that illegal oil bunkering signifies great danger to Nigerian state, as it has reduces the wealth generation of the state that could be used for developmental purposes. In view of this, the study recommends that, both the federal government and the oil companies must cater adequately for the needs of the people and development of the region.

Keywords: Corruption, Economic Sabotage, Oil bunkering, Niger Delta.

Introduction

Nigeria is a country located in the Guinea Coast of West Africa between latitude 4° and 14° North and longitude 3° and 14° East. It is bounded by the Republics of Niger, Chad to the North, Benin to the West, Cameroon to the East and Atlantic Coast to the South. It covers a land area of about 924,000 square kilometers with diverse climates, soil types, ecological zones and natural resources (Ekpo, Chime & Enor, 2016). The scholars posited that judging by the

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National Population Commission (2006) figures Nigeria is unarguably the most populous Black Country in the world with over 140 million people. Nigeria is blessed with magnificent arable lands; forest resources such as timber, palm oil and kernel, cocoa, rubber, kola nuts, yams, rice, millet, wheat; semi-temperate climate suitable for the production of tea, coffee, as well as the breeding of cattle, sheep, goats and other livestock; mineral resources such as petroleum, coal, asbestos, clay, iron, marble, limestone, salt, tin, tantalite, uranium, gold and other precious metals (Uya, 1992 cited in Ekpo, Chime & Enor, 2016). Based on her material and human potentials, Nigeria should be a safe haven for its citizens and investors. The standard of living of its average citizens should be among the highest in the world with low poverty and illiteracy. Unfortunately, the reverse is the case! Particularly, the Niger Delta is the hub of oil and gas production in Nigeria, accounting for about 80% of total government revenue, 95% of foreign exchange and over 80% of national wealth. The oil industry in the Niger Delta is dominated by multinational companies such as Chevron, Texaco, Exxon-Mobil, Total, Agip, Shell Petroleum Development Company, ELF, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Presently, there are over 600 oil fields, 5,284 onshore and offshore oil wells, 10 export terminals, 295 flow stations, 4 refineries and a liquefied national gas project (Lubeck, Watts & Lipschits, 2007).

However, Nigeria's Niger Delta has been a theater of conflicts linked to oil. Although oil, which accounts for 85 percent of federal revenues and 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings (Obi, 2010:473), is mainly produced in the Niger Delta, the region lacks development (UNDP, 2006). This paradox triggered conflicts which began in the 1970s and community agitations against transnational oil companies (TOCs). The issues in contention were environmental pollution, payment of compensation for properties destroyed by oil production activities, and provision of basic social amenities such as potable water, school buildings, health facilities, and the security of livelihoods. From community agitations in the 1970s, the conflict was transformed to full blown insurgency in 2005 (Watts, 2007), as militia groups, which emerged to make political demands such as resource control and self-determination engaged the Nigerian security forces in armed confrontation (Wapmuk, 2012).

Certainly, the security threats from this region became worsened due to the inability of successive governments over the years to show political and practical will to mitigate the sufferings of the people. Rather than demonstrating high level of responsiveness to assuage the fears and agitations of the people

occasioned by the deplorable environmental conditions and capitalists posturing of the political elites and the multinational companies, the Nigerian government exhibited high-handedness by employing military options to subdue the agitations in the Niger Delta region.

Thus, this enabled the militant groups in the region to give credence and moral justification to their acts of criminalities and economic sabotage, and consequently elicited relate support from the local communities. In fact, various narratives on the Niger Delta violence have alluded to the fact that the massive disruption in oil production by the Niger Delta militants has been attributed to feelings of relative deprivation arising from environmental degradation, socio-economic deprivation and poverty (Nwachukwu, 2004:13). Hence, the study intends to unveils the impacts of oil bunkering in the Niger-Delta region on the Nigerian state, and in what ways and manners that the Nigerian government has offers a strong enabling environment for the large scale theft of crude oil.

The specifics of who steals oil are elusive, even in Nigeria. A typical large-scale theft network has facilitators, operations and security people, local and foreign transport, buyers and sellers, and a range of opportunists. Top Nigerian officials cut their teeth in the oil theft business during military rule. Over time, evidence surfaced that corrupt members of the security forces were actively involved. The country's return to democracy in 1999 then gave some civilian officials and political 'godfathers' more access to stolen oil (Maduegbunam, 2008). Therefore, the crux of this study is the examination of oil theft as a dimension of corruption and it impact on national development in Nigeria.

Niger Delta Region and the Agitation for Justice

The Niger Delta covers an area of well over 70,000 square kilometers, covering the greater part of the South - South region and some part of the South East region of Nigeria. It derives its name from the River Niger and is one of the world's largest wetlands and Africa's largest delta. The Niger Delta is one of the largest deltas in the world, probably the third largest on earth. The region is regarded as one of the nine most difficult deltas of the world comparable to the Mekong, the Amazon and the Ganges. It is situated in the central part of southern Nigeria. It lies within latitudes 4 degrees north to 6 degrees north, and longitude 5 degrees east to 8 degrees east (Azaiki, 2007: 1; World Bank Report, 1993: 1; Lie & Akukwe, 2001 cited in Nwogwugwu, Alao & Egwuonwu, 2012). The area has a population of about twenty five million people, according to the 2006 National Census Figures (National Bureau of Statistics, 2006) and more

than forty ethnic groups with links to the linguistic groups of Ijaw, Edo, Igbo, Efik, Ibibio and Oron. It is rich in both renewable and non renewable natural resources such as oil, gas, bitumen, etc, accounting for 95% of the total revenue for the Nigerian government, generated from oil and gas exploration and 80% of national wealth (Brisibie, 2001: 1; Tell, 2008: 33). The NDDC ACT (2000) recognizes nine states, namely; Abia, Akwa - Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and rivers as comprising the Niger Delta. These are the states geographically characterized predominantly to an extent with deltaic features (Kimiebi, 2010).

Prior to the discovery and exploration of oil and gas resources in the Niger Delta region, the primary occupation of the people was fishing and farming. Unfortunately, years of oil exploration and exploitation by the Oil companies, has destroyed the subsistence economy of the people. Testimonies from various quarters lend credence to the claim that environmental degradation occasioned by oil spillage has made life extremely difficult for the local people. The destruction of farmlands, fishponds and rivers had radically altered the economic life of the once self- reliant and productive region for the worst. The region is unique in the Nigerian state based on the fact that it is naturally endowed in abundance with oil and gas which have continued to be the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. However, in the same measure, it has equally continued to be a source of security threats to the Nigeria state. The area is further reputed for accounting for over 90 percent of Nigeria's known oil and gas reserves (Hazan & Horner, 2007:15), which in turn translates to nearly 80 percent of total government revenues, with the estimation that oil has generated over $600 billion for the country since the 1960s (Wurthmann, 2006). Irrespective of the fact that this region generated the substantial wealth upon which the federating states and the central government are being sustained. Paradoxically, it has suffered grievous neglect by both the Nigerian state and the oil companies prospecting in the area as seen in the lack of development, environmental damage, violation of the rights of the people, as well as the emergence of violent conflicts, militancy, among others (Okafor, 2017:440). In this regard, the UNDP (2006) report succinctly noted:… that social instability, poor local governance, competition for economic resources and environmental degradation have taken a toll of the region … The Delta today is a place of frustrated expectation and deep-rooted mistrust … where long years of neglect and conflict have fostered a siege mentally.

Many years of military and authoritarian rule further deepened the economic crisis and impoverishment of the region. The emergence of the late Ken Saro-wiwa led Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), a group formed in 1990 and the struggled led by the group internationalized the Niger Delta situation. The MOSOP adopted the non-violent approach in its struggle to seek redress for the environmental degradation of Ogoni land. It drafted the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) and presented it to the Nigerian government, demanding for rights to representation, religious freedom and the right to protect their own environment. It was in the setting up of MOSOP and the pursuit of its goals that the youth in the region emerged as a distinct force (Obi, 2006:25).

Despite their commitment to the principle of non-violence, the military regime initiated a major and violent crackdown on them, with arrests, burnings, lootings and execution following the murder of the 'Ogoni Four' in May 1994, the military arrested MOSOP members including Ken Saro-Wiwa. The 'Ogoni nine', as they were later known, were held in detention without charges until February 1995, when they were accused of incitement to murder. The four Ogoni elders were tried and executed on 10 November, 1995. After the killing of Ken Saro Wiwa by the General Sanni Abacha led - military government, many members of the Ogoni youth were targeted. This and their arrests and detention served to reverse the Ogoni revolution from its non-violent posture. The hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa indicated clearly that the non-violent approach could not be relied upon to persuade the state and the OMNCs to proactively engage with the Niger Deltans on the salient issues of environmental degradation, neglect, politics of exclusion and other forms of injustice imposed on the region (Wapmuk, 2012).

Following the death of General Sanni Abacha in 1998 and Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999, the youth in the Niger Delta formed armed militant groups for the purpose of advancing the cause of their region. For instance, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), a youth led movement, inspired by the Isaac Boro led Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), declared in the Kaiama Declaration that: "All land and natural resources within the Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw communities and are the basis for our survival." Some of the militant Ijaw youth groups, such as the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), had engaged the Nigerian Military in guerilla like operations. Several other militant groups that sprouted across Niger Delta adopted a militant posture to the struggle in the region. These included amongst others: the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDVF),

Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Coalition for Militant Actions in the Niger Delta (COMA) and Martyrs Brigade (MB). Some of the militia groups were community and warlord based; they include Ijaw freedom fighters, Mobutu Boys, Niger Delta Freedom Fighters, the Atangbata Youths, the One More River to Cross Youth, the Alagbada Youth of Kombo, the Tomgbolo Boys (Osaghae, et al. 2007). Among these groups, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Coalition for Militant Actions in the Niger Delta (COMA), Martyrs Brigade (MB) and the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC), which was later constituted by the NDPVF, MEND and MB, became more prominent (Ikelegbe, 200100:42).

The Niger Delta crisis relates to the agitation over the exploration, control and management of the rich petroleum resources from the region. Nigeria has jettisoned other sources of revenue since the discovery of petroleum in Oloibiri in 1956, resulting in the overdependence on the revenue from petroleum, which provides over eighty percent of the Federation's annual revenue (Ibeanu, 2000:21). Although, the Niger Delta agitation has characterized Nigeria's post-independence political history, its violent component escalated during the protracted period of military rule and into the Fourth Republic between 1999 to date with series of violent activities, including youth restiveness, militancy, kidnappings for ransom, pipe vandalism, oil bunkering, operations of illegal refineries, and bombings (Gwaza, 2017:292-293).

It is paradoxical that despite the abundant wealth the region parades, which happen to be the fiscal basis of the Nigerian state, majority of the people in the Niger Delta live in a state of chronic want. The region epitomizes one of the extreme situations of poverty and underdevelopment in the midst of plenty. Infrastructural development is very low, while poverty and unemployment levels are very high. The poverty level is about 80 percent, and unemployment level ranks 70 percent. Access to basic social amenities is very limited. For example, over 80 percent of the coastal or riverine communities' source water for drinking, cooking and other domestic uses is from polluted rivers, streams and lakes that are equally used for disposing of human and other forms of waste. The upland communities largely drink from shallow wells that are contaminated. Indeed, the Niger Delta falls below the national average, in all measures or indicators of development (Ibaba, 2005:13-14).

Testimonies from various quarters lend credence to the claim that environmental degradation occasioned by oil spillages has made life extremely difficult for the local people. The destruction of farmlands, fish ponds and rivers had radically altered the economic life of the once self-reliant and productive region for the worst (Okonta & Oronto, 2001:108). For instance, the consumption of food and water from this poisoned environment has led to the emergence of new diseases that are devastating to the health of the people of the region. The result of this is poor fecundity and lower life expectancy in the Niger Delta. Recent studies in two core Niger Delta states in Nigeria: Bayelsa and Delta shows that, there is one medical doctor for every 150,000 inhabitants. Oil has wrought only poverty, state violence and a dying ecosystem (Okonta, 2005). Inspired by the existential realities in the region, certain segments of the Niger Delta populace began to make demands on the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies operating in the area to better their lot. But, instead of redress, the people were visited with state violence, repression and brutalization. The invasion and occupation of Niger Delta communities such as Umuechem, Ogoni land, Opia, Tombia, Kaiama, Soku, Odi, Odioma, Agae, Gbaramatu and Oporoza etc by the Nigerian Military captures reality. Therefore, it is not surprising that the consciousness of exploitation, marginalization and disempowerment has made the Niger Delta a region of deep rooted frustration, hence the escalating crisis (Paki & Ebienfa, 2011:135).

The closing decades of the 20th century marked a historical turning point in oil-induced violence in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria. During this period, the region had seen various forms of violence, bloodshed and criminality perpetrated by armed groups, which became fostering sores on the thumb of the Nigerian state, oil corporations and their host communities. Though, violence and armed struggle in the Niger Delta is not entirely new, the mushrooming of heavily armed militias, cults and criminal syndicate groups in the oil-rich region in the last decades of the 20th century posed the gravest threat ever in post-civil war Nigeria. The outbreak of war in the region coincide with the return of Nigeria to civil rule in May 1999, under President Olusegun Obasanjo. The Obasanjo administration, which was initially predisposed to dialogue, changed course of account of the loss of oil rants, the carnage, and the likelihood that the Nigerian state might disintegrate. The administration introduced and pursued a simultaneous carrot and stick strategy, reflected by the implementation of a 13 percent derivation revenue allocation principle and the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), with increased development

projects and the deployment of military troops to crush the rampaging armed militia groups. Inspite of these measures, the tendency to warfare in the Niger Delta region did not change from what it was before the return to democratic governance in May 1999 (Osumah, 20013:245).

Illegal Bunkering in the Niger Delta Region

The crisis is the most complex of all threats to peace and democracy in recent times because of the overdependence of the country on oil products and the internationalization of the crisis. According to Asuna (2009:1): … a significant amount of oil is being regularly stolen through collusion between militant groups, corrupt politicians, and other officials and the proceeds from the sale of this oil has financed a steadily increased sophistication of arms flowing to the militant groups. These groups are now capable of attacking offshore oil installations as well as onshore ones, and even attacking neighbouring countries.

Wilson (2001) observed that the presence of arms and gang groups in the region encouraged oil thelt in the region. The politics of arms struggle and resource control for survival in the region gave rise to oil pipes vandalism and oil theft. With the heavy arms in the possession of the youths, they use same to attack the oil company security personnel and state security agents to enable them invade oil installations and carry out their desired oil theft and this account for incessant kidnapping activities in the region. However, the presence of some international communities and illegal foreign crude oil traders along the Nigerian high waterways provide available markets for the stolen oil from Niger Delta. Today, many institutions from different countries such as Liberia, U.S.A, China, Europe etc are parading Nigeria high seas with the prospect of buying stolen oil from Nigeria, thereby providing markets for the stolen oil and encouraging the oil theft in the region. The presence of illegal international crude oil marketers provide opportunity for large-scale oil theft at the fields and export terminals. This is established in Asuni (2009). Oil theft is not a business of a single individual in the region. It involves different parties at different time.

The collaboration between the state security agents responsible for the security of oil installations and personnel, the government officials involved in the sales and export. Oil theft actors are all those who are involved in and or aid successfully, the activities of oil theft in Nigeria. Katsouris and Sayne (2013) hold that Nigerian crude oil products are stolen in large scale, and exchanged for heavy arms or exported illegally to overseas, with few of the quantities consumed locally. Oil theft is carried out at different levels and quantities. The

study further identified three types of oil theft in Nigeria, with different persons and groups (actors) involved in the exercise. Indeed, the organization of the bunker market trade in the Niger Delta region is a replication of what is whole. The Niger Delta as a matter of fact is the centre of action for all bunkering activities in the country. This is because it accounts for over 90% of crude oil and gas in the country unlike in the developed world where bunkering trade is properly organized with traders, brokers and buyers performing separate roles, these are clearly absent in the region. The root cause of all these is the lack of ocean governance and monitoring by those expected to be in charge. It is sad and disheartening to note that the DPR who are supposed to be in charge of the monitoring the activities are not just empowered to do their work. Proposals and memos submitted to the federal Government on the way forward have not been attended to and the resultant effect is for the DPR to close her eyes and allow illegal bunkerers have their way. Licenses for operation of the bunker trade were last issued and renewed in 1999. It therefore means that those who has been masquerading as legal bunkerers have been doing so illegally.

According to Braide (2001) the illicit bunkering in the Niger Delta has been a source of international business deal whereby a new form of syndicated criminal proclivity is thriving in the form of illegal oil bunkering. Dr. Braide further stated that Nigeria losses about US$ 1 billion per annum as a result of illegal bunkering. He said that between 100,000 and 130,000 barrels of crude oil are lost daily with an international market value of about US $ 6 million daily. This according to him is the equivalent of a very large 95,000 metric tonnes crude oil tanker hijacked every week, right under the watchful eyes of the security men. The Elendu reports by Cary K. Bush culled from an internet article titled: “Nigeria Another Crisis of Governance” alleged that every day the Nigerian economy loses between 150,000 and 320,000 barrels of oil. These are stolen by "bunkerers" who have small tankers which load the oil in the Delta and transship this stolen oil to offshore tankers which deliver this stolen to other West Africa states. Further, inland, illegal tanker trucks load their stolen oil and refined products and drive these into neighbouring countries for black market sale. All the current market price of about $100 per barrel, this amount to a leakage of around $ 15m to $32m a day and this would amount to $11,680 billion a year. Particularly, the illegal bunkering is rife in places like Port Harcourt, Warri, Okrika, Bonny, Akassa and Soku. These are major loading points for the international market. There are many other key sites for illegal bunkering in the more remote areas of the swamp such as Jones Creek and Cawthorne Channel.

The pipeline vandalization and other activities associated with illegal oil bunkering take place in far more diverse areas throughout the Niger Delta. The vast majority of the oil bunkered illegally is destined for the international market but other products such as condensate and refined petroleum can be sold locally. Some direct uses for crude in local industry have been identified, ensuring the existence of a local market, but this cannot utilize the vast amount of crude oil stolen daily and hence the key to the operation is export. The poor state of Nigeria's oil refineries ensures that a significant amount of the exported oil is then imported back into Nigeria, at considerable cost to the country. Indeed, the illegal bunkering of oil in the Niger Delta is widespread and conducted in a surprisingly open manner. Asari Dokubo, leader of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), is often linked with illegal oil bunkering. He claims that there is nothing wrong with him or other Ijaw people carrying out the business of illegal bunkering because the oil belongs to the Ijaw people. He contends that it is in fact those who are awarded oil lifting licenses that are illegitimate dealers because of what he describes as the climate of conspiracy and corruption surrounding the whole business. With arguments like this illegal oil bunkerers try to rationalize their involvement in a clearly criminal activity. Licenses to "lift" crude oil (take from the terminal and sell) are not awarded under clear and transparent rules and are often used to gratify political cohorts and friends and associates of leading politicians. The Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) receives an average of 57 percent of crude oil produced in Nigeria. It has a right to dispose of crude as it wishes. The Government appoints agents to sell its crude oil. These agents are awarded a license to "lift" a defined volume of oil per month and sell it. Illegal oil bunkering is not always totally unrelated to the daily process of lifting legally bunkered oil. There is a strong suggestion that some of the legally approved oil lifters are also involved in illegal oil bunkering. It has long been suspected that legally approved oil lifters take more than.

Another dimension to the issue was that stated by a ship owner and active stakeholder in the industry, Chief Isaac Jolapamo (president of ISAN) who in a presentation before the House of Representatives panel probing the NNPC, stated that there are about fifteen (15) vessels roaming the Nigerian waters doing illegal bunkering. These unregistered vessels are patronized by the NNPC, PPMC and other independent oil marketers who steal the nation's wealth. According to Jolapamo, these vessels and their customers engage in round tripping with refined and oil and stolen crude oil which they sell at rock bottom

prices at the international market. He also alleged that the bunkering vessels change names and random in a bid to beat coastal surveillance by security agents. According to them, these clandestine activities cost the nation about $100 million daily. The Elend (2014) reports also stated that three Nigerian banks over being investigated for allegedly funding illegal bunkering activities. They funded the recently exposed MT Africa pride bunkering activities to the tune of $15 million. The banks reaped supper returns on their investments. According to a senior US Department of Defense official with oversight in the Niger-Delta, he said that "illegal oil bunkering is extensive, pervasive - its part of the culture". The same official stated that the total national theft is much greater than 200,000 barrels a day and by today pricing it is a loss of about $8.03 billion annually. In all, illegal bunkering signifies a huge financial loss to the nation and invariably this has implication for low development of infrastructural amenities.

Theoretical Framework

Within the context of the oil theft and bunkering in Nigeria, the Marxist Political Economy Theory have been found very appropriate to explain the problem investigated by this study. The choice of the theory is influenced by the fact that, it scientifically studies the society as a whole and takes into consideration the interconnection of the social relations, class conflict and the organic relationship between the substructure (the economy) and the superstructure (politics). The approach is seen as a window to understand the laws that govern economic life of the society. It explains the relationship between what man produces and how he benefits from the surplus he produces. Ake (1981) posits that a major advantage of this approach is that, it emphasizes the relatedness of social phenomena, exposing the links between the substructure and the superstructure. Furthermore, the approach helps to penetrate deep into the processes and policies, lay bare their essence and then explain concrete forms of their manifestation. As Marx & Engels (1977) puts it, the history of all hitherto existed society is the history of class struggle.

Thus, the class analysis framework of the approach best explains the endemic struggle between the exploiters (the multinational oil companies and government) and the exploited (the Niger delta people, including the militant groups). Marxists hold that the dominated, exploited and marginalized groups, which paradoxically generated or bears the burdens of creating resources seeks to change the *status quo* when it becomes conscious (Libman & Borisox, 1985;

Marx & Engels, 1977; Luckac, 1968). Therefore, militancy in the Niger delta region is attributed to the consciousness of exploitation being perpetrated against the people, and the struggle to change the *status quo*. This struggle has also created a state of insecurity which has by extension affected Nigeria's economic growth, because of the monolithic nature of the national economy.

Factors Fueling Oil Bunkering in the Niger-Delta Region

Oil bunkering thrives in a climate of instability, conflict, and political chaos. Nigeria offers the perfect operating environment. A large, densely populated, and highly heterogeneous country of approximately 140 million people, Nigeria is a complex mixture of peoples and religions, all of whom have competing claims on an inefficient and corrupt government. There are approximately 350 ethnic groups and the population is divided evenly between Christians and Muslims. Since winning its independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has spent more time under military than civilian rule. Democracy has theoretically prevailed since 1999, under the stewardship of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and now All Peoples' Congress (APC). In reality, informal patronage networks define the political system. Elections have been marred by brazen vote rigging, intimidation, and violence. Although overall standards of governance have improved, Nigeria's economic development continues to be held back by corruption and political instability. Nigeria has traditionally been ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world, according to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index.

The Niger Delta has a long history of militant activity dating back to and beyond the discovery of oil in Bayelsa State in 1956. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, which flourished for a short period in the early 1990s, was the most celebrated example. In the past couple of years, the mantle of resistance against the federal government has been taken up by the Ijaw people, the region's largest ethnic group. Organizations such as the Ijaw National Congress and the Ijaw Youth Council sought to nurture a sense of Ijaw nationalism and have demanded from the government a fairer share of the wealth.

The fight for control illegal bunkering opportunities has also significantly established the violence in the Niger-Delta region and worsened the human rights abuses suffered by its people. The economic cost of these abuses cannot be easily quantified. An NNPC report had estimated that between 1998 and 2003 there were about four hundred vandalisation of the on the company

facilities each year. In seven years these attacks have cost the government $6.8 billion in lost oil revenue. The multi - billion dollar oil industry in the Niger-Delta is however a mixed blessing to its people as many do anything to show for it. It is not surprising that a daring IMF Report had stated that "Oil did not seem to add to the standard of living and could have contributed to a decline in the standard of living". There has been a high rate of militancy and insecurity in the Niger delta starting from 2006. This can be attributable to several factors including the marginalization of the peoples of the Niger delta, environmental degradation, bad governance and inconsistent policy framework, and the divide and rule policy of the oil companies. There are several factors which encourage illegal bunkering in the region. Many factors have been adduced to be responsible for oil bunkering in the Niger-delta region. They include:

The Niger Delta terrain where the bunkerers carry out their activities is surrounded by water and the usually have a field day with their sophisticated weapons and mastering of the interlocking rivers. Some naval officers who attempted to arrest these criminals were shocked at the number of hours the illegal merchants spend underneath the waters and at the dexerity displayed when navigating the barges and ships used to cart away oil stolen from oil installations. Another factor which aids illegal bunkering in the region was the opinion given by Captain Abiodun Omoteso in the interview granted on shipping position in the weekly magazine of Monday 2 January 2008 (Vol. 1 No 12). He had stated that over 80% of the 60-70 vessels that are always lying idle at the coast in Port Harcourt waters are unregisters tankers looking for brisk business. He said that because the new IMO regulation had placed ban on single hull tankers they cannot operate in US, Europe or even South Africa. So instead of their owners getting rid of them they bring them to Nigeria waters and just anchor them. Such vessels usually have about 4-5 man crew and they will be waiting for brisk business like smuggling and illegal bunkering. They simply sneak in and sneak out. They do not have the right to be in our waters and everything they do is totally illegal.

Again, another factor encouraging oil theft is the poor quality of the oil pipeline infrastructure and their close proximity to human habitation. These pipelines are old and need to be replaced. But the NNPC had refused to change them. It is easier for the vandals to easily puncture the pipelines because of their condition. The non - prosecution of illegal bunkerers appears to also encourage them rather than be a deterrent. According to a report by the leadership newspaper of 18th

September 2007 the Nigerian Navy had stated that they only arrest but do not prosecute illegal oil bunkerers. The Nigerian Navy had stated that in between 2004 to 2007, they had arrested 236 ships, tugboats, barges and canoes engaged in crude oil theft, gun running illegal bunkering and other vices out of these, none was prosecuted.

Marginalization, abject poverty and massive unemployment is another factor identified. The Niger Delta communities have remained grossly socio-economically underdeveloped and pauperised amidst the immense oil wealth owing to systematic dis-equilibrium in the production exchange relationship between the state, the Trans-national companies and the people. Enormous money had been derived from oil export but the area has been subjected to severe land degradation, socio-economic disorganisation, increasing poverty, misery, military occupation and bloody violence (Pegg, 1999).

Oil extraction has impacted most disastrously on the socio-physical environment of the Niger Delta oil bearing communities massively threatening the fragile subsistent peasant economy and bio-diversity and hence their entire social livelihood and survival is practically difficult is not impossible. The oil producing communities have basically remained dependent and underdeveloped, persistently dis empowered, socio-culturally marginalised and psychologically alienated. The wealth derived from oil resource exploitation and exports benefit directly only the operators of the oil industry and the bureaucrats in government (Owabukeruyele, 2000). Ejibunu (2007) posits that 'the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta region in 1957 triggered a chain of events that has led to the political and economic marginalization of the inhabitants.

Worst still, despite over forty years of oil production in Nigeria and hundreds of billions of dollars of oil revenue (Oronto, et al 2003), the inhabitants of the Niger delta region especially the riverine (creeks) remain in abject poverty. Poverty level is about 80% while unemployment level is about 70%. They live without even the most basic amenities such as pipe-borne water and electricity (Ibaba, 2005). Mukagbo (2004) opines that "in the Niger Delta, scenes of abject poverty pervade the area, very similar tc what you find in a refugee camp". The distribution of resources from the federation account has been another source of marginalization for the Niger delta. Prior to 1999, the allocation to the Niger delta from the federation account of revenues from oil, decreased progressively as Nigeria became more dependent on oil. In 1960, the allocation was 50%. then down to 45% in 1970, declining to 20% in 1982, down to 3% in 1992. It was

raised to 13% following persistent agitations from the Niger Deltans (Ikelegbe, 2006).

Impact of Oil Theft on the Nigerian State

The impact of oil theft is serious and very harmful. They include the following factors:

One. Loss of human and material resources: Some people benefit from the activities and proceeds of the oil theft in the region, including the actors and non - actors, but many (including individuals and the state) suffer losses from the oil theft. Both the actors and non-actors loss their lives and properties worth billions of naira to oil theft activities, either during a gun battle between the host community youths, militants and state security agents while siphoning the crude oil from the oil pipelines and well heads, or in a fire disaster during the local refinery work by the local oil criminals. In the process, Nigeria records severe loss of lives and properties, as the casualties include the militants, the youths, the properties of the natives of the host communities, security agents, and oil company personnel and installations, as was observed in Rumuekpe, Bele, Obele-Ibaa, Ogbakiri etc communities of Rivers state.

Two. Impact on flow of foreign investments: Illegal bunkering has impacted negatively on the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow into the country is getting leaner, and international oil investors are diverting to cheaper/safer environments, due to the incessant violence in the region. This has affected the region negatively, as it is denying the Niger Delta the chance for more investments that can provide jobs and boost local economy (Okah, 2010). Analysts have identified insecurity in the Niger Delta and weak fiscal policy as key reasons why investors are beginning to leave for more stable business opportunities in Africa (Harper, 2009). An ominous sign for Nigeria's production is slumping international investment. Foreign direct investment, mostly in the petroleum sector, sank to $5.85 billion last year from $13.96 billion in 2006, according to a recent United Nations report (Swartz & Connors, 2010). In a survey of the most attractive economies for the location of FDI, 2007-2009 carried out by UNCTAD at the end of 2006, Nigeria was listed as the 40th most attractive economy for the location of FDI (UNCTAD, 2007), this placed Nigeria in the fourth position in Africa, behind South Africa, Egypt and Morrocco. The reality at the end of 2009 has proved those projections wrong. The inflow of Foreign Direct Investment into the Nigerian economy in 2009 was $8.28 6bn. This figure was $4.72bn lower than the $13bn generated by Angola

within the same period (Ezekiel, 2010). As at the end of 2010, the inflow of FDI to Nigeria according to the World investment report produced by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) had further declined to $61.bn. (Williams, 2011). The impact of militancy on the inflow of foreign direct investment is brought out in graphic detail in the treatise of Timi Alaibe, who posits that; By January 2009, militancy in the Niger Delta had virtually crippled Nigeria's economy. Investment inflow to the upstream sub - sector of the oil industry had dwindled remarkably.

Exasperated foreign investors had begun redirecting their investments to Angola and Ghana as preferred destinations over Nigeria. At that point Angola surpassed Nigeria as Africa's highest crude oil producer. This dwindling investments in the critical oil and gas sector threatened Nigeria's capacity to grow its crude oil reserves as planned .... Clearly, insecurity in the Niger Delta was identified as key reason why investors were leaving for more stable business opportunities in Africa. For example, due to militant activities in the Niger Delta, Royal Dutch Shell by early 2009 saw its production drop from one million barrels per day (bpd) to about 250,000 bpd. ... Sabotage, oil siphoning rackets and kidnappings of oil workers by suspected militants further threatened the operations of the oil companies and exerted immense pressure on the Nigerian economy (Alaibe, 2010). The impact of militancy on the inflow of foreign direct investment is brought out in graphic detail in the treatise of Timi Alaibe, who posits that:

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Three. **Fall in oil revenue to Nigerian State:** The force majeure declaration has resulted in a fall in oil production capacity in Nigeria, with its basic effect on fall in oil export revenue to the state, while a significant proportion of the generated oil revenue is spent on security and environmental pollution challenges in the region, thereby reducing the revenue base of the state. In 2013 alone, Tumini Green (2013) states that daily crude oil production suffered a set-back and staggered between 2.1 million bpd and 2.3 million bpd as against the oil production estimate of 2.48million bpd, with its implication on the fall of crude oil revenue in the first quarter of the year, 2013 to $1.23bi. This trend has continued with its attendant effects on the state, as the Federal Accounts and Allocation Committee (FAAC) has funds to share to various tiers of the government during her allocation meetings, resulting in the inability of the various tiers to pay staff salaries as at when due and pursue other development agenda. Bello (2013) adds that due to the short fall in oil revenue, government finds it difficult to fulfill some of her basic responsibilities to the citizens.

Four. Increase in Fire arms and ammunition: Importantly, oil theft or oil bunkering has contributed significantly to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region as well as the threat to national security in Nigeria. It has been revealed that a day's worth of illegal oil bunkering in the Niger Delta (at 100,000 barrels and USD15/b) will acquire quality weapons to sustain months. Illegal weapons and oil bunkering thrive on each other in that while oil bunkering makes money readily available to acquire sophisticated weapons through black market networks, access to firearms facilitates brazen oil bunkering activities. This has led to the attraction of a swarm of illegal oil buyers and arms dealers to the Gulf of Guinea coast off Nigeria, making the Niger Delta highly volatile. More often, the shadowy foreign partners supply arms in exchange for cash or stolen oil. It provides the armed groups with enormous financial resources and better networks, which in turn enables them to acquire not only weapons but also more and better-quality weapons, making it possible for them to overpower rival groups and use them as proxies. Indeed, many security personnel and law enforcement agents assigned to police the region have lost their lives in the hands of these vandals through the sophisticated weapons in their possession.

The size of the theft requires resources far beyond the reach of local inhabitants or the unemployed youths as it requires strategic support. Powerful interests and highly placed individuals are deeply involved in illegal oil bunkering. Oil

moved on barges and ocean vessels requires at least the tacit approval of some top officers of the Army and Navy and the former militants paid to guard pipelines, boats with massive tanks, vessels, imported arms and ammunition, are beyond the reach of the poor. They are obviously supplied by the rich who stay in their mansions and expect returns from the boys on the field. Similarly, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated that:

Bunkering and related activities are facilitated by widespread corruption. Uniformed officers get their cut for providing information, looking the other way, or actively protecting the bunkerers. Employees of the state oil company can also cash in on their positions by supplying information and access. Even the beleaguered farmers and fishermen who can no longer support their families on the oil-tainted land can profit from the odd compensation claim. Local communities can also be "settled" for allowing bunkering to occur on their land.

This partly accounts for the failure of the government to effectively tackle the problem. Steps must be taken to tackle corruption among security personnel that are supposed to check the illicit trade.

Amnesty Programme: Militating Approach to Crisis and Oil Bunkering

The government and IOCs have tried several measures to check illegal bunkering but to no avail. These include: criminalization, advocacy, pipeline surveillance, and the deployment of the armed forces (JTF). Why have these initiatives not yielded tangible results? The answer is explored in the study. The problem is not the initiatives, but their implementation. Government has not tried hard enough as it has hardly made any sustained effort to faithfully implement its own initiatives. Corruption in the anti- bunkering agencies which aid and abet oil theft, influence-peddling and weak judicial mechanism that impede the successful prosecution of arrested suspects, have combined to undermine government's struggle against illegal bunkering. A crucial omission in this struggle is the failure to effectively address the fundamental socio-economic grievances of the oil-producing communities. As noted, the majority of those involved in illegal bunkering and artisanal refining do so because they are jobless and do not have alternative means of earning a living. Since stolen oil represents an insignificant fraction of global oil trade and oil theft is largely regarded abroad as a peculiar Nigerian problem which does not threaten the world economy and international security, a concerted international action to combat the problem cannot be expected.

By mid-2006, the region had entered a new era, with heightened forceful occupation of flow stations, pipeline vandalism, kidnapping of oil managers, bunkering (oil theft), shelling and exchange of artillery fire, clashes between heavily armed militias and retaliation by armed forced. The momentum that had been generated prompted President Umaru Yar'Adua's administration in June 2009 to announce an amnesty offer to all militias in the region as a strategy for restoring peace (Osumah, 2013:245). Specifically, in order to fulfill the vision and mission of the Niger Delta Development Commission, Yar'Adua government included Niger Delta Master Plan, abandoned during the previous regimes, and it became a good ingredient for proper and long term development of the region. Speaking at the meeting with the Governors of the region and the Board members of NDDC on September 28, 2007 in Abuja, late Yar'Adua said "we believe that if the Master Plan is implemented, it will completely transform the region and will remove all issues that brought about contentions and agitation (cited in Amaraegbu, 2011:210).

It is instructive to recall that the Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta region was unveiled on 25th June, 2009 by late President Umaru Yar'Adua and it ran from 6th August to 4th October 2009 (a period of 60 days). The government hinged the programme on the willingness of the militants to give up all illegal arms in their possession; a complete renunciation of militancy in all its ramifications, and deposition to an undertaking to this effect (Onuorah & Ebiri, 2009:1). For national cohesion, the government implements a Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR) programme in the region. This programme primarily consisted of a declaration of Amnesty for all Niger Delta Militants was in exchange to surrender of their arms and ammunitions within a 60-day period (from August 6 – October 4, 2009). The declaration allows all militants that complied not to be prosecuted for the crimes committed during the agitation that was capable of crippling Nigeria's oil industry. The government established trainings on various vocational skills both at home and abroad and also to secure gainful employments for them on completion of the trainings and become reintegrated into the society, coupled with payment of a monthly stipend of N65,000 to each ex-militant (Dode, 2010).

By official account, about 15,260 militants surrendered their arms at the various disarmament centres and on the whole, a total of 26,760 guns of different types, 287,445 rounds of ammunitions, 18 gun-boats and 1090 dynamite caps were

surrendered (Daily Champion, October 27, 2009). Reacting to this, the then Nigerian Minister of Information and Communications, Professor Dora Akunyili, maintained that:… the success of the offer represents a major breakthrough in government efforts to bring peace and development to the region (The Guardian, 28 October, 2009)

Conclusion and Recommendations

Illegal oil bunkering signifies great danger to the Niger delta region in Nigerian state as it has reduced in the wealth of the nation. As a result of dwindling funds, less funds are available for developmental purposes, such as education project, health and among others. Also, this problem has its roots in corruption, lack of regulatory frame work which often facilitate the illegal business of oil bunkering to triumph.

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made:

Federal Government should encourage corporate social responsibility in the region and manage the sustainable development programmes and activities in a logical manner.

The oil companies should be better educated to have better attitude toward the host community, completely devoid of arrogance.

Extensive re-orientation, sentisation and education prorgamme for the youths to change their perceptions to bunkering so that they too can contribute meaningfully their community and Nigeria at large.

Strengthening the Legal Process by combating corruption and ensuring effective enforcement of the law against oil bunkering in Nigeria.

Strengthening Enforcement Regime by setting up the Rapid Intervention Force (RIF) to combat illegal bunkering.

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